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ABSTRACT
The Battle of the Somme, I9I6, provided a severe and bloody test for 
the inexperienced units of Kitchener's 'new* volunteer armies, among 
them the 38th (Welsh) Division which had been raised by Lloyd George 
in 1914 in an ambitious, but unsuccessful, attempt to create a Welsh 
Army Corps of two divisions.
The Welsh Division went to France in December 1915 under the command 
of Major General Ivor Philipps, Liberal MP and political acquaintance 
of Lloyd George. The division's early training had given it the 
appearance of a smart, well disciplined force and both the divisional 
commander and Lloyd George were confident that it would distinguish 
itself in battle.
After six months in the trenches near Neuve Chappelle, the division 
marched to the Somme where,for its first major attacl^ it was given 
the formidable task of capturing Mametz Wood, on rising ground 
between the German first and second lines. This wood, the largest on 
the Somme, was defended by regular troops and reservists of the 3rd 
Guards Division, the cream of Germany's highly professional army.
The Welsh Division, by contrast, consisted of wartime volunteers, 
unskilled in offensive tactics, untrained in woodland fighting,
A half-hearted first attack failed, as much the result of poor handling 
from above as of German opposition, Philipps was relieved of his 
command. At the second attempt, the division captured the wood after 
two days bitter fighting. But its performance did not satisfy the 
Corps commander and the division emerged from the battle with an 
indifferent reputation - which was not shaken off until the division 
had proved its worth at Pilckem Ridge in 1917*
This study examines the difficulties which it faced at Mametz Mood, 
and shows that the Welsh Division did remarkably well, without getting 
the credit it deserved.
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CHAPTER ONE. The New Armies
Pick those knees up •
Throw those chests out
Hold those heads up
Stop that talking
Keep'those chins in '
Lef, left lef* - lef* righ' lef* - you Private Ball it*s you 
I*v got me glad-eye on.
Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914. Within days, Russia 
and Germany mobilised their forces. On 2 August, news reached the 
British Government that German troops were massing on the Belgian 
frontier. The next day, the Lord Chancellor, Richard Burdon Haldane, 
went to the 'War Office, and, on behalf of the Prime Minister, who 
was also Secretary of State for Y/ar, sanctioned mobilisation of the 
Expeditionary and Territorial Forces. Just after midnight on the 
night of the 4th August the Foreign Office made the following 
announcement:
Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government 
of the request made by His Majesty* s Government for the 
assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected. 
His Majesty* s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports 
and His Majesty*s Government have declared to the German 
Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain 
and Germany as from 11 pm on the 4th August,^
The machinery of mobilization worked smoothly and during the second
week of the war four regular infantry divisions and one cavalry
division crossed to France to take up their position on the French 
%
leftc*^  Two more regular divisions were held ready in Britain. 
Y/ithin the same short period of time the 14 divisions of the 
Territorial Force, Britain*s part-time soldiers, had mobilized 
for home defence. That such a relatively large army - the largest 
ever assembled in Britain at the outbreak of war - could be made 
available in such a short time owed much to the timely reform of 
army organisation which Haldane had himself introduced a few years 
earlier.
The Haldane Reforms . .
Haldane became Secretary o f State for War in Campbell- 
Bannerman's Liberal administration in December 1905. It was not 
a much sought after position. ’Nobody', observed Campbell- 
B a n n e r m a n , ^ 'would touch it with a pole'. This is not surprising. 
The Boer war, which had ended less than four years earlier, had 
exposed the Army's shortcomings for all to see and its reputation 
in the country was still at a low ebb. Furthermore, the new 
administration was wedded to reducing expenditure and money was 
unlikely to be available to finance the necessary improvements.
On the contrary, most members of the Government could be expected 
to demand substantial reductions in Army spending to pay for 
social reforms.
Haldane was not the sort of person to be put off by these apparent 
difficulties. To him, improvements and economies were not mutually 
exclusive. He was confident that by seeking out first principles 
and measuring everything against them - a procedure which had served 
him well during his successful career at the Bar^ - he would be 
able to achieve both objectives. Within three months his ideas 
had taken sufficient shape for him to make a small, but nevertheless 
politically significant, reduction in Army Estimates and to speculate 
in the House of Commons on a form of military organisation in which 
part-time soldiers would play a larger part than ever before. The 
answer, he explained later, was to organise the large standing army 
at home - whose size had hitherto been governed by the need to 
provide drafts for India - into a smaller, but much more efficient, 
striking force and to use p=art of the money thus saved to provide 
an effective auxiliary army of part-time soldiers to back it up 
in times of war. In this way, Haldane reasoned, the size of the 
Standing Army at home could be re duced, and the necessary economies 
found, while the strength and efficiency of the army as a whole 
would be increased.7 Underlying this plan v/as the assumption 
that the Regular Army would play no part in home defence, which 
would be left to the Royal Navy and the new auxiliary forces. But 
although in all his speeches at this time Haldane laid great stress 
on the need for economies, he had other reasons, which he did not 
mention in the House, for seeking to reform the military organisa-
tion. Soon after assuming office he had been warned by Sir Edward 
Grey, the Foreign Secretary, of persistant reports that Germany 
might invade France and it had been suggested to him that he
g
might suddenly be asked what he could do to help. , His strike 
force - later to be known as the Expeditionary Force - was therefore 
designed to meet this possibility. For this, Haldane decided that 
he required six fully equipped infantry divisions - the number 
which could be provided from the existing Standing Army at home 
with a few battalions to spare - and one cavalry division. This 
force was to be capable of being despatched to France within 15 days 
compared with the two months or so which studies had shown to be the 
minimum required, under existing plans, for a much more modest force,
Haldane’s plans inevitably ran into opposition. It was no easier
then, than now, to disband regimental battalions without ruffling
a few feathers and his proposals for reducing the size of the
Regular Array, modest though they were, provoked sharp reaction in
■ high places. Haldane did not yield. ’Our mandate from the country’,
said his Under-Secretary of State, the Earl of Portsmouth, bluntly,
10
’is to spend less money, therefore v/e must have fewer men’. But
Haldane moved more cautiously when he came to organise the existing
auxiliary forces - the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Imperial
Yeomanry - into an effective second line army. Each was jealous
of its independence, and each had powerful supporters in Parliament.
A year passed before he was ready to forward a Bill for the Creation
of the Territorial Array. But although he trod warily, and was
careful to explain his ideas at every step, his plans met with
criticism. During the Second reading of the Bill, Mr Vyndham, for
the Opposition, moved that
This house, though anxious to increase the capacity for 
expansion of the Forces of the Crown in time of war, 
regrets that the government should make proposals which, 
while destroying the Militia, discouraging the Yeomanry 
and imposing new and uncertain liabilities on the Volunteers, 
would not, in a period of national peril, provide an 
adequate force for home defencj^ or prompt support for 
the Regular Army in the field.
Haldane’s main problem v/as the Militia. Although this body had a 
long and honourable history it had failed completely to move 
with the times. Units turned out for training once a year
but otherwise might not have existed. The long period of training 
- 28 days - effectively closed its doors to all except land owners 
and their agricultural workers and there was in consequence little 
potential for growth. It was also expensive since Officers and men 
received full Army rates of pay during training and each unit was 
well supplied with regular Officers to supervise the training. 
Furthermore, there was considerable uncertainty about the role of 
the Militia which had tended over the years to degenerate into a 
recruiting organisation for the Regular Army, providing as it did, 
a means.whereby potential recruits could savour something of Army 
life before taking the final plunge. Haldane sought to regularise 
the position by moulding the Militia into Reserves for the Regular 
Army leaving the Volunteers and Yeomanry to form the basis of his 
Second Line Force. When the Commanding Officers of the Militia 
refused to accept this role, he went ahead without them and the 
old Militia passed away. Its place was taken by the newly created 
Special Reserve, whose members accepted liability for immediate 
call to the colours in times of National emergency, and to which 
many officers and men of the Militia transferred.
The Volunteers and Yeomanry proved less of a problem. The former, 
essentially a middle class organisation based on the drill hall, 
had many of the qualities which Haldane wanted for his second line 
force. They trained regularly and they were cheap, although like 
other auxiliaries they lacked the supporting organisations - trans­
port,medical services etc - essential to a modern army. There
were some grumbles about pay but Haldane promised another $d per
12man per day in camp and they were soon won over. The Yeomanry - 
a privileged force of landed Gentry and tenant farmers who trained 
as cavalry and mounted troops - likewise offered no resistance 
and became, eventually, the mounted troops of the Territorial 
Army.
In spite of opposition by supporters of the Militia, the 
Territorial and Reserves Forces Bill went through almost without 
amendment and became law in August I907. The Terr itorial Force 
came into existence formally in April I9O8 and soon built up to 
14 well organised Infantry Divisions and I4 Cavalry Brigades,
complete with all supporting services. Haldane formed County 
Associations under the Lords Lieutenant to handle recruiting and 
general administration but placed training under centralised 
military control to ensure a de quate professional standards.
No one, however, pretended that this part-time force could be 
made immediately ready for war. Peace time training - 15 days 
a year in camp plus drill hall attendances— could not possibly 
bring it up to fighting trim, so it was planned from the start 
that the mobilisation of the Territorial Force would be a ■ ,
mobilisation not for war but for six months of intensive train­
ing during which time the responsibility for home defence would
13rest mainly with the Fleet, - .
Haldane left the War Office in 1912 but his organisation - 
'my old organisation' as he liked to call it - remained more or 
less unchanged until the outbreak of war as did the plans he.„ 
had drawn up for mobilisation. In essence, these envisaged 
/that at the outbreak of war the first and second battalions of 
each regiment — one at home and the other on garrison duty abroad — 
would be quickly brought up to fighting strength from the reserves, 
the home battalion taking its place in the Expeditionary Force.
Third battalions would be formed from the Special Reserve and 
these would take over the regimental depots and be responsible 
for supplying drafts to the fighting units to make good an estimated 
wastage of 80^ 6 per annum. The Territorial Force would begin 
training and later take over home defence, or, as Haldane. 
confidently expected volunteer for gE^rison duties abroad to 
release regular battalions for,the front. .
Lord Kitchener
In the summer of I914 the British Government, preoccupied with
Ireland and concerned at the possibility of civil unrest at home,
was slow to recognise the danger signs in Europe. Even when it
did, the prevailing mood was to stay out of a Continental war at
almost any price. In the few days of intense diplomatic activity
which followed Austria’s declaration of war on Serbia, Sir Edward
Grey worked hard to prevent war altogether but on 50 July,
suspecting Germany’s motives, he began to turn his attention
15
towards the possibility of war.  ^ The Cabinet however was
deeply divided and incapable of reaching any decision. On
3 August, Sir Edward Grey in a long and rambling speech in the
House of Commons appealed to each member to 'search his conscience'
on the matter of Britain's obligation to France and reach his
ovm conclusion. He dusted down Britain's complicated treaty
with Belgium and spoke of a moral, if not a legal, obligation
to go to that country's defence. He also spoke of Britain's own
self-interest. 'If we were to say that all those things mattered
nothing, were as nothing, and to say that we v/ould stand aside,
we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and
reputation before the world, and should not escape.the most
16serious and grave economic,consequences.' Even those who had
been inflexibly opposed to intervention saw that it was now inevit­
able, and Britain went to war.
Throughout this time, the country was effectively without a
Secretary of State for War, Asquith having combined the post,
temporarily, with the office of Prime Minister after the Curragh
incident some months earlier. It became imperative, therefore,
to appoint a new Secretary of State for War. Asquith himself
favoured Haldane because of his great experience at the War Office
and because he had the confidence of senior officers who would
17be serving in the field. This possibility, however, brought 
loud protests from The Times which was deeply suspicious of 
Haldane's fondness for Germany and all things German. 'It is 
necessary' The Times declared, 'that the Army should be in firm 
hands of a man in whom the public have confidence; and we do 
not know where we can find any head for the War Office who.would 
more completely secure this confidence than Lord Kitchener.'
And with some shrewdness, considering subsequent events. The Times 
added: 'It is true that he has not an intimate acquaintance with
the Army at home ..... (but) Lord Kitchener is a capable adminis­
trator and à first rate organiser. He can also improvise new 
measures and deal faithfully with red tape.'^® Haldane himself 
recommended Lord Kitchener and on 6 August, to the delight of 
The Times and most of the population, Asquith announced that 
Kitchener had agr eed to become Secretary of State for War, 'without
IQ
in any way identifying himself with any set of political opinions'.
Few people in the country had ever set eyes upon Kitchener, but 
his reputation as a soldier and administrator was immense. Conqueror 
of the Sudan, Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, reformer of the 
Indian Army and ruler of Egypt, he had become almost a legend in 
his ovm. lifetime - and the Liberal Government assumed that his appoint­
ment would inspire confidence and improve their own image in the 
public m i n d . A t  first, the general expectation was that the war
would soon be over. Kitchener however brought to his post the
conviction that the war would be fought on a massive scale and 
would last for many years.
The British Army, he firmly believed, was quite inadequate for this
task. He made little allowance for the difficulties which his
predecessors, in time of peace, had faced in shaping an instrument
for war, and he regarded their achievements with contempt. The
Expeditionary Force might be well organised and well equipped but
it was ridiculously small. ' ’I am put here to conduct a great v/ar’
21
he said 'and I have no army*. His view of the Territorial Army
was equally jaundiced. He completely ignored its enthusiasm and
its potential for growth and saw only that it., was under strength, 
partly trained and poorly equipped. Furthermore - and this seemed 
to damn it completely in his eyes - it was a 'Town Clerk' army, not 
fully under War Office control. Kitchener determined, therefore, 
to raise his own armies, building firmly on the foundation of the 
Regular Army.
The New Army
Kitchener had arrived at the War Office on 6th August. That evening, 
Asquith asked Parliament on his behalf 'for the army, power to increase
the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number alreaciy 
voted, by no fewer than 500,000’. The contrast with Haldane could 
not have been more marked. It had taken Haldane more than 18 months 
of persuasion and negotiation to obtain parliamentary sanction merely 
to reorganise the Auxiliary Forces. It took Kitchener less than 
one day to obtain similar authority for the creation of an 
entirely new army of unprecedented size, and the only argument 
put forward in justification was that it was being done 'at his 
request'. Such is the stimulus of v/ar.
It was Asquith's belief that public opinion was not ready for
conscription and Kitchener though he would have liked conscription,
accepted this. On 7 August he appealed for 100,000 volunteers to
22join the Regular Army for three years 'or the duration'. The ,
response was immediate and recruits came pouring in. The normal
recruiting machinery, which had been built to cope with $0,000
recruits a year was swamped with as many in less than a week,
'All the air was ringing with rousing assurances', C E Montague
later recalled, 'France to be saved, Belgium righted, freedom and
civilization rewon, a sour, soiled, crooked old world to be rid
of bullies and crooks and reclaimed for straightness, decency,
good-nature, the ways of common men dealing with common men.
23Yihat a chance!' At the London recruiting office in Great
Scotland Yard the crowd of applicants’was so large that mounted 
police had to be called in to control them. Additional recruiting 
offices were quickly opened to deal with the flood and by late 
August the first 100,000 men had been obtained. During the first 
week in September recruitment was running at the phenomenal level 
of $0,000 a day and it soon became necessary to ask Parliament to 
sanction the addition of another half-million men.
Meanwhile, Kitchener's plans for the army took shape. Little needed 
to be done about the Expeditionary Force except to re-inforce it as 
quickly as possible with other units of the Regular Army. Arrange­
ments were made to relieve troops on garrison duty abroad with units 
of the Indian Army and by this means two more Divisions - the Seventh 
and Eighth.--were made available for France. The Territorial Army, 
however, posed special difficulties. Kitchener has been criticised 
for not using this Force as a basis for expansion but, in truth, 
the Territorial Army needed to be reorganised before it could be 
ready for this role. For although Haldane had prided himself on 
his impeccable logic, the role of the Territorial Army was, in some 
respects, as uncertain as had been that of the old Militia which 
he had been so quick to condemn. The Territorial Army had been 
raised ostensibly for home defence and there was no obligation 
on its members to serve overseas. Haldane however had also seen 
it as a possible means of expanding the Expeditionary Force and 
he had been confident - rightly, as it turned out - that in an 
emergency there would be no shortage of volunteers for foreign
8
service. He failed, however, to take^ccount of the divisive
effect this would have on individual units, each of which would h e
hound to have its proportion of men unwilling, or unable, to serve
abroad. Kitchener's first step, therefore, was to ask the County
Associations to designate some units as home service units 'to
receive all those who cannot volunteer for foreign service into
their ranks' and from which those 'who have not such important
ties at home' would transfer to units selected for foreign service.
Arrangements were also made to match the training to the new role with
the aim of bringing the units designated for overseas quickly up
to a 'standard of efficiency which would enable them to do credit
24
to the British Army on foreign service'. Under these arrange­
ments , the move of Territorial Divisions overseas began in weeks 
rather than months, the first being used to relieve regular troops 
in the Mediterranean, Egypt and India, thus enabling three new 
regular divisions - the 27th, 28th and 29th - to be formed. A 
few selected battalions were also sent to France,in the first 
2 or $ months of the war, to be brigaded with Regular Battalions, 
although full Divisions were not sent until the spring of 1915.
Even so, this was months before the first New Army Division was 
ready to take the same road. Once these decisions had been talcen, 
the Territorial Force was ready for expansion. On 21 September 
1914, County Associations were authorised to form a 'second line'
T F unit for each original unit accepted for Imperial Service ie 
for each unit in which at least GOP/i of the strength had volunteered 
to seiu^ e overseas. By this means, the size of the Territorial 
Force was almost doubled. At first these new units were intended 
for Home Service to replace Imperial units moving overseas, but 
as new recruits automatically accepted liability for Imperial 
Service the inflexibility of the Territorial Force in this 
respect gradually disappeared. By the end of the war, 22 of the
25
28 first and second line divisions had served overseas. This 
expansion took place, of course, in competition with the formation 
of the New Armies and, given the attention and publicity lavished 
upon the latter, it is not surprising that the Territorial Force 
came off second best. For every recruit joining the Territorials,
26 -at least 2 went to the New Armies.
Within days of launching his appeal for 100,000 volunteers,
Kitchener had decided on the framework for his New Armies.
IArmy Orders issued on l6 and 21 August 1914 authorised the addition 
to the Army of 6 infantry divisions, the new battalions of which 
'will be raised as additional battalions of the Regiments of the 
Line and will be given numbers following consecutively on the 
existing battalions of their regiments. They will be further 
distinguished by the word 'Service' after the number eg:-.
8th (Service) Bn The Royal Welsh Fusiliers'. 27
Thus was born the First New Army.^^ Equal in size to the Expedit­
ionary Force itself - 80 new battalions of the Regiments of the Line 
organised into 6 named infantry divisions (eg 9th Scottish) plus 
Army Troops - it was impressive enough on paper. In reality, 
of course, it was nothing more than a collection of raw recruits 
(the 'first hundred thousand' as they liked to call themselves), 
without uniforms or military equipment of any kind. More New 
Armies were formed as the recruits came streaming in. The Second, 
authorised on 11 September was almost an exact replica of the First, 
being made up, in the main, from the second 'Service' battalion 
of the same line regiments. The same distinguishing titles for the 
Divisions were used - I5th Scottish, for .example. A Third New Army 
was authorised 2 days later but the practice of naming divisions 
had to be dropped because recruiting varied so much from one part 
of the country to another. A Fourth New Army quickly followed, 
and then a Fifth, In all, $0 Infantry Divisions were raised in 
this way, every one of which eventually saw service overseas, as 
the following table shows :
10
New Army 
1st (Kl)
2nd (K2)
3rd (K3)
4th« (K4)
5th* (k5)
Divisions
9th (Scottish) 
10th (Irish) 
11th (Northern) 
12th (Ebstern) 
l$th (Western)
14th (light)
15th (Scottish) 
16th (irish) 
17th (Northern) 
18th (Eastern) 
19th (western) 
20th (light)
21st
22nd
2$rd
24th . .
25th
26th
$Oth
$lst
$2nd
33rd
34th
33th
$6th (ulster) 
37th
$8th (Y/elsh)
39th
41st
1st Theatre of War
France 
Gallipoli 
Gallipoli , 
France
Mediterranean
France
France
France
France 
France 
• - France ■ 
France.,
France
France
France
France
France
France
France 
Egypt 
France 
: France 
France 
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
*"Second formations. In April 1915 the divisions of the original 
Fourth New Army were broken up to provide reserves for the other 
New. Armies. The original Fifth New Army then became the Fourth, 
and a ne?/ Fifth v/as added. - .
By the Spring of 1915, the British Army contained 70 Infantry 
Divisions; 11 Regular, 28 Territorial, $0 New Army and a 
Naval Division, and remained more or less at this strength 
throughout the war.^^ The size of this force may be gauged 
from the fact that an infantry division on the move occupied
about 15 miles of road space.30
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Lloyd George and the 'Welsh Army'
In Wales, there was an even greater rush to arms than elsewhere.
With a population less than 5/o of that of Britain as a whole on 
which to draw, the $ Welsh regiments of the line - the Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, the South Wales Borderers and the Y/elsh Regiment 
- each with two regular battalions at the outbreak of war, supplied 
between them no less than 25 infantry battalions for the 5 New Armies; 
7% of the t o t a l . I n  addition, these regiments provided terri­
torial battalions for the Welsh Territorial Division (one of the ■ 
fourteen original territorial divisions) and for its second line 
derivative, as well as a few pioneer battalions for the New Armies 
and numerous infantry battalions for the Reserve, Nor was the 
contribution by Wales confined to units bearing the name of the 
Principality, Welshmen also enlisted in large numbers in the 
various technical Corps; in the Royal Artillery; and in those 
English regiments which had looked for some years to Wales for a
large proportion of their recruits. About half the regiment of
33Grenadier Guards, for example, was said to come from Wales.
Towards "the end of August 1914, when recruiting was at its height
and the Y/ar Office machine was in danger of being overloaded,
Lord Derby offered to raise, organise and administer local
battalions in Liverpool until such time as the army could take
them over. The offer was gladly accepted and the idea soon spread.
Manchester and Liverpool between them produced enough infantry for
34a complete division. Local committees sprang up in other cities 
and tovms to raise similar battalions, which quickly became known 
as 'Pals' battalions. Most of the units of the fourth and fifth 
Kitchener Armies were raised, and provided for, in this way.
This development was to have a dramatic effect upon the pattern of 
recruiting in Wales. Not content with the few 'Pals' battalions 
which had begun to be raised on local initiative in Wales, Lloyd 
George called for a complete 'Welsh Army', a phrase which, however 
loosely used, implied a force of at least two divisions, ie 24 
infantry battalions, plus supporting arms - artillery, transport, 
medical services etc. In an emotional speech before London Wels’nmen 
at the Queen's Hall, London on 19 September 1914, Lloyd George 
roundly condemned the Prussian Junker and called on 'Little Wales'
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to continue to do her duty to 'Little Belgium’ and Russia's
'little brother', Serbia:
I should like to see a Yfelsh Army in the field.
■ I should like to see the race who faced the 
Normans for hundreds of years in their struggle 
for freedom, the race that helped to win the 
battle of Crecy, the race that fought for a 
generation under Glendower against the greatest:
- captain in Europe - I should like to see that 
race give a good taste of its quality in this 
struggle. And they are going to do it.
Until August 2nd, Lloyd George had been an advocate of 
non-intervention. This speech heralded his strong support for ■ 
the war effort and it was widely reported. The Times, not normally 
well disposed towards Lloyd George, was ecstatic, much to the letter's 
scornful amusement. Many of his colleagues thought it the best
speech of his career and Sir Edward Grey is said to have, wept
36 'when he read it.^ This reaction was not unimportant, for
Lloyd George needed the support of his colleagues in overcoming
Kitchener's knov/n hostility towards the creation of large Welsh
(and Irish) formations. The issue was finally decided in Lloyd
37George's favour by the Cabinet. On 2$ September the South 
Wales Daily News announced that the Secretary of State for War,
Lord Kitchener, had 'given his sanction to the formation of a 
Welsh Army Corps, which was urged by Mr Lloyd George in his speech 
on Saturday, and that a Provisional Committee has been formed for 
the purpose of carrying out the project'. Formal approval was 
given a few weeks later.
The first and only task undertaken by.the Provisional Committee 
was to arrange a 'representative Rational Conference of leading 
men' at the Park Hall, Cardiff on 29 S e p t e m b e r . Lloyd George 
went down to raise support for what he now described, with greater 
precision, as a Welsh Army Corps of two divisions. He aimed 
high in quality as well as quantity. 'It is important', he told 
his audience of Peers, Bishops, Politicians, employers and trade 
unionists, 'we should secure the cream of the youth of this country 
for the purpose of this army ...... If we can only get the right
type of young man to join we will have one of the most magnifi­
cent little armies ever turned out of this country. That is
39what we are aiming at'.
13
The conference passed a resolution that Wales,including 
Monmouthshire, should become a military administrative area 
for the purpose of recruiting the necessary men and that 'the • 
National Executive Committee to reorganise the Welsh Army Corps, 
and advise and direct it, be and is hereby appointed'
The reaction of the military authorities was understandably 
cool, much as they would welcome extra recruits. Army life is 
centred on the Regiment: there is no tradition of loyalty to
the army as such, only to the Regiment and the Queen, The 
thought of a national army, particularly one raised by a 
politician,.- and a Welsh politician, at that - naturally filled 
them with unease. The Cardiff Western Mail reported a Welsh 
Officer 'of considerable experience' as saying that 'as he 
understands the proposal ...... Mr Lloyd George is not seeking to
raise a complete Welsh Army Corps in the strict military sense
of the term, but to enlist between 40,000 and 50,000 additional 
men in Wales to supplement the large contribution which Wales has
already made to the Army......You must bear in mind /the officer
sai^ that in the regular army the best morale is the result of 
the esprit de corps which exists in regard to the maintenance 
of the honour of the regiment to which the men belong'. This is 
a curious interpretation to put on Lloyd George's speech.
Lloyd George clearly had in mind an army in the field not merely a
source of recruits to be distributed here and there as the occasion 
demanded. This difference of approach was to be the cause of 
continuing friction between the Welsh Army Corps Executive Committee 
and the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Command over 
the months ahead.
The committee however was not short of support. A certain 
Captain Vaughan, for example, wanted to go beyond a purely 
military force. 'A Corps of 40,000 men is a fine thing', he 
wrote. 'A single regiment of a thousand men /ie one battalion 
of a regimen// armed and equipped for war, is a thing far finer, 
for it would sweep the 40,000 out of existence in a single flash 
if the 40,000 were unarmed and unequipped ..... If vie wanted to 
do a fine thing which will make our work to be of tenfold effect
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41
we must establish a Welsh Armaments and Equipment Company 
(Limited) in order to arm and equip our men ready for action 
Not surprisingly, this bizarre advice was not accepted.
But unfortunately for the Executive Committee, there was no 
immediate rush of recruits to the New Army Corps. Lloyd 
George's appeal had in fact come almost too late. By the 
middle of September there had been clear signs that the recruit­
ing boom was over, and the Executive Committee,, for all its 
propaganda and publicity (which included a visit to Cardiff by 
the Prime Minister) found it hard to reverse the trend. Some 
began to worry that Wales' reputation might suffer. 'Wales has 
a right to feel aggrieved - if you could have grievances in face 
of the present crises', said Sir Ivor Herbert in a recruiting 
speech for the Welsh Array Corps 'that from the National point 
of view she had given generously from her manhood, in the mass of 
the British Army, and that their eafter it might appear that Wales 
had really not done all she could have done, because there were
thousands of V/elshmen in regiments which had no connection what-
4? ■ever with their native land'. ' Later on, however, recruitment
improved, stimulated partly by a special reduction of the minimum
height requirement to 5ft $ ins in recognition of the short stature
of Welshmen and the authorisation of 'Bantam' Battalions with a
minimum height of 5ft., and partly by news of the fall of Antwerp
to the Germans. By the end of the year about 10,000 recruits
had been found. Thereafter , they came in at the rate of some 4,000
a month and by October 1915 the target of between 40,000 and 50,000
45 ■ ■men had been reached.
Units of the Welsh Army Corps
Formal authority for the raising of the Welsh Army Corps by the
Executive Committee had been given by the Army Council to the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Command'on 10 October 1914, ' the
units to be raised as Service battalions of the existing Welsh
44Regular regiments'.. By this time, thanks to the initiative of 
local committees, some units were already taking shape. A.'Pals' 
battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers formed at Rhyl on 2 October,
A similar battalion of the Welsh Regiment raised at Swansea, had 
recruited $47 men by 10 October and was therefore up to one-third
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strength. Another "battalion of the Welsh Regiment, the 1st Rhondda, 
which formed on the 1 October as a E$ battalion, v/as diverted to 
the Welsh Army Corps at the Committee's request. At the end of 
October the Welsh Army Corps boasted'4 battalions, the $ mentioned 
above and a second from the Rhondda Valley. By the end of the year 
this had increased to 12 battalions ; enough to form the 1st Division:
Battalion
No.
l$th RY/F
14th R W
15th RWP . 
I6th RY/P
10th Welsh 
l$th Welsh
14th Welsh 
15th Welsh
l6th Welsh 
17th Welsh
10th SWB 
11th SWB
Battalion
Name
1st North Wales
Caernarvon and 
Anglesey
London Welsh
2nd North Wales
1st Rhondda 
2nd Rhondda 
Swansea
C armarthenshir e
Cardiff City
Glamorgan
/
1st Gwent 
2nd Gwent
Recruiting & Source
Rhyl and surrounding 
areas
Llandudno " it t
Welshmen in London
'Overspill' from l$th 
RWF '
Rhondda Valley
Rhondda Valley
Swansea and district
Glamorgan (mainly 
Porthcav/1 ) and Carmarthen
Cardiff and district
men below the normal 
minimum height in 
Glamorgan
Coalfields and ironworks
of Monmouthshire
Monmouthshire coalfield; 
Brecon
On the 18 November the Committee announced the formation of the 
3 infantry brigades of the 1st Division:
First Brigade (Brig-Gen. Owen Thomas), to be based at Llandudno, 
consisting of the above 4 battalions of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 
Second Brigade (Brig-Gen. R.H.v/, Dunn), to be based at Rhyl, 
consisting of 4 battalions of the V/elsh Regiment ; the 2 Rhondda 
battalions, and the Swansea and Carmarthen battalions.
Third Brigade (Brig-Gen Ivor Philipps), to be based at Colwyn 
Bay, consisting of the 2 battalions of the South Wales Borderers, 
and the Cardiff City and Glamorgan battalions of the Welsh 
Regiment
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Two of the new brigadiers, Owen Thomas and Ivor Philipps IIP were 
founder members of the .Executive Committee. The fomer- certainly, 
and the latter, probably, owed his promotion (from Colonel to 
Brigadier) to Lloyd George. Prances Stevenson records a meeting 
at the War Office between Lloyd George and Kitchener at which Lloyd 
George suggested that the man whose name he thought might be put 
forward for the appointment of a General for the Nqrth Wales 
Brigade would not be at all suitable for the post, *L agreed 
and asked C /Lloyd George/ if he had anyone in mind. C suggested 
Colonel O.T. and K rather fell in with the idea. He asked where 
the Colonel was, and when he heard he was in the building, sent 
for him and appointed him Brigadier General on the spot. C said 
it was a most dramatic touch, and very magnanimous on K's part as 
he must have known that it was the Colonel who had been supplying 
C with complaints about the War Office and the Welsh Army Corps.
C was very pleased with the appointment. The new Brigadier seemed 
dazed at the sudden e l e v a t i o n , '
The evidence that Lloyd George had a direct hand in the appointment 
of Ivor Philipps is less clear, although subsequent events leave 
little room for doubt. Within two months of becoming a Brigadier- 
General, Ivor Philipps received a further promotion to Major General 
in command of the 1st Division of the Welsh Army Corps, ihis was 
certainly Lloyd George's doing. 'I have seen Ivor Philipps and 
confirmed Gwil^ m^i' s appointment with him if P. gets the Generalship 
of the Division', he wrote to his wife, 'Have seen K about that 
how and think it will be all right'.
Ivor Philipps had been Liberal MP for Southampton since 1906.
Even allowing for the acute shortage of experienced regular officers, 
it seems remarkable that a politician who had ended his full time 
military career, in the Indian Army, more than 10 years before, should 
receive such rapid promotion to high command. Some clue to the 
choice may perhaps be found in an entry which Prances Stevenson 
made in her diary almost to the day on which Ivor Philipps took 
up his Divisional Command. Prances Stevenson records that 
Lloyd George had mentioned to her a great kindness sho^ vn to him many 
years earlier by Ivor Philipps' elder brother, Lord St Davids.
At a time when Lloyd George's political and financial prospects
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were at a low ebb, Lord St Davids had offered/to lend him £500.
'C was mightily touched’, she wrote, ’for he said the.man had - 
nothing to gain from this generous off er, nor could he knov/ that 
C would ever be in a position to repay him. But although C did 
not accept the offer, yet he has never forgotten St. Davids’ ■ 
generosity and St. p-will never ask him for:/anything in vain’
The move to the North Wales coastal resorts began in December
1914. In London, the officers of the London Welsh battalion
(the 15th R\W) were given a banquet to wish them ’God-speed’.
Lloyd George found time to be present in spite of being heavily
preoccupied with Cabinet business. He was, he said in proposing
the toast, 'proud to be President of the bat "talion, and still
more proud to find among the list of officers a young officer
called Captain Richard Lloyd George', He also hoped that 'there
would soon be another Lloyd George among the Lieutenants of the 
50battalion', this latter being a reference to his younger son 
Gwilym, who transferred to the battalion a few weeks later.
On 31 December the citizens of Cardiff turned out 'in their 
thousands' to give a send off to the Cardiff City battalion 
which had broken its journey at Cardiff Station on its way from 
Porthcawl to Colwyn Bay. The reception.at the end of the journey 
was equally enthusiastic. The Cardiff City battalion and the 
1st Gwent were met at Colvyn Bay Station by tovm dignitaries 
and the clergy and were given, according to the Western Mail,
'a hearty reception', ■ The town was gaily decorated in their 
honour although this was hardly noticed in the pouring rain. At all 
three resorts the growing army of men was comfortably billeted 
by the sea. Hardly conducive to good training, their officers 
thought, but much appreciated by the troous. 'We are in clover*
51some of them said 'and cannot wish for greater comfort'.
After 2 months marching and drilling - mainly on the sea front 
before a crowd of interested spectators - the units acquired 
enough 'soldierly bearing' to make a full scale review worthwhile. 
Lloyd George went up to inspect the $ brigades and was suitably 
impressed. 'One of the most magnificent spectacles I have ever 
seen', he is reported as saying. Prominent in attendance were 
his 2 sons Richard and Gwilym, acting as aides-de-camp to
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52Generals Philipps and' Thomas respectively.
About this time, too, other Divisional Troops were building up 
to full strength. Two Artillery Brigades,of four batteries each 
were based at Pwllheli; another at Criccieth and a fourth at 
Portmadoc - all 40-50 miles away by road from the Divisional HQ at 
Colwyn Bay. They had no guns, of course, but practiced limbering 
up using pairs of old bus wheels fastened to long poles. Also in 
the Pwllheli/Portmadoc area were four companies of troops forming 
the Divisional supply train, and three Field Ambulance units, although 
the latter moved up to Prestatyn, and nearer to the Infantry, early 
in March, Three Field Comoanies of Engineers were even further
55away, at Abergavenny, on the South Wales’ border.
But even as Lloyd George was enjoying his moment of minor triumph 
reviewing the infantry in Hprth Wales, the writing for the Army 
Corps was on the wall. By the end of February it appeared to the 
Executive Committee that they would have the greatest difficulty in 
completing the second Division unless there was greater co-ordination 
of recruiting in Wales for the Regular Army, the Territorial and 
the Welsh Army Corps, and unless there was a concerted effort to 
get into much closer touch with the sources of recruits. They 
therefore proposed to the General Officer, Commanding—in—Chief 
Western Command that strong recruiting agencies should be estab­
lished in each county and that attempts should be made to work 
out; in conjunction with the local employers, quotas for each
county, of men who could be drawn into military service without
5Ainjury to the industrial effort,^' This imaginative proposal - 
which anticipated the official scheme for Rational Registration -
drew a sharp response from General Kackinnon, in which he gave vent
to his feelings about the Welsh Army Corps:
At present the Welsh Army Corps is looked upon as a unit 
. and apart from any other Welsh troops, and orders have been 
given that all men who enlist in Wales are to go to the 45^d
Division /then the official Army designation for the l_st __
Division of the Welsh Army Corps/ in preference to /other__/
Service battalions. Pals battalions have been raised; the 
men are billeted in popular seaside resorts, and the Welsh 
Army Corps has been boomed by some of the most influential 
gentlemen of Wales, and last and by no means least, has had 
the personal advocacy of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
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This outburst reflected the GOC's concern at the grooving difficulty 
of maintaining the special reserve battalions which served the 
Welsh battalions fighting overseas, and which were being starved 
of recruits by the Welsh Army Corps. With growing losses at the 
Front it was now becoming more important to provide drafts for '
overseas than it was to form new battalions. He therefore proposed 
that all recruits enlisted for the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the 
South Wales Borderers and Welsh Regiment should be sent to the 
Special Reserve battalions of the Regiments to be drafted by the
55military authorities 'where their services are most required’.
At first, the Committee resisted, holding firmly to the view that
there would be a marked falling off in recruits if the idea of a
second Division were to be abandoned. By July, however, the
Committee was having second thoughts and decided to submit to
decision by the Army Council, Tivo months later, on 27 October
1915, the Committee assembled in London to hear the Army Council’s
verdict relayed by Lord Derby. In the words of the Committee’s
report; ’His Lordship stated that the War Office view was that
new units were not then desirable, and that every effort was
necessary for the recruitment of reserves, - With this declaration,
which the Committee accepted, recruiting for the Welsh Army Corps
56was brought to an end’, . >
Ironically, this decision came at exactly that point in time when 
the original recruiting target of between 40,000 and 50,000 men 
had been achieved. The 1st Division (by this time officially 
renumbered the 30th (Welsh) Division of the (Hew) 5th Hew Army) was 
fully up to strength and receiving final training in the south of 
England in preparation for its move to France, Seven other battalions 
had been formed, including a complete brigade of 4 ’bantam’ battalions 
which was later trans f erred to the 40th Division as the Welsh 
Bantam Brigade, The other tliree battalions passed to the Reserve,
Thus Lloyd George’s dream of an Army Corps of two Divisions 
just failed to c o m e  tru e , IB he had launched his campaign 
a few week3 earlier, when recruiting was at its height, the result 
might have been otherwise, although, of course, at the expense 01 
other Kitchener armies. Still, the creation of a complete Division
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was in itself no mean achievement, and with its descriptive title 
and all Welsh make-up, the 38th (Welsh) Division carried with it 
something of the aura of Lloyd George’s ’Welsh Army’. V/hether it 
would he ’one of the most magnificent little armies ever turned out’ 
remained to he seen, ' . . .
Training
In the opening months of the war, the Army faced the enormous task 
of training and supplying the vast new army of recruits, to bring 
it up to something like the pitch of the highly trained professional 
armies of the continental powers. Kitchener’s critics maintained 
that it could not be done in time to affect the course of the war, 
pointing out that in peacetime, when the Army had little else to do, 
it took a year of hard training to turn a new recruit into an effective 
soldier. Now the army was fighting the greatest war of all time 
and recruits were pouring in at well over a hundred times the peace­
time rate,. Even those most closely involved found it a daunting 
experience, ’I was shocked by my first contaot with the New Army’,
Guy Chapman v/rote later, ’It was not so much the circumstances; 
the dull little south coast watering-place in winter; the derelict 
palazzo, the headquarters, facing on one side the tumbling grey sea 
and on the other an unkempt field; it was not the men in shabby 
blue clothes and forage caps with, their equipment girt about them
with bits of string; it was the obvious incapacity and amateurish­
ly
ness of the. whole outfit which depressed’.
The most immediate problem was the shortage of regular officers.
Those on leave from India were diverted at once to the New Armies 
and some others were kept back from the Expeditionary Force itself, 
but these were nothing like enough for the task. The first New.
Army did reasonably well in getting about 6 ser^ ring regular officers 
per battalion (ie about 6 per thousand men) but the subsequent 
Armies were luclcy to have one regular officer in each battalion.
The growing units of the 38th Welsh Division were no exception, and 
in common with other locally raised units of the fourth and fifrh 
New Armies, had to resort largely to the use of ’dugouts’ - retired 
ex-Regular officers — and part-time soldiers of the old militia, 
though the commanding officers of some battalions came from the 
Indian Army, The division also had more than its fair share of
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Liberal MPs: Ivor Philipps in command of the division, and 
Hamer Greenwood and David Davies in command of the 10th South 
Wales Borderers and 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers battalions respect­
ively, All three attended meetings of the Executive Committee which 
was influential in filling senior posts, ’You will be glad to hear 
that .... I have recommended the appointment of Major V. Paget 
(retired R.H.A, ) for the command of 1st Division Field Artillery’ , 
the chairman. Lord Plymouth, v/rote to Lloyd George at one point, 
’•....Major Paget is my brother-in-law’,^ ^
Almost all the junior officers were new to the Army although some 
had received training of a sort in the Officer Cadet Corps which 
had been introduced into Universities and Public Schools in I9OS 
by Haldane. It was mainly on these junior officers and the NCOs 
that the burden of training fell. The Warrant Officers, Company 
Sergeant Majors and other NCOs were found wherever possible from among 
reservists and re-enlisted men so as to inject as much experience 
as possible at this level. To increase their numbers, the War Office 
raised the upper age limit for re-enlistment to fifty^^ but even this 
failed to meet the demand and many promotions had to be made from among 
the raw recruits. One new recruit to the ’Swansea’ battalion, who 
had had some drill instruction in the Police Service before joining 
the Army, recalls being sent to Aldershot on a short, intensive course 
of Physical training and Bayonet fighting. On his return to the 
battalion he was immediately promoted to Sergeant and given the task 
of imparting to the new recruits all that he had learnt at Aldershot.
Uniforms and rifles were in short supply while industry geared itself up 
to meet the enormous increase in demand. Most of the Kitchener armies 
made do with ’horrible blue serge uniforms impossible to smarten up 
save by brass buttons’, but for the Welsh Division the Executive 
Committee provided uniforms of brethyn-llwyd (a brown Welsh cloth) 
which were fairly smart and therefore popular. Rifles remained scarce 
however for over a year except for antiquated or sub-standard models 
suitable only for drill purposes. Other equipment was also in short 
supply and this severely limited the training programme. But
22
in spite of the difficulties; the shortage of equipment and the 
obvious lack of professionalism at all levels, the men were keen 
to learn, ’Friday was a very bad day for drilling or any out­
door exercising for the men of Cardiff City battalion at Porthcawl’ 
reported the Western Mail on 5 December 1914» ’From early morning • 
there were gales and heavy downfalls of rain that would drench one 
to the skin. The men have been in some cases drilled in small 
companies in the shelter of some high walls.’
Y/ith the move to North Wales, squad drill and platoon and Company 
training began in earnest. ’At the height of 'drilling time it is 
a great sight on the ’front’ and one which attracts a large number 
of townspeople to watch the evolution', said one newspaper report.
’At one point the elementary stages of ’forming fours’ etc. are 
in progress under the direction of one of the most exacting of 
instructors. In another position, squads are.being instructed in 
the mysteries of Swedish drill. Again one comes across a group of 
men being put through a course of signalling and at other points 
various other exercises are being carried out.’
Rifle drill and bayonet practice soon followed. Some instruction 
was also given in the theory of musketry (rifle-shooting), although 
firing practice itself had to be deferred until suitable rifles were 
available. There was also plenty of route marching, so much so 
that in April 1915 the Cardiff City battalion, reporting a shortage 
of socks, blamed this on the amount of marching done by the battalion. 
Sometimes there would be mock battles at Company or battalion strength, 
in which a small force would be sent off in advance to take up defensive 
positions and scouts sent out to find them. A dummy attack would 
follow. On 15 December 1914, C Company of the London Y/elsh battalion 
defended the Little Orme at Llandudno against two other Companies of 
the battalion which had been ordered to attack that position. ’The 
men embarlced upon their task with enthusiasm and negotiated many 
difficult obstacles in their endeavour to gain the heights’ reported 
the Western Mail, ’Colonel Fox-Pitt, the Commanding Officer, who 
acted as umpire, was loud in his praise of the way the men had carried 
out the operations, especially the way they took cover
But these high-jinks fell a long way short of the preparation needed
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for large scale v/ar, and the disadvantage of having the divisional 
troops scattered across Wales soon became evident. Brigade training 
was difficult enough while the men were still in billets, but 
Divisional manoeuvres were impossible. By April 1915, there was 
already talk of a move to the Army training grounds in the south 
of^  England, but this had to be delayed until the camps there had 
been vacated by the first and second New Armies. These divisions 
began to move to France in July and by the end of August all units 
of the 38th (Welsh) Division (as it had then become) were gathered 
together in the Winchester area where more advanced Brigade and 
Divisional training could begin.
The shortage of rifles however, persisted until November. In the 
last few, frantic, weeks before embarkation each man was put through 
a hurried course on the rifle ranges on Salisbury P l a i n , T h e  
Artillery was even less fortunate and had to delay its departure 
for France a few weeks in order to get in its first practice firings 
with live shells. / . ■
During these final stages of preparation, younger, more experienced 
officers - including some who had been wounded at the front and 
since recovered - took over many of the Brigade and battalion 
commands, A young, 37 year old Brigadier, L.A.E. Price-Davies, 
who had won the VC in South Africa took over the 1st Brigade (now 
renumbered the 113th) from Owen Thomas and another Regular Officer, 
T.O. Harden, who had taken the 1st Battalion of the Welsh Regiment 
to France with the Expeditionary Force, took over the 2nd Brigade 
(now the 114th) from Brigadier Dunn, The old 3nd Brigade (the 
115th) however remained under the command of H-J Evans, also a 
Regular Officer, but in his fifties, who had been promoted from 
command of the 4th District, Western Command, to succeed Ivor 
Philipps when the latter had taken over the whole Division,
On 29 November 1915, the 38th (Welsh) Division turned out in the 
rain for a drive past by the Queen - an inspection which signalled 
the end of its period of training, lYhat shape was the Division in, 
on the eve of its departure for France? One participant, who 
remembers the occasion very well, has this to say:
'On the whole, training turned us into a fairly smart, 
well disciulined and efficient force; morale was good,
. ' 2,
but I realised later that the training v/e received 
was related more to earlier wars, such as the South 
African Campaign,^rather than the one in which we were 
about to engage'.''
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CIL'iPTMl TWO. France
You can hear the silence of it : 
you can hear the rat of no-man’s-land
Early on the morning of 1st December 1915, the leading battalions
of the 38th (Welsh) Division marched through Winchester en route
for Southampton, Le Havre and the British Expeditionary Force in
France, the rest of the Division, less Artillery, following
closely behind. They marched ’in an even drive of wind and rain,
into a late afternoon that found us on a Y/et quayside, staring at
a grey ship on a grey sea. Rain in England, rain in the Channel and
rain in France; mud on the Hampshire Downs and mud in the
unfinished hors e-standings in Havre where we sheltered from the
]_
rain during the hours of waiting for a train’, On the outskirts 
of Southampton the bedraggled troops had made an attempt to 
smarten themselves up and the bands played bravely as they 
marched through the streets towards the docks. They need not have 
bothered: after l6 months of war the sight of troops marching
through the port had become so familiar to the inhabitants that
2 'nobody took any notice. But in spite of foul weather and rough
seas, there was no mishap and by 6th December 1915, 526 officers;
15,447 other ranks ; 1,580 horses and mules; 526 horse-drawn
vehicles; 515 bicycles; 70 lorries; 36 cars; 29 motor cycles and 
other parapheraiia of the Division were safely delivered to a 
billeting area 10 miles south of St Omer and about 30 miles behind 
the British front lihe,^ Here they joined the XIth Corps in the 
centre of the British 1st Army. -
They moved at a time when the British supreme command,' both civilian 
and military, was in disarray and British strategy in turmoil. 1915
had been a year of failures, principally in the Dardenelles where 
an attempt to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula had ended in disaster, 
but also on the Western Front, particularly at Loos in September.
Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Ghief of the British 
Armies in France, was in disgrace for mishandling that battle and 
for allegedly falsifying his dispatches. On 19th December he was 
recalled to England and replaced by General Sir Douglas Haig, commande'
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of the 1st Army, who was told by Kitchener to .'keep friendly 
with the French' and look upon General Joffre 'as the C-in-C 
in France, where he knew the country and general situation well'.'
Kitchener himself, however, viels in difficulties having lost the 
confidence of his Ministerial colleagues oh the War Committee 
who increasingly resented his autocratic and secretive ways - with _
some justification - and vrho now regarded him as a bad adminis­
trator.^ Lloyd George angled for his dismissal on the grounds 
that he had given the Cabinet wrong advice about the Balkans and 
.had so mismanaged the, munitions problem that failure on the Y/estern 
Front had been inevitable; but Kitchener was still popular in the 
country and Asquith, as head of a shaJiy coalition could hardly take 
/this step without risking his own position as Prime Minister,
Instead, he prevailed upon Kitchener to allow the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff to take his place as the Government's 
chief adviser on strategy, and suggested the appointment of Sir Y/illiam 
("Wully") Robertson - French's Chief of Staff in France - to the
post of CIGS.^ Robertson himself was encouraged to dictate his own 
terms before accepting office.? This he did to such effect that 
T/hen he took up his appointment on 23rd December Kitchener was reduced : 
to a mere figurehead, responsible mainly for recruiting and for 
clothing and feeding the Army.
Although military operations in I915 had ended in failure, the out- 
look was not entirely gloomy, if only because Britain's military 
strength was increasing rapidly with every day that passed:
. Like Pilgrim relieved of his burden, the nation, freed 
from the incubus of the Dardenelles, entered on the year 
1916 on a note of hope. The nev/ armies were rapidly putting 
on final touches and preparing to taice the field. Many 
divisions had already been in action and oehavea creciitacly.
Others were fully prepared to outshine them. All over the 
country nev; munitions factories were sprouting up like 
mushrooms. Before the year was half spent what seemed an 
inexliaustible supply of heavy guns, light guns, machine-guns 
and munitions of all kinds would be pouring into the various 
theatres of war,^
Both Robertson and Haig were confirmed 'Westerners' oelieving tnam 
the Germans could be beaten only in Belgium or France. All other 
theatres of war were, therefor e to be subordinated to the Res tern 
Front. During 1915, the British Expeditionary Force in France and
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Flanders had grovm from 10. division to 37 (including two from 
Canada).,^  organised in three Armies, two (the First and Second) 
holding a continuous lino from Boesinghe in Belgium, to Loos in 
the coal fields of Northern France, a third (the Third Army) being 
sandwiched between the French Sixth and Tenth Armies in an area 
north of the river Somme (see map l), Robertson was determined 
that as many divisions as possible should be released from 
England to serve in France and that they should be joined by 
troops from the Dardanelles. To this end, he moved quickly to 
discontinue all engagements on the Gallipoli peninsula. The 
Cabinet, after wrestling with the problem for weeks, had already 
decided (2_7th December) that the beach-heads at Suvla and Anzec 
should be evacuated but that Cape Helles, the southermost tip of 
the Peninsular,- should be retained. Robertson would have none 
of this and ordered complete evacuation. He also instructed 
Murray, the Army Commander in Egypt, to reorganise the troops 
which were pouring into Egypt from Gallipoli and transfer them
to France. Within 6 months, 9 of the best divisions in Egypt had
' 6 
been sent to France. •
On 28th December 1915 the War Committee accepted 'in principle' 
that British forces should be concentrated on the Western Front 
and that preparations should be made for a major Franco/British 
offensive in the spring to be carried out simultaneously with 
offensives on the Russian and Italian fronts - as had been 
recommended by an Allied Military Conference at Chantilly on 
8th December. Some members of the Committee hovrever had serious 
misgivings and the War Committee made it clear that their assent
11should not be 'construed as authority for undertaking the offensive'.
In spite of this reservation, Robertson was well pleased and wrote
immediately to tell Haig the good news. On 13th January, however,
he had to ■'/Trite again, to say that the decision had been further
watered down by the Cabinet:
There is a fairly strong party in the Cabinet opposed to 
offensive operations on your front in the spring or indeed 
at any time. One wants to go to the Balkans, another to 
Baghdad, and another to allow the Germans to attack us. I 
have used all the arguments you or any other soldier would 
use, but not with complete success. In the War Committee 
decision I sent you a few days ago you will see that we are 
to make every effort "to prepare" for offensive operations 
in the spring. In the original draft I put we were to make
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every effort to "imâertake" offensive operations in the 
spring. By a decision made today (which I will send you 
later) it has now been watered dov/n to the effect that 
we are to "prepare" for offensive operations in the spring 
"but \7ithout committing ourselves definitely to them".....
_/some/ people are trying to get their.way by urging us 
to wait for an offensive until we are at ...full strength, 
which they say will not be until well on in the summer and 
amongst these people is Lloyd George who has received 
the Prime Minister’s sanction to meet the French Munitions 
and Artillery Authorities in France to discuss with them 
how much ammunition they think they will want before they 
can be ready and how long it will take them to get it. j.2 
This is the thin end of the wedge for deferring matters.
But whatever disagreement there might have been about the date —
of the coming offensive, the die was.cast. 'Once authority was
given to concentrate our maximum strength on the Western Front.: '
to quote Lord Hankey, 'it was inevitable that the generals would
lose no time in setting to work. Very soon our available resources
would be irretrievably committed to and locked up in that theatre.
Vdien the French, Italians and Russians were all attacking on their
respective fronts it would have been morally impossible for the
British Supreme Command to refuse the co-operation of the forces
at their disposal in accordance with the plans of the Allied 
1 ?
generals'.^ In I916 then, the weight of Kitchener's Armies was • 
to be thrown against the Germans; and they would fight on the 
Western Front. It was against this background that the $8th (Welsh) 
Division, with many others, moved to France.
Annrenticeshiu in the line
The strength of the XI Corps when the 38th Division joined it in 
December 1915 was three divisions: two in the front line and one
in reserve. The Guards Division held the left sectors of the Corps 
front north of Neuve Chapelle, and a New Army division - the 19th 
(Western) - the right sectors south of the village. The 46th (North 
Midland) Division, a Territorial unit, was in reserve at St. Venant 
having come out of the line a few days before the arrival of the 
38th. The 46th Division was destined to move, against the general 
flow, from the Western Front to Egypt as soon as the 38th had gained 
sufficient experience to talee its p l a c e . For the first four weeks 
in France, the 38th Division trained continuously for this role, both 
in and out of the line:
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They did short route marches each day along winding ways 
saturated with continued rain. They did platoon-drill and 
arm-drill in soggy fields behind their billets. '
They were given lectures on very wet days in the barn......
...... lectures on military tactics that would be more or
less commonly understood. Lectures on hygiene by the medical 
officer, who was popular, who glossed his technical discourses
with every lewdness......... -
One day the Adjutant addressed them on the history of the 
Regiment. Lectures by the Bombing Officer: he sat in the
straw, a mild young man, who told them lightly of the efficacy 
of his trade; he predicted an important future for the new 
Mills Mlc.IV grenade just on the market ; he discussed the
improvised jam-tins of the veterans, of the bombs of after
the Marne, grenades of Loos and Laventie - he compared these 
elementary, amateurish, inefficiencies with the compact and 
supremely satisfactory invention of this Mr Mills, to whom 
his country was so greatly indebted.
He took the names of all those men who professed efficiency 
on the cricket field - more particul arly those'who claimed 
to bowl effectively - and brushing away with his hand pieces
of straw from his breeches, he sauntered off with his sections
of grenades and fuses and explanatory diagrams of their 
mechanism stuffed into the pockets of his raincoat, like a 
departing commercial traveller. ' — .
Bombing practice followed, at which most men. threw at least one '..live 
bomb, and those selected to be bombers threw 10 or more. ■ Faulty 
grenades and occasional carelessness in handling made this a hazar­
dous exercise in which a number of officers and men were killed, 
and others wounded. On the rifle ranges, the most accurate shots 
were trained as snipers,while the rest practised to bring their 
firing rate up to 15 aimed rounds a minute - a fairly respectable 
rate of fire even if well short of the '30 rounds a minute which 
could be achieved by the best of the regulars in the pre-war army.
The troops also learned the basics of field engineering; how to 
revet earthworks with sandbags and timber; how to drain and pump; 
how to construct new traverses and dug-outs. Machine-gun crews 
fired live ammunition for the first time and elementary training 
was given in gas warfare, all officers and men passing tlirough a 
tunnel of gas wearing the primitive gas helmets of the time.^“
BetT/een Ipth December 1915 and 6th January 1916, battalions v;ere 
attached in turn to units of the two divisions in the front line to 
learn at first hand the business, of trench warfare,W\ni Griffith 
has recalled his own feelings as he faced this initiation into the 
brotherhood of the trenches:
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Less than 24 hours stood between us and the trenches; there 
were two kinds of men in the world - those who had been in 
. the trenches, and the rest. Y/e were to graduate.’from the one 
class to the other, to be reborn into the old age and experience 
of the front line, by the traversing of the miles over the fields 
' of Flanders.
The journey itself, across the chumed-up, waterlogged valley of
the Lys brought its ov/n unpleasant experiences; unwelcome encounters
with rotting corpses, huge rats and ice-cold water:
Appear more Lazarus figures, where water gleamed between 
dilapidated breastworks, blue slime coated, ladling with 
wooden ladles; rising, bending, at their trench dredging.
They sÿeak low. Cold gurgling follov/ed their labours. They 
lift things, and.a bundle-thing out; its shapelessness sagSi 
From this muck-raking are singular stenches, long decay 
leavened; compounding this clay, with that more precious,
patient of baptism; chemical-corrupted once-bodies.......
You step down between inward inclining, heavy bulged, walls 
of earth; you feel the lateral slats firm foothold.
Squealcing, bead-eyed hastening, many footed hurrying, 
accompanying each going forward.
Break in the boards - pass it back; The fluid mud is icily 
discomforting that circles your thighs .......   .
By Contrast, the front line with its signs of homeliness, of a 
culture 'already developed, already venerable and rooted' was 
almost welcome: - -
You turn sharp left; the space of darlmess about you seems 
of different shape and character; earth walls elbow at you 
in a more comnlicated way. You stand fast against the parados.
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And you too are assimilated, you too are of this people....
The troops soon became absorbed in the dull routine of trench 
life: stand-to at davai and dusk in case the enemy attacked in the
half light, and at other times repairing trench walls, renewing
barb-wire, carrying stores and ammunition, and 'scheming against the
20
insidious attack of water'. This work was mainly carried out at
night:
Most of the daytime - invariably in the morning - the three 
lines, firing, support and reserve, were deserted except for 
a few sentries leaning against the parapet with periscopes 
handy, and for a s-niper or two; everyone else was under 
cover, silent and, if possible, asleep. At dark a whole 
population suddenly appeared, literally out of the earth; 
working parties would set about draining, digging and wiring; 
from the rear, along the communication trenches, would come 
parties carrying rations, water, ammunition, sandbags, duok- 
boards, and everything imaginable. Behind these again the 
roads were packed with horsed wagons and limbers.... Then
37
dav/n would approach, the trench garrison would stand 
to arms and he dismissed to begin another similar day.
On Christmas. Eve, the divisional Artillery began to arrive from
England and by 27th December the division was complete. At '
about this time, the 46th Division-departed leaving the 58th
Division as Corps reserve. By 6th January, the training programme
was over and two complete brigades - the 113th and 114th - moved
into the line to relieve a brigade each of the Guards and 19th
Divisions, still under the watchful eyes of experienced divisional
commanders, but responsible, for the first time, for whole sectors
of the front line system. On 12th January, the 113th Brigade had
its first break with routine, making a demonstration with 200
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pljn.vood dummy soldiers 'as if getting over the parapet'. They 
repeated this ruse three times to represent three waves of infantry, 
while the artillery heavily shelled the German front line which,' 
hopefully, the German infantry would be leaving their dugouts to 
defend. 'From the increase in rifle fire, it appears he 
reinforced his front line' wrote the XI Corps diarist, anxious 
to attribute a measure of success to this elementai?y piece of 
deception.
A few days later, the Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. R Raking,
satisfied with the division's progress, ordered Maj.-Gen.Philipps
to prepare to take over the line from the 19th Division with these
words of approbation:
Now that the 38th Division has completed its training 
in the trenches, and is about to take over half the front 
occupied by XI Corps, I wish to convey to all reinks my 
appreciation of'the manner in which they have set to work 
to makethemselves efficient ........
Although,of course, a good deal remains yet to be done, 
this Division has made more rapid strides towards efficiency 
than any of the several new formations that I have had
under my command during the campaign.
Now that you are about to take over part of our line I 
anticipate with confidence that you will dominate the enemy 
in front of you; that your offensive spirit will be far
superior to his; that your patrolling, sniping, trench
mortar, bombing, infantry, Artillery and Engineer work will 
be better than his, and that with careful reconnaissance 
work and preparation you will shortly be able to continue 
the raids on his trenches which have alreafly been carried 
i out with such success by other Divisions of the Corps."'"
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This emphasis on ascendancy, on ‘dominating the enemy in front’, 
was common to most Corps and Army Commanders at tnat time, but 
General Haking - whose penchant for offensive action was to cause 
unnecessary slaughter on this front some months later - was a 
particularly enthusiastic proponent. The theme recurs time and 
time again in the records of his frequent conferences with his 
divisional commanders, as being the most effective way of 
'breaking the enemy's morale'* Junior officers were sceptical 
and wondered if the losses were justified. The troops had fow 
illusions, preferring like the Germans and the French, a quiet 
life. The whole philosophy became something of a joke amongst 
them. Thus David Jones, describing the chaos which ensues when, 
unwittingly, a party of Royal Welsh Fusiliers runs into a German 
patrol at night:
The thudding and breath to breath you don't know which way, what 
■ way, you count eight of him in a flare-space, you can't find 
the lane gap in the wirj^ - the one way - you rabbit to 
and fro, you could cry.......
' 25
We maintain ascendancy in no-man's-land.
Atithis time, however, there ivas a need to conserve ammunition 
for the coming offensive and extravagant raids and bombardments 
were discouraged. The line settled into a quiet routine of 
sporadic gun fire by day and reconnaissance patrols by night, 
perhaps two or three on each divisional front. 'Nothing to 
report', is a frequent entry in the 33th Division's diary. The 
following extract from a 38th Division Tactical Progress Report
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describes a typical day in January I916. Map 2 shows the area
to which the report refers:
Tactical Progress Report No.7 
Right Sector
In the fog, this morning, two Germans were seen approaching 
one of our posts in the Right Sub-Sector. The post with 
considerable restraint lay low, and "Hands upped” the Germans 
when they were within 30 yards. From reports at present to 
hand, it would appear that these men belonged to the 33th Guard 
Reserve Regiment......
A listening post at BOAR'S HEAD located enemy's working party
half way across no-man's land..... Yesterday morning at
"STAND-TO" the Germans opposite COPSE ST-MOLE ST. were heard 
to shout several times "Who are you" while those further on 
our right shouted "You bloody murderers" . This is eminently 
satisfactory if it indicates that our activity has been giving 
them a thin time... The H.G. mentioned in yesterday's report 
to be firing from the high breatwork behind BOAR'S HEAD did
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not reply to the fire of our Machine Guns for the first time.
An officer was observed through a telescope to come up and 
speak to a man near point 95^ /nnidentifiable on Trench map»/.
This officer wore a coat closed up at the throat and had a 
high straight collar. His cap v/as shaped like ours, and was 
blue in colour with a red band round it. His face seemed 
very pale but he looked particularly clean.
Left Sector
A searchlight which we attempted to use on the ORCHARD did 
not prove a success, the beam not being apparently powerful 
enough. Strong wire is reported /south of the ORCHARÿ: two
whistles were heard playing in the German lines. 'I've got 
my eye on you' appeared to be the tune. An Officer's patrol 
from THE NEB saw no signs of enemy work, but a strong enemy 
patrol was seen. Mining is suspected near THE NEB, the men 
reporting the noise being experienced miners. Necessary 
precautions have been taken and investigations are being made. 
Opposite the Right Sub-Sector, Left Sector, the enemy appears . 
to occupy an old communication trench in NO I/iAN'S LMD as VERY 
lights were seen coming from it. Opposite the Left Sub-Sector, 
the enemy were laughing and talking and playing mouth organs 
during the early part of the night. An officer's patrol from 
THE NEB followed the willows to the v/ire near the German trenches. 
They heard talking and posts being hammered in, apparently in 
front of the parapet for wiring. On receipt of the patrol's 
report, machine gun fire was opened on the spot.
But although the front line was quiet, it was not without its hazards.
Snipers' bullets and shell bursts on the one hand, and continual exposure
to mud and water on the other, took a steady toll. During March and
April the Swansea battalion alone drafted in 100 officers and men
each month to make good its losses, equivalent to over 1,000 men a
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month for the v/hole division. On 1/th May, the division lost one 
of its most senior officers, Lt, Col. E. Gaskell, commanding officer 
of the l6th Welsh which he himself had raised at Cardiff, 
was mortally wounded when visiting his men at Colvin Crater. His 
second in command. Major Frank Smith took over the battalion.
In mid-February, the Guards Division transferred to the Second 
Army, The 19th Division replaced them in the line and the 35th 
Division joined the Corps to bring it up to strength. At the same 
time the Yihole Corps front moved southward, the 38th (Welsh) 
Division moving to Festubert where, for a while, they had all 
three brigades in the line together. At Festubert the ground 
was low lying and completely waterlogged. The front line consisted 
of a series of isolated posts called 'islands', each held by a
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garrison of from 10 to 20 men. These posts were all that lemamed 
of a once continuous front line which elsewhere had been washed away, 
On the islands themselves the parapets were barely bullet-proof and 
dug-out accommodation was almost non-existent. Communication trenches, 
were flooded and the islands could/only be approached across open 
ground. As the German front line was only 200 yards away and on 
slightly higher ground athe islands were virtually isolated by 
d^ay. 100 yards behind the islands was a rudimentary support trench, 
again barely habitable, and further back the Old British Bine (of 
,1915) where most of the front line fighters were garrisoned, though 
even this was broken dovai in places and sadly lacking in dug- 
outs. In these miserable conditions, the Welsh Division spent 
most of its time draining the land and improving the defences.
There was little time for fighting,
A few weeks later, however, the Corps absorbed the 33zd Division,
extending its frontage further southward to Cuinchy and Auchy
beyond the-.La Basses Canal, and the 38th Division again shuffled
south, exclianging the watery wastes of Festubert f or slightly
drier, but less restful surroundings at Givenchy. Givenchy was
notorious as an area which was actively mined: . _
A mile to the north stood Festubert, where man fought more 
with water than with his f eIlow men; a mile or two to 
the south the trenches were dry, but on Givenchy hill there 
was no respite from fire or flood, nor from that devil's 
volcano of a sprung mine. To stand in tne trencn was uo 
wait to be blown up, without warning, from below, or 
. to be struck down by some terror frgm the sky in the 
shape of a bomb, grenade or shell.
The activity was not'however all one-sided and at his conference 
on 8th March the Corps Commander congratulated the .38th Division 
on their activity on the Gr/EIIClïY fronts which had resulted in 
their gaining‘ascendency’over the enemy ,
At the end of March, the 39th Division, newly arrived from England, 
joined the %I Corps for training; bringing its total strength up 
to 3 divisions, all New Army, reflecting the preponderance of
New Army divisions in France at that time. The diagram on the 
following page shows the Corps dispositions on 3th April I916 - 
9 brigades in the line, holding sectors from.Petillon, neac? Baventie, 
in the north to Auchy in the south. Six brigades were in reserve.
' ^ ' 42 \
RESERVE FRONT LiNu
LES L/\UR.^ ER5
HoAcr&D GRN4GE
NEUVE ChappelUu 
SGln^ . Edi:
FERME Dü Bois 
SElnF.P^ cle
L O C O ‘.4
(ocuTn- 5  /\prji
C'i o m Wa r î)û ir^ ' f \ f  V^4 )
43
Surprisingly enough "brigades in reser\’e did very little formal train­
ing. Days were spent.on fatigues or on working parties or what was 
euphemistically called ’company training' which seldom went beyond 
platoon an(^ company d r i l l s . A  few specialists, and those chosen 
to raid enemy trenches, were given an opportunity to practice their 
skills, but not until the end of May were brigades asked to train 
larger formations,and by then the coming offensive was only weeks 
away. Part of the difficulty was that the British army unlike 
the French, did not have a civilian work force so that infantry out 
of the line tended to be used as casual labour. This and the 
generally exhausted state of the men after a spell in the front 
line, left very little time for serious offensive training.
Plans for the Allied offensive in 1916
10 days after succeeding Sir John.;French, Haig attended a conference 
at the French headquarters at Chantilly, Not much was said about 
future plans for an offensive but the following day, 30th December 
1915, Joffre wrote to say that he was studying, amongst other 
possibilities, the launching of a 'powerful offensive' south of the 
River Somme and he asked for views on the possibility of British 
forces joining in with a simultaneous attack on a wide front north 
of the river. He also pressed for the relief of the French 
Tenth Army (see Map l) since its interpolation between the British 
First and Third armies would make for difficulties during such an 
a t t a c k , H a i g  was not anxious to use his divisions both to 
relieve the French army and to mount an offensive and he replied 
saying that although he would arrange to relieve the left of the 
French 10th Army he could not offer to do more without further study. 
On 20th January however General Joffre proposed a different arrange­
ment, which was that the British should attack on a large scale 
north of the Somme as a preliminary to a weighty, and decisive, 
joint attack at a place and time still to be determined. In a 
letter sent a fev/ days later he explained that what he had in 
mind for the British was a 'wide and powerful offensive with
a minimum of fifteen to eighteen divisions' during April, followed,
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possibly, by another in May elsewhere on the British front,
Haig would not agree and at a conference at Chantilly on 14th 
February, Joffre gave way. 'He admitted', Haig wrote in his 
diary, 'that attacks to prepare the way for the decisive attack
and to attract the enemy's reserves være necessary, but only some
10 to 15 days before the main battle., certainly not in April for
35a July attack. This seemed quite a victory for me'. At the 
conference both Generals agreed that the French and British forces 
should attack 'side by side' with the French left placed just 
north of the River Somme,
On 21st February, the Germans pre-empted the Allied plans by 
attacking the French at Verdun, Haig immediately undertook, to 
relieve the whole of the French Tenth Army which he did by putting 
in extra divisions to extend the First Army southwards and the 
Third Army northwards until they met near Vimy, A Fourth Army 
was formed under General Sir Henry Rawlinson on 1st March and this 
took over the front previously held by the right of the Third Army,
The German attack at Verdun did not weaken Joffre's enthusiasm for 
a joint offensive although it threw the date back into the melting 
pot, Joffre's attitude was in marked contrast to that of the War 
Committee in London which still showed a distinct lack of enthusiasm. 
Prompted by Robertson, Haig submitted his plans to the committee 
in early April and asked for authority to proceed, Asquith 
consented but with such obvious misgivings that Haig, at a, 
meeting with Kitchener and Robertson some days later, was prompted 
to ask 'Did H.M.'s Government approve of my combining with the 
French in a general offensive during the summer ?' He did not 
get a clear answer even then; just an indication that some 
prominent members of the Cabinet were on his side, but this was
54enough to enable him to proceed with his plans.
By early May, Joffre was beginning to think again in terms of
July f o r  the opening of the coming offensive, although he
realised that this was probably the earliest date on which it
could begin. Haig would have preferred an even later date to
allow the British army to build up to full strength, but when he
mentioned this to the French Commander-in-Chief on 26th May, Joffre
reacted violently, as Haig recorded in his diary:
I said that, before fixing the date, I would like to indicate 
the state of preparedness of the British Army on certain 
dates and compare its condition, I took 1st and I5th July 
and 1st and 15th August. The moment I mentioned August 15th. 
Joffre at once got very excited and shouted that 'The French
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Army would cease to exist if we did nothing till then'. The 
rest of us looked on at this outburst of excitement, and then 
I pointed out that, in spite of 15th August being the most 
favourable date for the British Army to take action, yet, 
in view of what he had said regarding the unfortunate condition 
of the French Army, I was prepared to commence operations on 
the 1st July or thereabouts. This calmed the old man,^^
Elsewhere, other Allied plans were coming to fruition. On 4th June, 
the Russians struck with great initial success on a 200 mile 
front against the Austrians, and the Italians, after regaining 
the initiative against an Austrian attack which had threatened the 
Venetian plapa, counter-attacked fiercely in mid-June, also with 
success. As the Germans were wearing themselves out at Verdun 
and the British and French were preparing to attack, with great 
superiority in numbers, on the Somme, it was beginning to look as 
though the plans laid at a Chantilly conference in December 1915, 
would be crowned with success. 'Never before, and never again 
till the fall of I9I8 ' writes Guinn, 'were the prospects of a . 
military victory over the German Army so attractive'.
The 58th Division moves South
Meanwhile, there was a heightening of activity all along the 
British front line. In April, May and early June, the 58th Divis­
ion carried out at least 6 raids on German trenches, some successful, 
some not; depending in the main on how effectively the wire had 
been cut beforehand. In most places, the opposing lines were 
too close together for the wire to be cut by shell fire and the 
favourite device was a 'Bangalore Torpedo*, - a long tube filled 
with explosive, which, when it worked (and frequently it did not), 
blew a wide path through the wire capable of admitting men three 
abreast. On 10th May, the 10th Welsh placed a torpedo success­
fully in position under the German wire, but, instead of exploding, 
it fizzled away in full view of the German line and, as the 
Bangalore Torpedo was supposed to be secret, an officer and a 
lance-corporal had to risk their lives trying to retrieve it,
37As all element of surprise was lost, the raid was called off.
Even when the wire was successfully cut and the German trenches 
entered, there still remained a hazardous return to the British 
line amidst heavy retaliatory fire from rifles and machine guns,
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and it was at this stage that most casualties were suffered. A 
typical example v/as on the night of 7th/8th May when 4 officers 
and 51 NCO's and men of the 15th R.WF (London Welsh) raided German 
trenches north of Farquissart, v/here the division had moved in 
the middle of April. On this raid, the wire v/as cut quietly by 
hand by an advance party and the raiders, divided into two parties 
to increase the chances of success, reached the German parapet 
unobserved:
Right and Left Parties filed into action. Both were 
surprised at the number of enemy in adjacent Bays and along 
- the traffic way. The Germans stood sandwiched together, some 
without equipment and arms, v/hich seems to show^  that they 
did not constitute the ordinaiy Garrison of the trench.
Although they could offer no opposition, they blocked the 
way p.f the Bombers, Realising that there was a delay in 
front, some Bombers on the Parapet, started to Bomb successive 
Bays to right and to left from the ditch, outside the 
Parapet, In this way they helped to clear up the Bays in 
front of the Bombers who were in the trenches bombing around 
the Traverses, Right Party also encountered a narrow 
Communication Trench also congested with Germans, The enemy 
in this trench was vigorously bombed and his casualties were 
severe,,.,.. Left Party also found progress slow on account of 
I  the density of the enemy. At one point a general rush was
made by the occupants of a Bay to a Bomb store but before
. they could secure any Bombs,,., they were put out of action 
by our leading Bombers, Numerous attempts to gain this Store 
by the enemy were prevented by steady bombing. Enemy casualties 
were hea\ry here,^#
After 13 minutes of intense activity during which more than 200 bombs 
were thrown and 50 yards of German trench occupied, the raid 
commander. Captain Ov/en, decided to with dr av/. Until then, neither 
raiding party had suffered a single casualty but as they retired, 
machine-guns and rifles opened fire on them and 2 young officers
and one man were lost; 2 men were killed and  ^wounded. Neverthe­
less, it was estimated that at least 50 Germans had been killed or 
wounded and the raid was judged a success. When the news reached 
General Making he v/as full of praise for the * fine fighting spirit’ 
of the 15th RiYF and he rated the raid as the third most successful 
on his front since early December, On his recommendation the 
battalion was mentioned in Sir Douglas Haig’s despatches.
A few days later. General Making made plans for several raids to 
be carried out simultaneously in early June, Divisional Commanders 
were asked to make proposals for a ’somewhat larger raid than usual’ 
though each v/as unaware that other divisions were also involved,
.
By this means, Haicing hoped to keep from the Germans any inkling 
that something special was afoot. At the last moment, however,
Making was told by First Army that * the Commander-in-Chief has 
decided that, in view of the proximity of offensive operations on 
our part and the consequent undesirability in these circumstances 
of disturbing the front and expending a quantity of ammunition 
which might otherwise be better employed, the simultaneous raids 
which were to have been carried out on the night of the 3rd/4th June 
are not to take place. The Corps Commander was however allowed
to make such raids as he ‘considered desirable from time to time*, , 
and acting on this, the 38th Division launched three raids against 
the German line in quick succession. Two, by the 14th R«F and 
14th Welsh Battalions were successful in reaching and entering 
the German trenches, but the third, by the 10th Welsh, was held 
up on the wire, three men being killed and all four officers and 
-.nine men wounded. A few’nights earlier, however, the 10th Welsh, 
with a great burst of activity had in one night dug themselves half 
way across no-man * s-land. This trench - known thereafter as 
Rhondda sap - was to be used a month later as a launching point 
for an attack on the German line, during the ill-fated battle of 
Fromelles.^^
This flurry of raids by the 38th (Welsh) Division marked the 
division’s farewell to XI Corps. On 11th and 12th June the two 
infantry brigades in the line, and the Divisional artillery, were 
relieved by units of the newly arrived 6lst Division and the 38th 
marched south to prepare for the Battle of the Somme, After 7 months 
in the trenches, the trek south through the hills of Artois brought 
a great sense of freedom and momentarily of relief from the cares 
of T/ar:
The marching in good air was leaving its mark on us all,
• ' and we were gaining a release from the humiliating burden of 
mud that had clogged our pores and turned our thoughts into 
our own greyness, Yfe walked with a swing, we sang on the 
march; men began to laugh to argue and even quarrel, a sure 
sign of recovery from the torpor of winter. We were going 
into battle, true enough, from which few of us could hope to 
return, but at the moment we were many miles from war, and 
the hedges were rich with dog-rose and honeysuckle; v/e were 
seeing the old flowers in a new c o u n t r y , 42
On 15th June the Division joined the XVII Corps (Third Army) at
St. Pol and moved into a new training area just East of the village,
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where they began to train seriously Tor offensive action. The 
training programme which GîîQ had issued a few weeks earlier laid 
down that divisions were to train not only to attack on a large 
scale against enemy trenches and strong points but also to follow 
through once the enemy defences had been broken:
Divisions must, therefore, be practiced in the passing of 
a fresh body of attacking troops through the troops which 
- have carried out the first assault and have reached their 
objective. The second attack will be carried out on the 
same principles, the assaulting columns going straight 
through to the objective in successive l i n e s . 43
Considerable emphasis was also placed on the importance of learning 
to deal with the unexpected, for Haig was well aware that during 
their period in the trenches' junior officers had become accustomed 
to acting only on detailed orders.
On 16th June, the division dug a system of trenches on which to
practice its manoeuvres. Here they were at a disadvantage,for,
being in GHQ Reserve and not yet destined for any particular part
of the front, they were unable to reproduce the features of the
ground over which they would eventually fight. This was to prove
of great significance later, for when the division eventually
went into battle they were faced with a large, heavily defended
wood and woodland fighting had not been included in their training 
44programme.
For the first 6 days of training, platoons and companies practised 
going into the attack over open ground in extended lines, or waves, 
each successive wave carrying the action forward as the one in front 
supposed itself in check. This was followed by 3days of brigade 
and divisional manoeuvres in which, for the first time in France, 
all arms joined - artillery brigades, machine-gun companies,signallers, 
engineers etc. - aided by spotter aircraft from the Royal Flying 
Corps,
The exercises were carefully planned. Each unit was given a definite 
objective and detailed orders were issued by Divisional and Brigade 
Headquarters, Axmex C shows the orders issued by the 113th Infantry 
Brigade (Brig,-Gen. Price-Davies) for a mock attack on trenches represen­
ting the German 2nd and 3^d Lines on 24th June. For this attack,
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which was supported by a full artillery brigade, the. 113th used 
all its available forces - two battalions in the initial assault 
and two for the capture of the final objective. Though the absence 
of an enemy must have lent an air of unreality to the proceedings, 
the Brigade Staff were nevertheless given an opportunity to handle 
large forces in the open and to practice the difficult manoeuvre 
of passing one battalion through another. As the attack proceeded, 
unit commanders were deliberately confronted with unexpected 
difficulties. Some, for example, were told that they had advanced 
into their own artillery fire; others that formations to right or 
left had been held up by the enemy and were in need of assistance. 
Until appropriate action was taken, the unit concerned was deemed
to have suffered casualties on a scale determined by watching
. 4 5umpires.
Some valuable lessons were learned during this all-too-short 
period of training - particularly about the importance of main­
taining good communications between infantry and artillery. But 
the technique of advancing in extended lines, proposed by GHQ 
and practised diligently at St Pol, was to prove less than effective 
on the field of battle.
On 26th June, the men still exhausted from their strenuous activi­
ties on the training ground, the Division marched west of Doullens, 
where they came under the command of GOG II Corps, in GHQ Reserve, 
and then south-eastwards to Toutencourt which they reached on 
30th June - the eve of the Battle of the Somme, Here they waited 
for orders, prepared to move at 6 hours notice.
The Battle of the Somme
As we have seen, neither the ground nor the date for the coming 
battle were of Haig’s choosing. He would have much preferred an 
operation in Flanders which at least offered the possibility of 
turning the German flank to the sea. There were however two 
drawbacks to such a plan; firstly, the King of the Belgians was 
opposed to offensive action on his soil^^ and secondly, an attack 
in this area v/ould, perforce, be on a much narrower front than 
any combined offensive with the French. The Somme in fact seems 
to have been chosen by Joffre for this very reason, for it had 
few other strategic advantages. It is true that Joffre, in
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advocating this particular part of the front, had drawn attention 
to the fact that it had been quiet for some time - thus implying 
that the Germans might not be on the alert'^ -^ but that was in 
December, since when the Germans had been busy all along the front 
preparing their defences. By 1st July the defences north of the 
Somme presented a very formidable obstacle, Tliroughout the plan- 
' ning of the Somme battle, Haig kept up his sleeve an alternative 
plan for an attack at Messines in Belgium should the French effort 
on the Somme dwindle as a result of the heavy fighting at Verdun, 
but it was never used.
North of the River Somme, the British line ran, as Map 3 shows, 
westward from Maricourt to Fricourt and then northward to Thiepval 
and Serre, cutti ng through fertile chalk downs reminiscent of the 
hills of southern England, though more open and unfenced. Around 
Fricourt and Mametz the hills are steeper and more wooded than to 
the north where the ground rises and dips with ’graceful gentleness*. 
Along this front. General Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose Fourth Army 
v/as to make the main assault for the British, had by 1st July 
j assembled five Corps; eleven Divisions in the line and five in 
close support. In addition there were two divisions and one cavalry 
division in Army reserve. On the left, the British Third Army was 
to cooperate with a simultaneous attack by two divisions on Gomme- 
court. On the British right, the French Sixth Army sat astride the 
marshy valley of the River Somme with three Corps: the XX Corps
north of the riverj the I Colonial Corps immediately south of the 
river and the XXXV Corps on the far right. In all,. five divisions 
would go into the attack along a front of 8 to 9 miles compared to 
eleven divisions along 15 miles on Rawlinson*s front. The burden 
of the attack would therefore fall on the British.
Haig’s plan v/as to break tlirough the German line between Maricourt
and Fricourt and drive northward, rolling up the Germans behind the
Fricourt-Thiepval front and creating an ever-widening gap in the
German defences as British troops attacking on that front joined 
49in. Although Rawlinson was to command all Fourth Army forces 
during the opening assault, Lt.-Gen. Gough was standing by with a 
mobile force, drawn from Fourth Army and GHQ Reserves, to spearhead 
the advance once the defences had been breached.
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Experience at Neuve Chapelle and Vimy Ridge in 1915 had taught the 
Germans that a single line of defence, even v/hen reinforced by a 
network of subsidiary trenches, v/as inadequate to withstand the 
increasing strength of British and French artillery. In the summer 
of that year they had begun to construct, along the whole length o f 
their front, a second defensive position, as strongly fortified 
as the first, about two miles behind the front line. Early in 
1916, faced with the possibility of a Franco-British offensive on 
the V/estem Front they started to build a third line, two miles 
further to the rear again which was completed in May I9I6. The 
front trench itself was considerably strengthened and the garrison 
protected from artillery fire by the insertion of thick traverses 
at frequent intervals to contain the blast from exploding shells.
Deep dug-outs were also built, 20 or 30 feet dov/n into the chalk.
In front, the barbed wire had been massed into two great belts, 
each 30 yards deep and 15 yards apart, interlaced with iron stakes 
and tall trestles to form an impenetrable barrier 3 to 5 feet high.
In the hilly country of the Somme, the whole system of defence, 
traversed by interconnecting trenches and provided with an excellent, 
deep-laid telephone network, rose ’tier upon tier’ on the hillsides,
50to a distance of 4 to 6 miles behind the front line.
Because of the strength of the German defence, and the limited 
range of his own field artillery, Rawlinson in his early planning 
decided not to attempt to carry the second line at the first 
assault but to limit himself to an advance of about 2,000 yards 
on a line from Mametz in the south to Serre in the north while 
maintaining strong defensive positions on either flank. He would 
then reform, and push forward another thousand yards to capture 
the German second line between Pozieres and Grandcourt where 
it came nearest to the front line. During this stage he would
51again stay on the defensive on both flanks.
This v/as not good enough for Haig. He v/as convinced that the 
Germans would fall back in confusion and wished to take advantage 
of their disarray to capture not only their front line but also 
much of their second position, and their heavy artillery, during 
the first day. He also v/anted a big push on both flanks, to 
capture the high ground around Montauban on the right, and west 
of Miraumont on the left, which he regarded as particularly 
important for the development of subsequent stages of the battle.^2
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In spite of Rawlinson's worries about the distance to bé covered
by the infantry and about the difficulties of cutting the wire
in front of the second line, this is substantially the plan
finally adopted (see map 4). The details of the opening attack
were thrashed out at Fourth Army headquarters on 12th June, as
was the broad outline of subsequent phases of the battle. Four
days later Haig put in writing his own view of the v/ay the battle
should develop after the first day. The attack, he wrote, should
Ix; '  ^- '
pressed eastward far enough to enable our cavalry to 
push through into the open country beyond the enemy's 
prepared lines of defence. Our object will then be to 
turn northwards taking the enemy's lines in flank and
reverse.55
But it was not to be. At 7»30 am on 1st July, after 7 days of
heavy bombardment v/hich was confidently expected to obliterate
the German wire and all defenders in the German trenches, the
British infantry rose from its trenches as the guns lifted from
the German front line, and, in brilliant sunshine, stumbled
under a heavy load across the broken ground of no-man's-land
into a hail of machine-gun fire. Thousands were mown down
near their own trenches ; others were held up on the German wire
which in many places the guns had failed to breach. Only in
the south was there any lasting success, the 18th and 30th
Divisions of the XIII Corps (both New Army divisions) capturing
their objectives around Montauban; and the 7th and 21st Divisions
of the XV Corps partially doing so by capturing Mametz village
and breaking the German front line west of Fricourt (see map 4).
Elsev/here it was total failure, although the 36th (Ulster) Division
of the X Corps broke right tlirough to the German 2nd position near
Thiepval only to be beaten back, with very heavy casualties, to
the German front line. The losses on the v/hole front for that
one day were disastrous - nearly 60,000 in all,including more than
20,000 killed or missing - though the figures reaching Rav/linson
at Fourth Army headquarters (l6,000 by 7»30 pm) failed to reveal 
54 •the true position.
On the right, the French, with a greater concentration of heavy 
artillery, did better, the XX Corps quickly overrunning the German 
front line north of the Somme, South of the river, the French
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pushed well beyond their first objectives almost to the &erman 
second line.^ .
During the afternoon, Haig visited Fourth headquarters and *e:jq)ressed 
the wish that the attack of the Fourth Army should be continued on 
the 2nd'• The situation, he felt, 'was as yet too obscure for any 
radical change of plan; the best that could be done for the moment 
was to keep up the pressure on the eneny, v/ear out his defence, and, 
with a View to an attack on his second position, gain possession of 
all those parts of his front position and of the intermediate lines 
still in his hands'. The village of Fricourt, already enveloped, 
was to be a prime t a r g e t , A f t e r  leaving Fourth Army headquarters, 
Haig motored to II Corps where he released two divisions - the 3Sth 
(Welsh) and the 23rd - from GHQ Reserve to Fourth Army, so that
57Rawlinson could put his existing reserves into the line for 2nd July,
At 7 pm, Rawlinson, realising that there was now no hope of an early
breakthrough, telephoned Haig to say that he was putting the VIII
• 58 :
Corps and X Corps under Gough at 7 am the follovdng morning so 
that he, Rawlinson, could concentrate his attention on the three 
Corps south of the River Ancre, Gough's independent command 
eventually became the Fifth Army.
At 10 pm Rawlinson issued orders for the attack to. be continued 
next day on the left and in the centre of the new Fourth Army 
frontage south of the Ancre - with the object of capturing 
La Boiselle, Ovillers, Fricourt and Gontalmaison. At Fricourt 
the Germans offered little resistance at first and by mid-day on 
2nd July the 17th (Northern) Division had occupied the village and 
pushed on towards Bottom Wood about a mile beyond. On their right, 
the 7th Division advanced from Mamets Village to White Trench, just 
south of Mamets Wood (see Map 3), At La Boiselle however the 
19th (Western) Division had difficulty in moving forward over shell- 
torn and.congested ground and was not ready to attack until 4 pm, ' 
and then with only one Brigade. Nevertheless by 9 pm half the 
village had been captured. At Ovillers, the 12th (Eastern) Division, 
having just moved into the line from Reserve, had even greater 
organisational difficulties, and the order to capture the village 
was cancelled. At the end of the day Gontalmaison remained well 
out of reach* Throughout this time, Gough's two Corps on the
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left, and the successful XIII Corps on the right, stood oh the defen­
sive, the former because Gough considered them to be in no fit 
state to attack until the morning of the 3rd, the latter because 
Rawlinson was not prepared to advance further on this front until
he had made *a strong line from Boiselle to Montauban as a basis from
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which to carry out further attacks' He was confirmed in this
view by aircraft reports that the ridge opposite Montauban was 
strongly held. Haig however had heard that the enemy had 'only a , 
few patrols in Bernafay Wood (N.B. of Montauban) and that they were 
surrendering freely'. He therefore told his Chief of Staff,
Lt.-Gen, Kiggell, to 'urge Rawlinson to greater activity in the 
direction of Longueval'. He also sent his Commander, Royal 
Artillery, ( Ma j. -Gen. Birch) to Fourth Army Headquarters 'to go 
into the artillery situation with the same objective*^^ In 
Haig's view there was plenty of men, but insufficient ammunition 
to sustain an attack along the whole Fourth Army front, and he was 
keen to concentrate on the ridge between Longueval and Bazentin-le~ 
Grand which would enable him to 'overlook the slopes running thence 
northwards and to threaten envelopment of /enem^ troops on the 
Posieres-Thiepval p o s i t i o n ' . H e  believed this would be more 
successful than a direct attack from the direction of La Boiselle 
and Thiepval on the Posieres ridge where the defences as he told
go
Joffre the following day, were'very much stronger and deeper*.
He failed however to secure a promise from the French to do anything 
other than give very limited support to his right wing. This made 
it difficult for Haig to exploit the success gained at Montauban 
on 1st July,
Before dawn on 3rd July, the 12th (Eastern) Division attacked and 
entered the German line in front of Ovillers. 'Jhen the attack 
moved on to the support trenches however, the Germans counter­
attacked fiercely and the attackers were gradually overwhelmed.
A few entered the outskirts of Ovillers but were soon driven 
back. In this bitter fighting, the 12th Division lost nearly 
2,400 officers and men. To the right, the 19th Division increased 
its grip on La Boiselle and the three divisions of the Coi'ps - 
the 7th, 17th and 21st - strengthened their positions below 
Maraetz Wood, the 17th Division capturing Bottom Wood and the 
21st Division, Shelter Wood. On the night of 3rd/4th July, the 
21st Division was taken out of the line to rest and the 38th (Welsh)
«
Division came into XV Corps Reserve,
The 38th Division had marched through the night of lst/2nd July from 
Toutencourt to Acheux, about 5 miles behind the front line at 
/Thiepval, After a day's rest they turned Southto Treux, 4 miles 
south-west of Albert, where they joined XV Corps and billeted in 
the nearby villages for the night of 4th/5th July. On the way, 
they passed tented encampments of cavalry which had been concentrated 
just west of Albert, A few days earlier the cavalry divisions had 
been given priority on the roads loading to the front, but now they 
were kicking their heels waiting for a break through which never 
came. On the 5th, the V/elsh Division, less artillery, was 
ordered to take over the front from Bottom Wood to Caterpillar Wood 
from the 7th Division whose artillery would remain in position.
Units of the division moved into the area below Mameta Wood that 
evening, 'footsore and weary',to begin the relief, which was 
completed by 1 am on 6th July. Maj.~Gen. Ivor Philipps sent
the following message of encouragement to every man in the 
division:
You have worked hard for many months with an energy and zeal 
beyond praise to fit yourselves for the task you have 
voluntarily undertaken. You have undergone the hardships 
of a vdnter campaign with fortitude. You have earned the 
praise of your Gozps Commanders for your courage, discipline 
and devotion to duty. You have now held for 6 months' a 
section of the British line in Prance, during vàiich time 
you have not allowed one of the enemy to enter your trenches 
except as a prisoner, and on several occasions you have 
entered the enemy's lines. 11 Officers and 44 NCO's and men 
have already received rewards from the King for gallant and 
distinguished conduct in the field. Your fellow countrymen 
at home are following your career with interest and admiration.
I al?/ays believed tnat a really Welsh Division would be second 
to none. You have more than justified that belief. I feel 
that whatever the future may have in store for us I can rely 
upon you, because you have already given ample proof of your 
'worth. During the short period in the Training Area you 
worked hard to qualify yourselves for still further efforts.
' I thank you most sincerely for the loyal and wholehearted
way in which you have all supported me and for the way in which 
each one of you has done his utmost to carry out the task allot­
ted to him. With such a spirit animating all ranks we can one 
and all look forward with confidence to the future, whatever 
it may have in store for us. You are today relieving the 7th 
Division, which has attacked and captured German trenches on 
affront of a little less than one mile and for a depth of about
I4. miles, In this attack the village of Kametz v/as captured, 
the enemy have suffered very heavy casualties, 1,500 German 
Officers and men were taken prisoners and 6 field guns were 
captured.
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The 1st Battalion, Royal Welsh Fusilers and the 1st Battalion, 
Welsh Regiment of the 7th Division have both distinguished 
themselves in this attack, and I am confident that the young 
battalions of the famous Welsh Regiments serving in the 3Sth 
(Welsh) Division will maintain the high standard for valour 
for which all 3 Welsh Regiments have been renowned throughout 
the war,
Siegfried Sassoon, with all the superiority of one who had arrived 
in France 4 weeks earlier than the 38th Division, watched some of 
the incoming units arrive at Bottom Wood:
In the evening we were relieved. The incoming battalion 
numbered more than double our own strength (we were less than 
400) and they were unseasoned New Array troops. Our little 
trench under the trees was inundated by a jostling company 
of exclamatory Vfelshmen. Kinjack would have called them 
a panicky rabble. They were mostly undersized men, and as 
I watched them arriving at the first stage of their battle 
experience I had a sense of their victimisation. A little 
platoon officer was settling his men down With a valiant 
show of self-assurance. For the sake of appearances, orders 
of some kind had to be given, though in reality there was 
nothing to do except sit down and-hope it wouldn't rain. He 
spoke sharply to some of them, and I felt that they were like 
a lot of children. It was going to be a bad look-out for two 
such bewildered companies, huddled up in the Quadrangle, 
which had been, over-garrisoned by our own comparatively small 
contingent. Visualizing that forlorn crowd of khaki figures 
under the twilight of the trees, I can believe that I saw 
then,for the first time, how blindly war destroys its victims.
The sun had gone down on my own reckless brandishings, and I 
understood the doomed condition of these half trained civilians 
who had been sent up to attack the Wood.
Sassoon might, perhaps, have been less patronising had he been able to 
read the minds of the incoming troops. They were equally condescen­
ding in their viev/s, and not at all overawed at taking over fi'om 
the 1st Battalion of their own Regiment (to which Sassoon belonged):
Our guides /from the 1st BattaliorJZ lost their way, but having 
wandered over most of the country we found ourselves in a 
half dug trench and we were told 'this was the spot'. By 
now I can forgive the company of the 1st Battalion for the 
unseemly haste with which it departed. But at the time, 
coming from an area where reliefs had amounted almost to a 
ceremonial parade, I was little less than amazed when I 
found no officers, no instructions, no information or anything 
else, and found that the tired regulars had departed almost 
as quickly as the Portugese used to up north.
After this unpropitious beginning, the Yfelshmen posted out sentries 
and spent the night slinging dead over the parapet and deepening 
the trench. When daylight came, they fired sporadically at the 
Germans in Mametz Wood while waiting, in unpleasant surroundings, 
for further orders,
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■CHAPTER THREE. Mametz Wood: 5th-9th July 1916
Alas said this staff-captain,
. Ah dam said this staff-major.
Alas alas said Colonel Talabolion
On 3rd July the Fourth Army had begun its preparations for the attack 
oh the German second line on Bazentin ridge. On the right, XIII 
Corps was ordered to occupy Bernafay Wood and Caterpillar Wood as 
soon as possible and to push patrols forward into Trones Y/ood (see 
Map 6). XV Corps in the centre and III Corps on the left were told 
to prepare for attacks on Mametz Wood and Gontalmaison respectively 
once they had consolidated their positions,^ Final orders were
issued on 5th July for all three Corps to advance on ?th July to
within attacking distance of the second line. The objectives of 
each Corps were: .
I XIII Corps: Trones Wood as far north as the railway line
XV Corps: Mametz: Wood, Acid Drop Copse
III Corps: The Cutting, Gontalmaison, Bailiff Wood
XV Corps were told to begin their advance through Mametz Wood 
at once and to capture as much of the wood as possible by the 
morning of the Tib*
Haig attached considerable importance to these preliminaries - more 
so than Rawlinson, On 4th July, Haig visited Rawlinson at 4th Army 
HQ to impress upon him the'importance of getting Trones Wood to 
cover the right flank and Mametz; Wood and Gontalmaison to cover the 
left flank of the attack against the Longueval front', A few days 
later, when Mametz Wood was proving particularly difficult to capture, 
Rawlinson wanted to press on with the main attack without it. Haig 
would not agree and ordered Rawlinson not to attempt to pierce the 
German line until the wood and Gontalmaison were in British hands. 
General Kiggell, Haig* s Chief of Staff, also wrote to Rawlinson 
giving him the Commander in Chief's views on the tactical situation.
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On the left flank of the Fourth Army main attack MAJ/IETZ 
WOOD is of great tactical importance. Unless it is in our 
possession the left flank of the main attack would be 
very insecure. Moreover, this flank could not extend to 
the west of a line from MARLBORO* WOOD to BAZENTIN le GRAND 
and the front would be seriously restricted. Furthermore, 
with MAÎ.ÎETZ WOOD in our possession BAZENTIN le PETIT WOOD 
and the enemy trenches to the south of it will be seriously 
threatened by us, and it may prove possible to assault 
them. Even the threat on them and on BAZENTIN le PETIT WOOD 
from the west, will be of great support and encouragement 
to the left flank of the main attack. For these reasons 
it is considered that only such a state of demoralisation 
on the enemy’s side as would justify great risks being 
taken to profit by it immediately would justify the launch- _ 
ing of the main attack before MMiETZ WOOD had been captured,
Rawlinson was not wholely convinced. ’I received this morning Kig’s 
appreciation of the situation with which I entirely agree’, he wrote 
in his diary on 9th July, ’he has put in irreproachable language 
what I said to D H yesterday. The only point I am doubtful about 
is whether we are wise to wait for the capture of Mamets; Wood before 
launching our attack against Longueval’’,^
These differing views about the importance of Mamets; Wood stemmed
directly from a lack of understanding between Haig and Ravrlinson
over plans for the main assault upon Bazentin ridge. Originally,
both had envisaged a frontal attack between the Basentins and Longueval
and both had acknowledged the importance of Mamets Wood on the left
flank. As time went by, however, Haig became attracted to the idea
of an attack north from Mametz Wood on the line between Gontalmaison
Villa and Bazentin le Petit Wood and then eastw’ard behind the German
line towards Longueval, the German defences being enfiladed by
7artillery fire from the northern edge of Mametz Wood. Map 7> 
shows clearly the uninterrupted view of the German second line 
from the northern edge of Mametz Wood which would have given the 
British Artillery considerable advantage over their German counter­
parts, It also shows ho’W an attack from this point would have 
been over relatively flat ground to Bazentin le Grand and beyond. 
Because this plan would have used Mametz Wood as a springboard for 
attack Haig naturally came to attach more and more importance to its 
capture as time went by.
Rawlinson on the other hand stuck to the idea of a frontal attack 
on the line between Bazentin le Grand Wood and Longueval but with
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this important changeî the attack would take place at dawn, the 
divisions concerned being formed up on the open ground under cover 
.of darkness. This night assembly, of course, considerably 
reduced the threat from Mametz Wood to the left flank and, although 
Eawlinson was prepared to support his main attack with a minor thrust 
from the wood if it was in his hands in time, he was equally prepared 
to press on without it. To Rawlinson therefore the significance of 
Mametz Wood diminished as the days wore on. His main concern was 
to waste as little time as possible in pressing his attack on the 
G-erman line.
Not until the 10 July ~ three days after the projected date for 
the capture of Mametz Wood - did Haig learn of Rawlinson's daring 
plan. He was not very happy; partly because it involved an 
uphill attack over 1,000 yards of open ground (see the contours 
in Map 7) but mainly because he just did not believe it would be 
possible to form up divisions 'in mass in the dark; .which we 
cannot do in time of peace'.^ But Rawlinson continued to argue 
the merits of his plan, strongly supported by General Montgomery, 
his Chief of Staff, and by Lieutenant-General Horne, Commander 
of the XV Corps, On 12th July Haig finally acquiesced, insisting 
only that strong points should be built to protect the troops 
assembling on the southern slopes,^ While these discussions were 
taking place, the 17th and 3Sth Divisions were hurling themselves 
at Mametz Wood in a desperate attempt to secure its early capture. 
Ironically, by the time Haig had come round to Rawlinson* s way of 
thinking, the Wood was in British hands. It is a sad commentary on 
the conduct of the war that both Commanders could issue orders for 
preliminary attacks, which were to cost thousands of lives, without 
having an agreed plan for the main battle.
All this was in the future however as the 38th (Welsh) Division 
moved into the line from Bottom Wood to Caterpillar Wood on 
5th July, The aiipi of the Fourth Army then v/as quite clear; capture 
Trones Wood on the right and Mametz Wood on the left-and do it 
quickly. On 6th July, Rawlinson wrote in his journal:
The attacks by III Corps and XV Corps against CONTAI24AISON 
and I.îAî.lETZ WOOD ;vill be carried out as arranged. They have 
fresh Divisions and I hope all will go well ....
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Thus was the 38th (Welsh) Division committed to battle,
Mametz Wood
North of the road from Mametz village to Montauban, the ground falls 
away, gently at first and then more steeply, until it reaches Willow 
Stream, The final descent is down a steep chalk bank, or * cliff', 
varying from about 3O to 50 feet in height. From Willow Stream the 
ground rises for more than a mile northward to the ridge which runs 
from Pozieres, through the Bazentins,. to Longueval and on which ^ay
the deeply fortified trenches of the German second line, Mametz Wood,
9 y
*a menacing wall of gloom’, lay on a slightspur on the far side of
the valley, flanked by two small re-entrant valleys rising up towards
the ridge. Because of these undulations troops advancing from the
south, east or west would have first to descend the slope of a
valley and then climb the far side, exposed all the while to rifle
and machine gun fire from the vmod and nearby copses.
The wood itself vra.s (and still is) very large and overgrown. Prom
north to south it measured about a mile long, the northern face
resting about 300 yards from the German second line (from whence
it could quickly be reinforced), the southern extremity dipping
down almost to Willow Stream, East to west, it measured about
J of a mile at its widest point, although a large open space at
the SW corner considerably reduced the width of the southernmost
10portion. The total area of woodland was about 220 acres.
On the night of 3/4-th July a small patrol from the 2nd Battalion
Royal Irish Regiment'(?th Division) had entered the wood and
reconnoitred the southern areas. They reported the wood dense
with undergrowth which made it difficult for infantry to move.
They found Strip Trench (see Map ,9) strongly wired and well traversed
The wood itself was a mixture of oak about in girth and birch
2 feet in girth, with some beech and ash. The average height was
12
between 30 and 45 feet. The wood, which had been untended for 
at least two years, was traversed by a central ride running from 
north to south and two cross rides more or less at right angles, 
clearly marked on the operational maps used by the XV Corps but in 
fact suffering from neglect and less easily discernable on the 
ground.
70
11
. J
-te- Ratkt
/To
; rv —  le - Grand 
WgcvJ
GoAlhtm
rio.h'^ n
MAmeh
■' A /  W O  \ t^a«“lbof W^ od
9 / ^ P’t'Oeh
Wh^i'e Tr^r>..J
«0
jV\cob<Xobd-0
Potnmiers
RedcüVr
6.cmaO_ _ 
_ ÇxQ
(Ccnl'oü''i in lAgtre&J
M ^ p  E  . hAAMETz. W o o d  gg "ù e p e n c e .s
7 i
To the west of Mametz Wood, the keystone of the German defences v/as
a well-constructed trench known as the Kaisergraben which ran south
of Contalmaison towards the western; face of Mametz.Wood. Behind
it lay a network of subsidiary trenches protecting the whole of
the southwestern flank of the wood (see Map 8). Some of these
were connected to the wood and, so long as this remained in German
hands, the trenches could be readily reinforced, or evacuated, as
the situation demanded® The Kaisergraben itself had been constructed
well before the opening of the battle of the Somme and was provided
15with good dug-outs cut twenty feet down into the chalk. Not 
surprisingly, it proved difficult to capture but on the night of 
if/5th July the 17th Division, in co-operation with the 7th Division 
which attacked Wood Trench, captui'ed that portion of it between 
Pearl Alley and Yfood Trench and renamed it Quadrangle Trench*
Yfood Trench itself «- the site of Siegfried Sassoon* s ’reckless 
brandishings’ - remained in German hands. I
There was no similar defensive network'of trenches to the east of 
Mametz Wood; nor was one necessary. At this point, the German 
second line -sloped down the face of the ridge and from this position, 
and from Sabot and Flatiron Copses, Germans machine, guns could 
easily command the eastern approaches to the wood.
On the night of 5th/6th July the XV Corps had two divisions in the 
line: on the left, the 17th (Northern) Division (Maj.-Gen. Pilcher),
which had already been heavily engaged in the fighting, held Quadrangle 
Trench up to its junction with Quadrangle Alley; on the right, the 
38th Division (113th and 115th Brigades) held Bottom Wood, Cliff 
Trench and most of White Trench. Both divisions were backed by 
artillery from the divisions which had been in the line before 
them; the 21st Division artillery covering the 17th Division on the 
left and the 7th Division artillery covering the 38th Division on 
the right. At that time, the boundary between XV Corps and XIII 
Corps lay on the western edge of Caterpillar Wood, the v/hole of 
which was occupied by the 18th Division (XIII Corps),
On 6th July, in preparation for the next day’s attack by XV Corps, 
there was a general shuffle to the right, the 17th (Northern) Division
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taking over Bottom Wood, and the 58th (v/elsh) Division the western half 
of Caterpillar Wood and also Marlborough Wood (the most forward position 
of all). Facing them were units of the German 5rd Guards Division and
n I
the 28th Reserve Division. Mametz. Wood itself was held by a
battalion of the Lehr Regiment of the Prussian Guard, another battalion
15of the regiment being in position around Flatiron Copse . On their 
right, the l63rd Regiment (attached to 28th Reserve Division) defended 
Contalmaison and the open ground between Quadrangle Trench and the Wood.,
For the 7th July, X? Corps planned a two-pronged attack upon the wood 
timed for 8 am,the 17th Division attacking Acid Drop Copse and the strip 
of v/ood Lî'iîNK from the west (see Map 9) and the 38th Division attacking 
the 'hammerhead' (AXCB on Map 9) on the eastern side of the wood. Once 
they had entered the wood both divisions were to advance on the central 
ride (see Map ^ ) before swinging northward up through the wood, the 38th 
Division being given the additional task of sweeping across the southern 
portion of the wood to take Strip Trench in the rear. As a preliminary 
to the main attack, and to protect their left flank, the 17th Division 
wore to attack and capture Quadrangle Support Trench and those parts 
of Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Alley leading up to it. This was to be 
done under cover of darlmess starting at 2 am after an Intense artillery 
bombardment of the enemy positions. It was assumed that this attack, 
completely unsupported on either flanlc and against strongly defended 
positions would be successful, if not at first, at least as the night 
wore on. The only concession to failure was that the main attack would 
be postponed from 8 am to 8.30 &m if at that time Quadrangle Trench 
was still in enemy hands. This contingency plan was known as Scheme B,
The main attack was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment of the German
second line, and of strong points in and around the wood, to a rigorous
17timetable laid down by the Artillery Commander of the X7 Corps. The 
bombardment v/as to start at 7*20 am and last for 40 minutes. Both 
supporting divisional artilleries (the 21st on the left, now reinforced 
by one artillery brigade from 38th Division; the 7th on the right) were 
to 'search* the wood thoroughly during this time using eve^yavailable 
4*5® Howitzer and 18-pounder, with concentrated fire on those edges of 
the wood v/hich were to come under attack from the infantry. In this 
preliminary bombardment special attention was to be paid to Acid Drop 
Copse on the left and Flatiron and Sabot Copses on the right which were 
known to harbour German machine guns. The Corps heavy artillery would
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back up by bombarding the same targets and the massive 9*2" batteries 
would register slowly on the German second line. Once the attack had 
been launched all guns would be lifted by strict timetable ahead of 
the supposed position of the advancing infantry, until by 9*30 & H  
fire would be concentrated outside the wood.- In the event of Scheme B 
being put into operation, the artillery would concentrate initially on 
the area around Quadrangle Support before moving on to the original 
programme phased back by half an hour.
On the 58th Division front, the task of attacking the wood fell to 
Brigadier-General H J Evans and his 115th Brigade. At 8 am on 6 July 
. «. two hours before XV Corps issued their detailed orders - the GSO 1 
of the 38th Division (ht.Col. ap Rhys Pryce) arrived at Brigade 
Headquarters and gave Brig,-Gen. Evans a brief outline of his task ^ 
namely to attack the south-east portion of the wood from Caterpillar 
Wood at 8 am the following morning. No mention was made of an advance 
to the central ride or of the subsequent drive northward through the 
wood, and it is possible that the GSOl was not at this time fully 
aware of the extent of the XV Corps plans. "
Together, Evans and Rhys Pryce went over to Caterpillar Wood to reconnoitre 
the ground. On the way, they were told by a neighbouring Brigade that 
nothing definite was known about the number of German troops in Mamets 
Wood but that it appeared to be held right up to the edges, though 
not in any great strength. When they reached Caterpillar Wood, the 
Brigadier reconnoitred the ground immediately to the north and west 
of the wood, while the GSOl went on to Marlborough Wood. During his 
reconnaissance, Brig,—Gen. Evans observed that troops could be safely 
formed up in a dip in the ground north of Caterpillar Wood provided they 
were not pushed too far up the hill towards Bazentin-le-Grand Wood. .
It also became clear to him that as the attack would have to be made 
oyer ground which could easily be swept by machine gun fire from the 
north, it would be prudent to keep as close as possible to the valley 
running along the northern edge of Caterpillar Wood (Map 9), and to 
attack on a narrow frontage, one battalion wide, supported by machine 
guns and Trench mortars in Caterpillar and Marlborough Woods. Y/hen he 
met up vdth Col. Pryce later, Brig.-Gen. Evans explained his plans 
fend pointed out where he would form up his four battalions in the valley
before the attack. He asked the GSOl to make "special provision" for
18 "his right flank to protect it from machine gun fire. The two men
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then parted, the GSOl returning to prepare divisional orders. Brigadier 
Evans to arrange the disposition of his battalions. He reached his 
headquarters between 2 and 3 pm in the afternoon and immediately ordered 
his Machine Gun and Trench Mortar Commanders to make their own 
reconnaissance and report back. He alerted the Commanding Officers 
of the 16th Welsh (Cardiff City) Battalion (v/hich he intended to lead 
the attack), the 11th SY/B (2nd Gwent) and the 10th SY/B (1st Gwent), 
which were to be in support, telling them also to make a reconnaissance 
and stand by for further orders. The Officer Commanding the l6th 
Yfelsh, realising that the right of his battalion would be exposed to 
fire from Flatiron Copse, asked to be allowed to assemble in the dark 
and attack at first light. He had to be told that plans were synchronised
19with those of the 17th Division and that it v/as too late to change.
Later that afternoon, Major-General Philipps visited Brigade HQ briefly
I
and hinted at the possibility of a more ambitious objective than the 
'hammerhead* at the edge of the v/ood. Pressed for details, he said 
they would all appear in Divisional orders which would be issued shortly. 
Soon after he had gone. Brigade received a message to move the l6th Y/elsh 
and 11 SWB into their preliminary positions near Loop Trench (Map 8) 
by 9 pm and then on to Caterpillar Ylood by 2 am on 7 July. Brig,-Gen. 
Evans went off to supervise their assembly leaving draft orders for the 
attack with his Brigade Major who was instructed to issue them, with 
any necessary corrections, as soon as Divisional orders had been 
received.
20
Divisional orders were in fact issued at 8 .30 pm. The assembly points
given for the four battalions were roughly as discussed earlier between
Brig.-Gen. Evans and the GSOl, ie two battalions in Caterpillar Wood
valley, one in Caterpillar Wood itself and one in reserve a little
21
further back towards Montauban Alley and Loop Trench, but on hearing 
of these dispositions Corps HQ immediately intervened:
The Corps Commander considers that it is dangerous to collect 
more than two battalions in the Western end of Caterpillar 
Yi^ ood and valleys in the vicinity owing to the danger of hostile 
shell fire if the troops are overcrowded. Two battalions are 
sufficient for the attack on the eastern projection of the Wood 
^^th a third in supperu in Montauban Alley and a fourth further 
back. Any further reinforcements required in the wood should 
enter by the southern tongue-Ql on map g - which the Division 
should be able to capture without difficulty when the troons 
have entered the wood from the east, and assisted by those from
76
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the west, are clearing up the southern portion of the wood.
Divisional orders were amended accordingly. Brig.-Gen. Evans arrived 
back at his Headquarters at 11 pm to find his Brigade Major struggling 
to reconcile the draft Brigade orders with those from Division, Evans 
was appalled when he saw the detail and complexity of Divisional orders 
Gapto Yfyn Griffith., on the Brigade staff, witnessed his reaction:
The General was cursing... at his orders. He said that only 
a madman could have issued them. He called the Divisional 
Staff a lot of plumbers, herring-gutted at that. He argued 
at the time and asked for some control over the artillery that 
is going to cover us but he got nothing out of them, ^
This is perhaps a little hard on the Divisional staff whose orders
merely repeated, with some elaboration, those given earlier in the
day by Corps Headquarters, The rigid artillery programme was none
of their doing and some of the elaboration --.for a smoke screen to be
for —
laid south of Flatiron and Sabot Copses.was distinctly helpful and in 
accordance with Brig.-Gen. Evans own request. However it was not 
just the artillery programme which worried Evans. He was aghast 
at what he took to be instructions to attack on a tv/o battalion 
frontage when he had been at such pains to explain to the GSOl his 
reasons for wanting only one battalion in the front line. 'It appears 
to me now', he was to write later, 'that the dispositions were all cut 
and dried by Divisional HQ and that the reconnaissance was simply 
made to satisfy them and that I was a mere figurehead. This is borne 
out by the fact that in Divisional orders the dispositions of each 
infantry unit of the Brigade were laid dovm. I was given no discretion 
in the matter. These, dispositions were the first intimation that the 
attack was to be made on a two battalion frontage'There is in 
fact, no evidence that this is what Divisional HQ intended. An 
examination of the orders issued on 6th July shows no reference at 
all to the position of battalions at the moment of attack, only to 
their dispositions beforehand in and around Caterpillar Wood.^^
Be that as it may, Brig,-Gen. Evans faced the formidable task of 
implementing within a few short hours, a plan far more ambitious and 
much more detailed than anything he had been led to expect and which, 
as he saw it, re quizzed a complete revision of all his previous plans.
He worked as quickly as possible to produce nev/ orders but it was 2 am 
(7th July) before they were issued. Under the revised arrangements,
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11th South Wales Borderers were to be on the left of the attack (with 
their left flank as close as possible to Caterpillar Wood) and l6th 
Welsh Battalion on the right, each facing North West and each covering 
about 250 yards of frontage. As the right of the l6th Welsh would 
now be perilously close to the German-held Flatiron Copse, they were to 
form up under cover of the smoke barrage arranged for 7,h3 era.
As soon as these orders had been issued, Brig.-Gen. Evans left to 
rearrange the position of his troops, .
7th July
Early in the morning on the 7th, the 17th Division on the left launched 
its attack on Quadrangle support. Tv/o battalions of the 52nd Brigade 
had been chosen for this attack, the 50th Brigade being held in 
readiness for the 8 am assault on the Western face of Mametz. Wood.
27
It had rained during the previous afternoon and again during the night
and the clinging mud made movement difficult. As the two battalions
moved out of their trenches at 2 am flares lit up the darkness and the
advancing troops came under machine gun fire from Quadrangle Support,
which was held in great force by the Germans who were themselves
preparing to counter attack at about the same time. Hampered by their
ov/n shells, which were falling short, the leading waves managed to
reach the German wire only to find it still intact in spite of a heavy
artillery bombardment. They fell back and eventually withdrew. At
4 am the Germans counter-attacked the British left flank but were
repulsed. Heavy fighting continued for some hours and 'greatly
28
interfered vdth preparations for the main attack’«
At 5.25 am, the 17th Division received further orders from Corps 
announcing that Scheme B was to be put into operation and that another 
attack on Quadrangle Support should take place as arranged at 8 am.
The two remaining battalions of the 52nd Brigade were brought into 
action but in broad daylight and across open ground they had little 
chance of succeeding v/here a night attack had failed. Heavy fire fr*om 
machine guns perched high above them in Mametz Wood cut them down as 
they moved into the attack and casualties were very high. Again, the 
attackers vdthdrew.
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Meanwhile, just before 7 am Brig-G-en Evans, who had been out all night 
organising his troops in Caterpillar Wood, went up to his new temporary 
headquarters at Pommiers Redoubt on the Mametz-Montauban road. From 
here there was a good view of Mametz Y/ood about a mile away, though 
not of the forming-up position, which was hidden by the immediate 
foreground; '
We had reached the high ground at Pommiers Redoubt, and, standing 
in a trench, scanning the Wood with our glasses, it seemed as 
thick as a virgin forest. There was no sign of life in it, no 
one could say whether it concealed ten thousand men or ten 
machine guns. Its edges were clean cut, as far as the eye could 
see; and the ground between us and the wood was bare of cover.
Our men were assembled in trenches above a dip in the ground, and 
from these they were to advance, descend into the hollow, and 
cross the bare slope in the teeth of the machine-gunners in the 
wood. On their right, as they advanced across the bullet-swept 
zone, they would be exposed to enfilade fire, for the direction 
of their advance was nearly parallel to the German trenches 
towards Bazentin, and it would be folly to suppose that the German 
machine-guns were not sited to sweep that slope leading to the 
_ Wood.2?
Soon after he arrived, Brig-Gen Evans received news that the attack was 
retimed for 8.30 am (Scheme B) and sent this information on to the 
battalions. He was also asked to get in touch with the Officer appointed 
by Corps to arrange the smoke barrage, but as the officer, and the 
whereabouts of his unit were unknown to those at Brigade HQ, his staff 
failed to locate him,-^ ^
At 8 o'clock Capt, Griffith watched the artillery begin its bombardment 
of the edge of the Wood:
A thousand yards from where I stood, our two battalions were 
waiting. I read the orders again. The attack was to be carried 
out in three stages, beginning at half-past eight, reaching in 
succession three points inside the Wood, under the protection of 
an artillery barrage. Smoke screens were to be formed here and 
there. Everything sounded so simple and easy,
A few minutes after eight, all our telephone wires to the 
battalions were cut by the enemy's reply to our fire. There was 
no smoke screens for some reason never explained — perhaps someone 
forgot about it. This was the first departure from the simplicity 
of the spoken word. Messages came through, a steady trickle of 
runners bringing evil news, our fire had not masked the German 
machine-guns in Mametz Wood, nor in the wood near Bazentin, The 
elaborate timetable suddenly became a thing of no meaning as 
unrelated to our condition as one of Napoleon's orders
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The attack had in fact been launched at 8.30 am as planned but it
was 9,20 am before even this simple piece of news reached Brigade HQ,
As soon as the guns had stopped, the leading waves of the l6th Welsh and
11th SWB Battalions had moved over the hill and dov/n the slope towards
Mametz. Wood, Immediately, they came under withering fire from the
Ylood and from Flatiron and Sabot Copses, About 200-300 yards from
the Wood, the attack petered out and the leading troops took what
cover they could in a line of shell holes. The successive waves in
turn came under heavy fire and were withdrawn back over the crest and
52
into comparative safety.
Private William Joshua who v/as with a Lewis Machine gun team in the 
léth Welsh battalion v/as in one of the leading waves;
Number 4 platoon A company led the attack, our Lewis gun v/as 
on the left flank to prevent them being cut off,
Yfe advanced about 30 yards when the German Machine Guns opened 
up. Sergeant Harries shouted out they are yards high and it 
appeared so, then going down a gentle slope to the v/ood the 
enemy got range with deadly effect.
One of my gun team gave me the signal to take a casualty* s 
place in the team, and as I struggled on, I felt a severe 
shock in my thigh and I was down looking for my leg, thinking 
I had lost it. Another platoon came along and rested for a breather 
leaving about 10 casualties behind including a sergeant from the 
Cycle Company of which a number had joined us to bring us up to 
strength, lach wave passing me left its quota of dead behind.
Our"company runner came along and asked me where Capt. Herdman 
was, as the order was to retire, I replied that he was somewhere 
ahead. A large number of our planes were flying low.
Now the German and our own artillery started up, and to add to 
' the horror rain started to fall heavily making the churned up 
ground into clinging mud, I dumped my equipment and started to 
crawl back, hugging the ground. Some stretcher bearers found 
me and took me to a large shell hole. They were members of the 
Tylorstown Silver Band who had enlisted en bloc in our early 
recruiting days..... My two sergeants, Harries and Thomas were 
killed also my closest pals G. Leyshon and Reg Davies, Tv/o 
brothers Tregaskis died. They were always first on parade when 
we formed in Porthcawl; made Corporals the same day; officers 
the same day and died together,
Brigade HQ, desperate for news, had despatched the Staff Captain 
(Capt. H V Hinton) to Caterpillar Wood at 8.43 am. His first report, 
T/ritten at about 9*30 m^, v/as received forty minutes later. He 
confirmed that troops were digging in about 300 yards from the Y/'ood and 
suggested another artillery bombardment. This was immediately relayed
to the artillery Group Commander, Brig-Gen Evans also instructed his
machine-gun company to push more guns towards Caterpillar Wood in an
attempt to stifle the deadly fire from the north. By 9*50 am however
things were getting worse. The Germans had intensified their
machine-gun activity and were opening up with artillery on the troops
out in the open. Casualties were mounting steadily and the 10th
South V/ales Borderers were ordered up to reinforce the two leading
battalions,^ Their progress across the maze of trenches was
considerably hampered by heavy mud and it was well into the afternoon
35before they arrived in the battle area.
Meanwhile, both XV Corps and 58th Division HQs were preparing for another 
artillery bombardment* At 10*20 am Corps informed Maj-General Philipps 
that the Heavy Artillery would bombard the eastern portion of Mametz:
Wood from 10,45 until 11.15 am and added, oblivious to the earlier 
mix-up, that if the Division 'wanted more smoke barrage they could 
employ the special party which was with them', The Division was also 
told to support the attack by fire from the Divisional artilleries 
which had the advantage of direct observation which the Heavy Artillery 
did not,^^ The news of a fresh bombardment was quickly passed to 
Brigade HQ and thence to the battalions, but there was no chance of it 
reaching them in time:
We were a thousand yards away from the battalions, with no 
telephone communications; there were maps at Divisional HQ, 
they knew where we were and they knew that our lines were 
cut. A simple sum in arithmetic , ... our operation was isolated; 
no-one was attacking on either flank of our Brigade, so that 
there was complete freedom of choice as to time. With all the 
hours of the clock to choose from, some master-mind must needs 
select the only hour to be avoided.
Fortunately, by 11 am the telephone wires had been repaired and the 
Officer Commanding l6th Welsh Battalion (it.Col, Smith) was able to 
report that although British shells were falling on his troops he 
was nevertheless advancing slowly. The artillery bombardment again 
failed to knock out the machine-guns and mounting casualties soon 
brought the attack to a halt. In the afternoon, the fresh troops 
of the 10th South Wales Borderers for a time brought new vigour to 
the offensive but their commanding officer, Lt Col Wilkinson, was 
killed bringing the men forv/ard and once more the advance faded away.
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Oiv instructions from XV Corps, Divisional HQ ordered Brigade to make 
a third attack at 5 pm, insisting that this time troops must go into 
the wood, the eastern edge of which would be heavily bombarded for 
thirty minutes beforehand*'^ These orders did not reach Brigade HQ 
until 4 pm and as the telephone wires had again been cut, Brig.-Gen Evans 
decided to go down to Caterpillar Wood himself to reorganise the 
attack and push in the last Battalion (the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers).
He took Capt Griffith with him;
The heavy rains' of the preceding days had turned the chalky 
soil into a stiff glue. The hurry in our minds accentuated the 
slowness of our progress, and I felt as if some physical force 
v/as dragging me back. Haste meant a fall into a shell hole, for 
we had abandoned the attempt to move along the trench, Shrapnel 
was bursting overhead, and a patter of machine-gun bullets spat
through the air. We passed through Caterpillar Wood   along
the bare ridge rising up to Mametz Wood our men were burrowing into 
the ground with their entrenching tools seeking whatever cover 
they might make. A few shells were falling, surprisingly few. 
Wounded men were crawling back from the ridge, men were crav/ling 
forward with ammunition. No attack could succeed over such 
ground as this, swept from front and side.by machine-guns at
short r a n g e , -^9
By now it was 4*40 pm and the battalions were very disorganised; 
casualties among the officers had been high and the men were exhausÈd 
and seemed, to Brig-Gen Evans, to be somewhat shaken. Brig-Gen Evans 
called the commanding officers together and ordered them to prepare for 
an attack on the wood at all costs v/ith the two freshest battalions 
(10 SV/B and 17 RWF) in the front line. By the time the battalions had 
reorganised ho'/zever the effect of the artillery bombardment had worn 
off, and machine-guns and trench mortars were still not disposed to 
Evans* satisfaction. He could see that defences on the edge of 
Mametz Wood were still intact and that the artillery had fired too 
deeply into the wood. Realising that a co-ordinated effort by 
infantry and artillery would take time to organise, and that success 
without it was unlikely, he decided to postpone his attack until 
the evening or even the following m o r n i n g , U s i n g  a field telephone 
connected to the Heavy Artillery at Pommiers Redoubt, he urged 
this course of action on 58th Division Headquarters, Division con­
sulted Corps, At 6,40 pm XV Corps HQ telephoned to 38th Division 
telling them * to withdrav/ and reorganise the Battalions engaged at 
the south east corner of Mamets. Wood and to make adequate arrangements 
for holding the line during the night* The 17th RIVF was detailed
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to hold the original line on Caterpillar Wood and the three tired 
battalions, which had between them suffered more than 400 casualties, 
returned to their bivouacs during the early hours of the following 
morningo
On the way back to Pommiers Redoubt, Brig-G-en Evans, thoroughly
exhausted by 36 hours of strenuous activity, unburdened himself
to Capt. Griffith:
I spoke my mind about the whole business... you heard me. They 
wanted us to press on at all costs, talked about determination, 
and suggested that I didn’t realise the importance of the 
operation. As good as told me that I was tired and didn’t 
want to tackle the job. Difficult to judge on the spot, they 
said*. As if the whole trouble hadn’t arisen because someone 
found it so easy to judge when he was six miles away and had never 
seen the country, and couldn’t read a map. You mark my words, 
they’ll send me home for this: they want butchers, not
. brigadiers. They’ll remember now that I told them, before 
we began, that the attack could not succeed unless the machine 
guns were masked. I shall be in England in a month.
Six weeks later he went horae^  but there is no evidence that he was 
relieved of his command for outspokenness or for any obvious want of 
determination, for these faults were usually rewarded with instant 
dismissal, as happened to Brigadier^xley and Fell of the neighbour­
ing 23rd and 17th Divisions. There was no shortage of replacements, 
and no qualms about changing a commander at the height of a battle:
I was with many others a ’vulture’ waiting in Amiens to get 
a brigade ^^ vârote Brig-Gen Trotter after the war/. My turn came 
on 6 July to take over command of 31st Brigade..*... I do think, 
looking back, it is rather hard on a brigade to be taken 
over by a complete stranger in the middle of very confused 
fighting, I know I felt for Fell, my predecessor in command 5 
when I arrived at his BHQ, and he was unaware that he was 
superseded by me, and of which I had to inform him.43
When Evans left the 115th Brigade in August I916 he was 56 years old 
and the Brigade was in a quiet sector of the front well away from 
the Somme. This would have been a natural time for giving the 
command to a younger man.
On the west side of the Wood, the 17th Division had fared no better. 
Although botn preliminary assaults by the 52nd Brigade on Quadrangle 
Support failed to make secure the left flank, the 50th Brigade, as 
planned, went into action at 8.3O am. One battalion (7th East Yorks) 
struck at the junction of Quadrangle Alley and Quadrangle Support
84
trenches (Map 9) and almost succeeded in capturing it, but were driven 
back by bombs and by enfilade machine gun fire from Mametz Vrood and 
from the north. They succeeded however in holding to on a point just 
50 yards short of the junction. Another battalion(8th Dorset), was 
held ready to advance on Wood Trench, Wood Support and the western 
edge of Mametz Wood, once the situation around Quadrangle Support 
had been resolved. As little progress had been made by mid-afternoon, 
the 51st Brigade, now under its nsw commander, was brought up from 
reserve to replace the 52hd Brigade wnich had suifereo. heavy losses*
As vdth the 38th Division, XV Corps ordered another attack for 5 pm 
after a thirty minute bombardment. The Divisional commander 
uncertain whether or not Quadrangle Support was in his hands, argued 
for a postponement and Corps reluctantly agreed to give him until 
6*30 pm to sort things o u t E v e n t u a l l y  the l?th Division was 
ordered to attack at 8 pm both Quadrangle Support and the Strip of Wood 
at DÆNK (Map 9). Ill Corps on their left which had earlier captured, 
and,then lost, Contalmaison, was to make a simultaneous attack upon 
the village. In the words of the official historian: 'The Dorset
and East Yorks went forward, the 10th Sherwood Foresters of the 
51st Brigade attacking on the left at the same time. As they struggled 
through the mud the leading lines were smitten by machine-gun fire from 
the flanks and were caught by a hostile artillery barrage. There was 
no,hope of success so the operation was a b a n d o n e d * T h e  III Corps 
failed to get itself ready in time for its attack on Contalmaison 
and this too was cancel i e d , .
So by the end of the day, both III and XV Corps were back where they 
had been at the beginning.
It is not difficult to find reasons for the failures on 7th July. The 
plan itself was ill-conceived, fragmented and, as a result of 
communication difficulties, badly co-ordinated. On both sides 
of the wood, the attacking troops were exposed to enfilade fire at 
short range. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a more 
suicidal direction of attack than that chosen (by XV Corps) for the 
115th Brigade: parallel to, and not far away from, the German front
line. If the artillery could have knocked out every German machine gun 
in si gilt there might perhaps have been some hope of success but this
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was far beyond the capaoity of the Artillery in I9I6. *It is 
beyond dispute that on several occasions where the field artillery
has made a considerable ‘lift* that is to say, has outstripped
the infantry advance, the enemy has been able to man his parapets 
with rifle and machine gun’, KiggeUwrote from GHQ a few days
later. XV Corps put it more bluntly:
_ The problem of dealing with hostile machine guns ia still 
unsolved. Divisions will report at once any useful ^
experience that has been gained, for the benefit of others.
But the operations were also badly affected by poor communications - 
wires between battalions and Brigades were cut on both sides of the 
wood - with disastrous consequences for the 115th Brigade. V/ith 
three-quarters of an hour lag between the Brigade and its battalions, 
messages coming down from Corps to Division, to Brigade, to battal­
ion crossed messages on their way up, to the general confusion of 
all. On this side of the Wood too it is arguable that too many 
levels of Command were involved. Divisional HQ, with only one 
Brigade in action, was sandwiched ineffectively between XV Corps 
and 115th Brigade, contributing little but adding to the general 
delay. Indeed, it might have been better if XV Corps, once they 
had realised that co-ordination between 17th Division and 58th
Division was more or less impossible (*38th Division ......
when last heard of were about 200 yards from the Wood’ they signalled 
17th Division lamely at one point)^^ had left the conduct of the 
battle in the hands of Brigade commanders. This would at least 
have allowed Brig-Gen Evans to shorten his own lines of communi­
cation by moving down to Caterpillar Wood earlier than he did, 
though whether he would have been able to achieve anything without 
direct control over the artillery (which he wanted) was questionable, 
and there was little chance of XV Corps giving him that. The view of 
the artillery high command was that ’the full destructive power of 
the available artillery must not be sacrificed to, nor be impeded by
50the whims of subordinate commanders*.
The lack of smoke - again due to faulty or inadequate communications 
between Corps and Brigade - also contributed in a big way to the 
failure of the 115th Brigade. The battalions had been ordered before 
the attack to form up ’as soon as the smoke barrage on the eastern 
edge of Mametz V/ood and around Flatiron Copse and Sabot Copse is 
- formed’ (Brigade Order No 62) and it is likely that the failure of the
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smoke barrage to materialise upset the inexperienced battalion
commanders so that the all important first attack lacked sting.
But probably the biggest factor of all was the haste with which the
plans, such as they were, had to be carried out. *It was a
deliberate attack v/hich required careful preparation and personal
reconnaissance of the whole area by me with my COs*, Brig-Gen
Evans wrote afterwards. ’This it was physically impossible to
do* (ie in the time available). He added that the position chosen
for his brigade Headquarters, which he had never seen till he
took up his position for the attack ’was such that no personal
51observation could be obtained of the progress of the attack’.
Higher Command however made no allowances, Haig’s Chief of Staff 
wrote to Rawlinson pointing out that ’ the C in C did not consider 
the withdrawal from CONTADilAISOH on the 7th and the failure of the 
38th Division to captui'e MAMETZ WOOD were creditable performances’^^ .
On the 8th, Haig wrote in his diary:
The 38th Welsh Division, which had been ordered to attack 
Mametz Wood had not advanced with determination to the attack. 
General Horne, Commanding XV Corps, is enquiring into General 
Philipps’ conduct as Divisional GOG. The artillery prepara­
tion v/as. ... . reported as ’highly satisfactory’ 53,
Rawlinson v/as also disappointed. ’A day of heavy fighting without very 
much success’ he wrote in his journal on the evening of the 7th,
’We took Contalmaison in the morning but failed to get into Mametg 
Wood. Prisoners tell us the Boshes are in a state of chaos but their 
machine gunners seem to go on figliting all right. In the pm v/e lost 
Contalmaison without sufficient excuse I think as it is reported we 
were shelled out. I have ordered both attacks to be renewed. It is 
raining hard tonight, We must go on pressing the Boshe now they are 
getting tired as fresh troops may be brought up....’
8th-9th July
On 8th July, the 17th Division continued to hammer away at Quadrangle 
Support trench, again without success although they mounted tv/o 
full-scale attacks during the day. The 38th Division v/as ordered 
to make a quiet raid during the night of 7th/8th on ’something like a 
Company front, not necessarily by the whole Company’. ’The place*, 
said XV Corps, ’must be chosen by the Commander of the 113th Brigade 
now holding the line, v/ho should carry out the raid and fix the
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exact point. Neither Corps nor Division, not being on the spot, 
could fix this*. Shortly after midnight, Corps learned that 
Brig-G-en Price-Davies ( 113 th Brigade) was preparing to make an 
•attack on Strip Trench using a whole battalion. Horne immediately 
telephoned 38th Division HQ to say that what he wanted that day was 
a small scale probe of the southern defences and not * an isolated
56attack by one battalion on point H* . A few hours later he went 
over to 38th Division HQ personally to discuss the situation and 
then ordered a night attack on Strip Trench to be exploited the 
following day,^^ This attack, timed for 2 am, failed to 
materialise. Corps demanded to know why and so did Fourth Army; 
Division asked Brigade. They said that the orders arrived at the 
Battalion too late to be executed, the 14 Royal Welsh Fusiliers having 
reported by orderly that trenches leading to the starting point of 
attack had been so congested that they had failed to get there in 
time.
This was too much for Lt-Gen Horne. When Haig and Rawlinson
visited XV Corps HQ on the 9th he told them that he ’was very
disappointed with the v/ork of the lyth Division (Pilcher) and
38th Division (Philipps)’, ’Both these officers have been
removed’, Haig wrote in his diary that evening. ’In the case
of the latter division although the wood had been most adequately
bombarded, fde on 7th July?, the division never entered the wood,
and in the whole division the total casualties for the 24 hours 
5Gwas under 1301’
Maj-Gen Philipps had in fact received his marching orders at 
11 o'clock that morning. At the suggestion of Fourth Army HQ,
Horne decided to put the 38th Division temporarily under the 
command of Maj-Gen Watts, GOC 7th Division, then in reserve. He was 
given freedom to ’ dispose of the 38th Division as he v/ished, keeping 
any Brigades he v/anted, or using them as required’
The news of Ivor Philipps removal soon reached Lloyd George, the 
new Secretary of State for War, in London. He wrote to his brother 
on 11th July giving news of the Division. ’Unfortunately’, he wrote, 
’the General has broken down in health and he returned home last night 
bringing with him his ADC Lt Gwilym Lloyd George’.
With this cloud hanging over it, and \vith a new General and his 
staff in command, the 38th (Welsh) Division prepared for its next 
attack on Mametz Wood.
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CHAPTER FOUR. Mametz Wood: 9th-12th July I9I6.
And to your front, stretched long laterally, 
and receded deeply, 
the dark v/oodc
^th July
In the early hours of 9th July, 38th Division HQ, then still under 
the command of Ivor Philipps, issued orders for an attack that 
afternoon on the southern edge of Mametz Wood from White Trench.
Two Brigades were to take part - the llAth Brigade (Brig-Gen Harden) 
on the right making the main thrust east of the central ride, the 
113th Brigade (Brig-G-en Price-Davies) supporting with a simultaneous 
attack by one battalion on Strip Trench, Once Strip Trench and the 
southern-most cross-ride had been captured, the 114th Brigade was 
to sweep on alone northwards through the wood leaving the 113th 
Brigade to consolidate the south-western approaches,
I
By mid-day however Ivor Philipps had been relieved of his command 
and XV Corps decided to postpone the attack. They sent the following 
message to the 38th Division:
The attack being prepared by you for 4 pm this afternoon will 
not take place. All preparations for making that attack are 
to be ready by early tomorrow morning.2
The words *by you' are significant. Previously, XV Corps had planned 
each attack itself in considerable detail. How they seemed content to 
lay down guidelines and let Divisions work out their own tactics.
Where previously they had given orders, they now gave advice, on occas­
ions even pleading for a particular course of action to be followed.
It would be tempting to put this down to lessons learned on 7th July 
but it is more likely that Corps HQ was simply too busy preparing for 
the forthcoming attack on Bazentin Ridge to spare much time for 
Mametz Wood,
At 2pm XV Corps sent a message to divisions urging then not to dissipate 
their efforts on piece-meal attacks:
All prisoners captured in the last twenty-four hours express 
astonishment that our infantry does not attack in greater 
strength instead of bombing up trenches in twos and threes.
The enemy is much in confusion there being small groups here 
and there of every Regiment. There are some stretches of country
94
without any enemy in it at all. If our infantry attacked in strength 
they could sweep the whole of them back.... All communication 
trenches to the rear are smashed. This information confirms 
that already received from aircraft and other sources. Corps 
Commander impresses on all commanders the necessity of utmost 
vigour and determination in the attacks to be delivered today 
and great results which accrue therefrom. He looks to 
Divisional Commanders ensuring his directions on this point are 
carried out.^
XV Corps, were, however, still willing to fragment their own resources, 
and they asked 17th Division to have one last fling against Quadrangle 
Support Trench before being relieved in the line by the 21st Division, 
They urged a surprise attack that evening using troops who had been 
rested the previous night, 'Machine guns should not stop fresh troops 
if they mean to get in', they said optimistically, 'Impress upon your 
troops that they are going to be relieved tomorrow night, that it is 
up to them to make their reputation by taking the trench before they 
go'.
Although 23rd Division (ill Corps) on the left had arranged to make 
another attack on Contalniaison at 6 pm this was too early for 17th 
Division, who in any case preferred a night attack. On the right, as 
we have seen, the attack by 38th Division had been postponed until 
the following day. No attempt was made to coordinate the efforts of 
these three units and the unfortunate 17th Division went into the 
attack again completely unsupported on either flank.
At 11 pm, the division launched the 51st Brigade against the junction 
of Quadrangle Support and Pearl Mley, and 50th Brigade against the 
junction of Quadrangle Support and Quadrangle Alley (Hap 8 ) as it 
had done so many times before. After a hard night's fighting the 
51st Brigade managed to capture the western half of (Quadrangle 
Support but was soon driven back along it to the junction with Pearl 
Alley where it hung on grimly. The 50th Brigade however was less 
successful and at 3 .3 0 am on the 10th the attack was called off,^
When Maj-Gen Watts assumed command of the 38th (Welsh)Division 
during the afternoon of the 9th July he took with him several members 
of his staff including his GSOl Colonel Bonham Carter who was to 
become the main point of contact between the Division and XV Corps,
The original staff were not entirely eclipsed however and ordersto the 
three Brigades continued to be sent out by Col Rhys Pryce who was 
also to do good work in the field,
95
Although General Watts had been given a free hand by X\^  Corps to 
dispose of Brigades as he wished, he decided not to break up the 
division but to employ it en masse against the southern edge of Mametz 
Wood, putting two Brigades into an initial attack with the third close 
behind. In this, he was not departing very radically from the plans 
previously worked out by Ivor Philipps's. staff but by giving the 
113th Brigade an equal part to play with the 114th Brigade he much 
increased the weight of attack and thus improved the chances of 
success. The artillery programme was however changed considerably 
to make use of techniques developed by both British and French 
in recent fighting.
Orders for the attack were ready by 5.3d pm on 9th July! That evening, 
the Brigadiers of the 113th and 114th Brigades were called to Divisional 
Headquarters at Grovetown 'and given orders by a GOG and staff whom 
they had never seen before, to capture Mametz: Wood at dawn on 10th
zero hour being fixed for 4»15 am'«^ As Grove to vai was 6 miles 
away from the Brigade HQs it was nearly midnight before Brigade staffs 
were fully in the picture. This gave them only 3 hours at most in 
which to alert battalions and move them into position,^but, in contrast 
to the situation on 7th July, there had been ample opportunity before­
hand for battalion commanders to make a reconnaissance of the approaches 
to the wood. That evening, Corps HQ sent the following message which 
was read out to all troops before dawn the next day:
The Commander in Chief has just visited the Corps Commander 
and has impressed upon him the great importance of the occupation 
by us of Mametz Wood, The Corps Commander requests that the 
Division and Brigade Commanders will point out to the troops of 
the Welsh Division the opportunity offered them of serving 
their King and Country at a critical period and earning for 
themselves great glory and distinction.&
The artillery programme apart, there was little subtlety in the plan 
of attack which relied solely on weight of numbers to overrun the 
German defences. There were to be no feints, no outflanking 
manoeuvres: just a straightforward attack in orthodox 'wave'
formation across unpromising ground from White Trench south of the 
wood (see Mapll), dov/n the steep embankment, across the open ground 
and up a gentle rise to the southern-most edge of the wood where the 
Germans had constructed shallow firing trenches. A distance of some 
500 yards of open ground had to be covered. 114th Brigade 
(Brig.-Gen. Harden) was to attack east of the central ride; 113th 
*See Annex D
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Brigade (Brig-G-en Price-Davies) on its left advancing on a narrow 
front between Strip Trench and the central ride. The first objective 
was the capture by 6.15 am of the area of wood south of the first 
cross ride and also the 'Hammerhead* • Once in the wood, the two 
Brigades were to keep in touch along the central ride which would 
be neatly marked with red flags as the troops advanced.^
The artillery programme however contained two novel features. The 
first of these had been evolved by the French to draw enemy troops 
prematurely qut of their dug outs and expose them to shell fire.
The technique, which at that time was not in general use on the 
British front, was to bombard the enemy front line, lift towards the 
rear as if an infantry attack was about to be launched, and then drop 
back on the front line a few minutes later as the enemy came out 
to man the parapets. There were many variants, some including 
simulated infantry attacks, but the one adopted by the combined 
artilleries of the 7th and 38th Divisions was as follows:
From 3.30 am to 4 am every available 18 pounder was first to
bombard the southern edge of the wood and then search back for a
distance of 200 yards. From 4 am to 4.10 am the bombardment
would be switched back to the edge of the wood, all 18 pounders 
and 4.5“ howitzers firing 3 rounds per gun per minute for ten 
minutes and then firing as rapidly as possible for another five 
minutes before making the final lift in advance of the attacking 
infantry.
The second feature was the use of a creeping barrage, then in the 
early stages of development although it had been tried out 
tentatively as early as the battle of Loos in I915 and had been 
used by ZIII Corps on 1st July I9I6. A barrage, as the name 
suggests, is not aimed at any particular target but is intended 
to form a barrier between the attacking infantry and enemy  ^
reinforcements. Originally it had been put down well ahead of the 
attacking troops - often on the enemy support trenches - but the 
advantages of keeping it as close as possible to the infantry had 
become apparent. The ultimate development was to move the barrage 
forward at walking pace with the infantry following very close 
behind. For the attack on Mametz Wood it was arranged that 
at 4 .15 am the barrage would lift back from the edge of the wood by 
steps of 50 yards each minute to a line just north of the first
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cross ride and west of * Hammerhead* where it would remain until ^ 6*15 am 
giving the infantry time to consolidate their positions. The barrage 
was then to lift slowly back again, this time coming to rest just 
north of the second ride. At 7.15 am it was to lift slowly to the 
northern edge of the wood, and one hour after that to the German 
second line.8 The targets allocated to the various artillery groups
and batteries are shown in the diagram at Annex E which has been 
reconstructed from operational orders issued by Commander Royal Artillery, 
7th Division.
10th July ' •
Thé disposition of British and German forces in and around Mamets 
Wood in the early hours of 10th July is shown in MaptO. To the 
right of the 38th (Welsh) Division the 3rd Division. (XIII Corps) 
had taken over from 18th Division in Caterpillar Wood. 3rd Divis­
ion was however busy with preparations for the forthcoming attack 
on Bazentin Ridge and played no active part in the fighting for 
the next few days. The 38th (Welsh) Division retained a toe hold 
in Caterpillar wood to command the Eastern Edge of Mametz Wood.
On the left, as we have seen, 17th (Northern) Division was 
struggling to capture Quadrangle Support trench. Its role during 
the coming day was to support the left flank of the 38th Division 
until relieved in the evening by the 21st Division. Further to 
the left, the 23rd Division (iH Corps) was to continue its attempts 
to capture Contalmaison.
As on 7th July, the southern edge of Mametz Wood v/as held by the 
2nd Battalion (Companies 3, 6, 7 and 8) of the Lehr Infantry 
Regiment (3rd Guards Division). Behind it were units from other 
divisions including part of the 3rd Battalion, l6th Bavarian Regiment 
and of the 2nd Battalion, 184th Regiment. Wood Trench and Wood 
Support were held by the 3rd Battalion of the 122nd (Wurttemburg)
Reserve Regiment (183rd Reserve Infantry Division) which had 
relieved the 163rd Regiment a few days before. Other battalions of 
the 122nd regiment held Quadrangle Support, the Kaisergraben and 
Contalmaison village.
East of the wood, the 3rd Battalion of the Lehr Regiment continued to 
hold the German second line from Bazentin-le-Petit wood to Bazentin-
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le-G-rand and also the positions' forward of this around Flatiron
and Sabot copses* North West of the wood, the second line was
occupied by a mixed force of the 1st Battalion Lehr Regiment and
the fusilier Battalion of the 9th Grenadier Guards, both well
under strength and badly shaken as a result of earlier fighting in
9defence of Contalmaison.
With such a mixture of units, and with both British and German
battalions at less than full strength, it is impossible accurately
to estimate the relative strength of the two sides. One German 
10source puts the ratio of battalions on this part of the front 
at four to one in favour of the British - three Divisions (25rd,
17th and 38th) of twelve battalions each against three German 
Regiments (l83r&, which was west of Contalmaison, 122nd Reserve 
and Lehr) of three battalions each, but tliis ignores the other 
German units mentioned above and thus overstates the British 
advantage. It seems probable however that the British infantry 
outnumbered the German by at least three to oney but the Germans 
of course had the advantage of being on the defensive in well- 
prepared. positions and their troops were in general much more 
highly trained and experienced in battle. Furthermore, unlike the 
British, the Germans tended to keep their divisions in one place 
for long periods so that they knew the ground well,^^
The morning of 10th July was fair and bracing. By 3 am the leading
battalions of the 38th Division were in position between White
Trench and the brow of the cliff and there was nothing to do but wait
They were to attack in parallel lines or * waves* as they had
practised in manoeuvres, with bayonets fixed and rifles held in
the high port position, 4 paces between each man, 100 yards
between each line, the l6th RWF leading for the 113th Brigade with
14th BifF close behind, and the 13th and 14th Welsh leading on the
12114th Brigade front (see Map 6) , David Jones, then a private
soldier with the 15th HJF in Queen* s Nullah, has captured the 
feeling of tension among the waiting infantry:
Racked out to another turn of the screw 
the acceleration heightens:
the sensibility of these instruments to register, 
fails:
needle dithers disorientate.
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The responsive mercury plays laggard to such fevers - you 
simply can* t take any more in.
And the surfeit of fear steadies to dumb incognition,
so that
when they give the order to move upward to align with *A*, 
hugged already just under the lip of the aclivity 
inches below where his traversing machine-guns 
perforate to powder white - 
White creatures of chalk pounded 
- : and the world crumbled away
and get ready to advance 1^
you have not capacity for added fear...,.
On the left, the l6 RWF sang hymns in Welsh and Col, Carden addressed
his men with religious fervour, *Boys, make your peace with God*.
We are going to take that position and some of us won*t come back,
14
But v;e are going to take it*. At 3*50 am the artillery opened 
up as planned and 20 minutes later a smoke screen, laid just south 
of Strip Trench, drifted effectively North Eastward. As zero hour 
approached, the two leading battalions of the 114th Brigade, having 
the greater distance to travel, moved off early, at 4 .09 am, so as to 
be near the wood when the artillery lifted off the southern edge.
This seems to have taken the l6th RWF by surprise and caused a 
moment of confusion. Colonel Carden had gone over to the 
114th Brigade for consultation and was still away when the 13th 
and IZhth Welsh had moved off. His second in command, Major McLellan, 
assumed that he had become a casualty and gave the word to advance;
On reaching the brow of the hill, the leading lines saw the 
114th Brigade, or parts of it, retiring and they too wavered.
Some went forward but almost all returned to their previous 
positions. This was not a headlong flight but was done slowly 
and was largely owing to someone who cannot be traced raising 
a shout of * Retire’.
Almost immediately after this, Col, Carden returned and the 
advance began again. Captain Westbrooke and Lt, Venables 
had shown great coolness in pulling their men together, and 
this time the movement was carried out in good order. All 
the officers state that the advance down the hill-side under 
heavy artillery and machine-gun fire was executed vdth perfect 
steadiness,I3
The delay however cost the battalion the protection of the artillery, 
and enemy fire from the edge of the wood and from Quadrangle Alley and 
Vfood Trench soon broke up the formation. Carden, a conspicuous figure 
with his stick held high, was wounded and fell, but he struggled on to 
the edge of the wood where he was k i l l e d , T h e  two companies of the 
14th Battalion RWF following close behind likewise ran into heavy fire 
when about 200 yards from the wood. Their Commanding Officer,
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Major Gv/yther was badly wounded and Captain Glynn Jones gave the order 
to reform in a cutting at the bottom of the cliff. Later, he described 
the descent down the cliff as he saw it from his position in the third 
wave;
Machine guns and rifles began to rattle, and there was a general 
state of pandemonium, little of which I can remember except 
that I myself was moving down the slope at a rapid rate, with 
bullet-holes in my pocket and yelling a certain amount, I 
noticed also that there was no appearance whatsoever of waves 
about the movement at this time, and that the men in advance 
of us were thoroughly demoralised. Out of the most terrible 
* mix-up* I have ever seen I collected all the men I could see and 
ordered them into the cutting. There appeared to be no one 
ahead of us, no one fallowing us, and by this time it was broad 
daylight and the ridge behind us was being subjected to a terrible 
artillery and machine-gun fire,
I well remember thinking *Here comes the last stand of the old 
Caernarvon and'Angleseys* as I ordered the men to get ready and 
posted a Lewis gun on each of my flanks...... Meanwhile, men
were crawling in from shell-holes to our front, with reports 
of nothing less than a terrible massacre, and the names of most 
of our officers and NCOs lying dead in front,^7
On the far right, the Lehr regiment had placed a machine-gun company 
skilfully on the underside of the Hammerhead (see Map n) and its 
fire caught the leading waves of the 13th Welsh (2nd Rhondda) in the 
flank as they approached the wood, Sgt, Price described the scene;
We attacked on a two company frontage, A and B Company 13th 
Vfelsh leading, followed by C and D. I was in A Company, No 2 
platoon.
We were loaded up with 4 Mills bombs each in our pockets and 
4 bandoliers of ammunition across our shoulders, which was 
quite heavy and which made the approach to the wood quite a 
physical task.
As the barrage started we moved off in quite an orderly fashion
....... The tension and noise cannot be described, what with
the traction of shells through the air and the noise of explosions 
all round us, it was almost impossible to give verbal orders and 
we had to rely on hand signals for directing any move.
Men were falling in all directions due to intense machine-gun 
fire coming against us. How we got to the wood I do not know; 
but we got there and entered it for a short distance before the 
Germans came at us - head on - and there was quite a lot of 
action before we were forced to retreat back into the field 
again, where we got into shell holes or any other form of cover 
we could get. The Germans followed us to the edge of the wood 
but as our lines were then able to fire on them they quickly 
returned to the protection of the tree s t u m p s . ^8
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As C & D Companies came forward, a second attempt was made to enter 
the wood. This was also repulsed but a third attempt was more success* 
ful and the 13th Yfelsh pushed on into the wood.
In the centre, the Swansea battalion (l4th Welsh) had the advantage 
of being protected on the flanks from enfilade fire. The battalion 
crossed the open ground in perfect formation and arrived at the edge 
of the wood just as the barrage was lifting back. The artillery 
tactics had worked well here and there were few casualties amongst 
the first waves of infantry. The rear waves were not so fortunate 
however and several officers fell, including the second in command 
and three Company commanders. Once in the wood the battalion found it
difficult to make progress. The undergrowth was thick and the central
ride almost indistinguishable, 'Many of the shells, probably from
both sides, hit the trees above us, detonated and caused us more
casualties’, Sgt. Lyons of D Company, wrote long afterwards.
’Progress through the wood was slow due mainly to German machine
gun fire but also to the density of the undergrowth in the wood.
This also impeded visibility. It was difficult to maintain our
sense of direction but I was helped in this by being able to tell
19the difference between the sound of our guns and ■the Germans’.
On the left, the léth RWP also entered the wood, the bombers 
successfully pushing up Strip Trench in spite of severe casualties.
The undergrowth was not so thick in this part of the wood but 
British shells had blown trees across the trench and at one point 
water was pouring in from a nearby pond. One of the bombers.
Private Griffith Jones remembers moving up through the mud:
I came up against a foot-thick tree trunk. I decided not to 
go underneath as the mud would be up to my neck so I lifted
one leg over it A German behind a bush about
\ 25 yards away levelling his rifle towards me. I threw 
myself back . «.. * ^ n ^ ,.... was hit by a bullet in the leg. 
Eventually I got up in the mud and felt burning pain and saw the 
mud-covered putties red with blood, I took the bayonet off 
my rifle and using the rifle as a crutch I trudged along back down 
the trench. When I came to the open I fell down exhausted and 
was taken away by stretcher b e a r e r . ^0
The 16th R'JP v/as soon joined by the 15th RWF (London Welsh), whom 
Brig-Gen Price-Davies had committed to the attack almost from the 
outset, and later by two companies of the 13th RJF - the last of the 
113th Brigade's four battalions. The Germans were now surrendering
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in large numbers and the three R#F battalions, pushing out patrols 
in all directions, were able to move towards the first cross-ride, 
joining up en route with the 6th Dorsets (l7th Division) in Wood 
Trench,
At about this time,.Capt, Glynn Jones, with the remnants of the 
14th RWF still gathered in the cutting below the embankment saw 
about 40 German soldiers leaving the wood with their hands up:
Suspecting a trick, I ordered my men to cover them but 
allowed them to approach us, Vfhen they got about half-way 
I went out to meet them, accompanied by a Sergeant, and 
sent them back to headquarters. As this appeared to point 
to the wood being unoccupied, I sent a small patrol to examine 
it; and then we all moved forward. Crossing the trench 
on the fringe of it, we entered the wood at the entrance of the 
main ride, and with two patrols in front advanced up the rise 
in file, as the undergrowth was very thick,21
Meanwhile, on the 114th Brigade front, the 13th a,nd 14th Welsh, now 
reinforced by 10th Welsh (1st Rhondda), also made progress towards 
the first cross ride "which they reached, and then passed at about 5 am 
while the barrage was still falling on it. *We suffered many 
casualties from our own shell fire', the 13th Welsh Battalion 
diary records, 'Major Bond being killed. When it was realised it was 
our own barrage we were in and not that of the Hun, the order to 
withdraw was given and the Battalion withdrew for a time. During the 
interval we fell in with the 10th Welsh coming up to re-inforce and got 
in touch with the 14th Welsh, Colonel Hayes (l4th Welsh) ordered the 
Battalion to dig in along the ride at E' (see map U). Colonel Hayes 
had earlier sent a message to Brigade headquarters asking for the 
artillery to be lifted right back to the German second line,
Brig-Gen Harden relayed the message to the artillery but the request 
was refused. The artillery stuck to its programme and Col. Hayes was 
told to strengthen his position and to be ready to advance at the 
appointed hour. According to the Official History, this 'afforded 
the enemy such a respite that he thought better of evacuating the
wood completely', orders to this effect having been v/ritten at 4 .15 am
2? —
by the local German commander.
In spite of this however the first stage of the attack had been quite 
successful. Hammerhead on the right and Wood Support trench on the
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left were still in German hands, but otherwise the first objective 
had been captured well ahead of timetable, though at considerable 
cost* Even at this early stage, seven battalions had been committed, 
five of which had lost their commanders killed or badly wounded - 
Lt* Col* Picketts of the 10th Welsh having been hit several times 
while bringing his battalion forward in support* Casualties had 
also been high among the other officers making it difficult to 
exercise control over the thousands of men already in the wood. The 
British High Command was however well content, Haig in particular 
expressing his satisfaction with morning reports that two Brigades had 
succeeded in entering the wood*^^
If the fighting so far in Mametz Wood had been hectic and confused on 
the British side, it was no less so for the Germans. At 4 .I5 am, as 
the 38th Division penetrated the Southern edge of the wood, the 
5th Company of the Lehr Regiment became trapped between the léth RWF 
pushing up Strip Trench and the 14th Welsh in the centre. Some of the 
guardsmen, as we have seen, left the wood and surrendered to Capt,Glynn 
Jones*s group at the foot of the cliff, but others held their ground 
until overrun. The 7th and 8th Companies however, under 
Lt. Pfeiffer worked their way skilfully back towards the northern edge 
of Hammerhead to join up with the 3rd Battalion at Flatiron Copse*
The machine-gun company at the SE corner of the wood also withdrew 
successfully, and although two guns were lost, another three kent up 
a deadly fire as they moved from shell hole to shell hole back 
towards the second line* In the centre, remnants of the 6th Company 
retreated towards the middle of the wood where they joined up with two 
platoons of the léth Bavarian Infantry Regiment and held on until 
the afternoon, when they too were forced back towards the second 
line.^^
At é.15 am the British artillery began its ponderous programme of slow 
lifts to the second cross-ride, the infantry following closely behind 
wherever possible. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the left however 
met strong opposition at Wood Support Trench and at the corner of the 
wood — point J on Map 7 “ where the 2nd Battalion of the German 
122nd Infantry Regiment had its headquarters in a well-defended 
redout. Lt.Col. Flower was therefore sent forward with the last 
two companies of the 13th RWF *to find out the exact situation and 
reorganise the Brigade’ *  ^ Shortly afterwards Brig-Gen Price-Davies
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received permission from Divisional HQ to enter the wood and together 
with Colonel Gosset of the Fourth Army staff he made his v/ay up Strip 
Trench, where he was distressed to see a party of men ’running back in 
panic*. David Jones, who also witnessed this incident, puts it down 
to lack of supervision, ’Something must have developed, if not 
into a panic, at least into a disorderly falling back - simply because 
of not having precise directions.'
■. • , , ■ '
Order was however soon restored and the two fresh companies of the 
13th RV/F began to advance through the troops in front of them, one 
company being given the task of holding the first cross-ride, the other 
of pushing on ahead into the wood. When they reached the cross-ride 
however, both companies became caught up in the confused fighting amongst 
the tangled trees and little further progress was made that morning.
Over at Flatiron Copse things were a little easier for the Germans, 
although the 3rd Battalion of the Lehr Regiment had suffered heavy 
losses during the Artillery bombardment of this area. However, as 
no infantry attack followed, the Regimental commander, Lt. Col. Kumme 
urged the Battalion to send help to the 2nd Battalion in Mametz; Wood, 
Major von Kriegsheim, the battalion commander, sent off one platoon 
each from the $th, 10th and 12th Companies and to these were added a 
platoon of the 5th Company/l84th Infantry Regiment. This group, 
under Lt. Kummetz reached the eastern edge of the wood at about 9 am, 
joined up with the ?th and 8th Companies, and created havoc among 
British troops in Hammerhead. Later on, Major von Kriegsheim sent 
another platoon to join this force but only under pressure from his 
superiors, and even then with great reluctance. He had still not 
ruled out the possibility that the British might launch a flanking 
attack east of the wood and he saw little sense in weakening the 
second line at this point in order to defend a wood the only strategic 
importance of viiich was in defence of that veiy line.
Meanwhile, since on the right the 13th Welsh was failing to make 
progress in, the Hammerhead the last of the 114th Brigade*s four 
battalions - the Carmarthenshires (15th Welsh) - was sent in to 
help. Together, the 13th and 15th Welsh pushed through the 
Hammerhead almost to point X (see Map 7) but were then driven back 
by Lt. Kumme tz* s group which had managed to get behind tv/o companies 
of the 15th Welsh and ambush two platoons. Machine-gun and rifle
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fire caught the Welshmen in the rear and of the two platoons (about
100 men) only 4 men found their way back to the battalion. The 15th
Welsh fell back on the line DE, with its left in touch with other battalions
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on the first cross-ride. Thus by mid-morning the British line in 
the wood ran roughly from point J on the left, through F to D and thence 
in a south-easterly direction to the edge of the wood (see Map 7)*
Shortly after 9 &m, at the request of 38th Division headquarters, the
Heavy Artillery had fired for 15 minutes on the wood north of the
second ride and on the German 2nd line. But this did not stop German
reinforcements from arriving, and large parties of them were seen
28
entering the wood from the north at about 9«35 am. At 10,30,
Brig-Gen Harden put Lt. Col. Hayes (l4th Welsh) in charge of all forces 
east of the central ride and ordered him to advance to the second '
cross-ride. This he did successfully in the centre, pushing forward 
about 200 yards before being held up for lack of support on the 
right. As the wood had now swallowed up all his troops, and little 
progress was being made, Brig-Gen Harden sought permission to enter 
the wood to see the position for himself and to reorganise. Gen, Watts 
however refused to let him go and instead sent in from the 115th Brigade 
the two battalions which had suffered least on 7th July; the. 17th 
KYF going to the assistance of the 113rd Brigade on the left, and 
the 10th SWB (1st Gwent) to the 114th Brigade on the right. To ease 
congestion on the 113th Brigade front, the 15th and the léth RWF 
were withdrawn temporarily from the wood. The fresh troops arrived 
at about 2,40 pm and gave new impetus to the attack. After another 
bombardment of the northern part of the wood, the two battalions 
began to push forward, the 17th RV/F by-passing the end of Wood 
Support trench and the German strong-point nearby. To its left, 
the 13th RWF bombed down Wood Support trench to meet troops of 
the 17th Division approaching from the other end. On the right 
the 10th SWB also made good progress, pushing forward to the line 
YV (map 7) with some patrols penetrating almost to the north-eastern 
corner of the wood. Eventually however the battalion was brought 
to a halt by machine-gun fire from the northern edge of the 
Hammerhead,
At 3 pm, Brig-Gen Harden was allowed to enter the wood where he 
conferred with Brig-Gen Price-Davies and Lt, Col. Rhys Pryce, the
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GSOl 38th Division, who had cone forward with the reserves.
Between them, they decided to straighten out the line, and, at 
4 .30,pm, to make a concerted sweep throu^ the wood. The 17th RWF 
supported hy the 14th and 15th Welsh made considerable progress 
against little opposition on the ground although German snipers 
in the trees inflicted a good many casualties.
By 6 ,30 pm the battalion had reached to within 30 or 40 yards 
of the northern edge of the wood. The 10th SWB, which had been 
tasked with capturing Hammerhead, pushed between Lt. Kummetz's 
group and other German forces in the wood. Major von Kriegsheim 
thereupon ordered the withdrawal of Kummetz* s group leaving 
Hammerhead in the hands of the 10th SWB. On the far left, however, 
the 13th RWF which had to spread out westward to cover the wider 
part of the wood, fell behind and it was some time before it 
caught up with the other battalions. With the front now close to the 
German second line, the troops came under very heavy machine-gun 
fire and were withdrawn to a line 200 or 3OO yards from the northern 
edge of the wood, with the left flanlc pulled back along the railway 
line (map 8). Here they dug in for the night. By now the troops 
were tired and jumpy, as well as being badly in need of water.
There was a great deal of wild fixing during the night and some 
men panicked down the central ride when the Germans threatened a 
counter attack. Eventually order was restored and the exhausted 
men fell asleep.
During the evening the German High command, having completely 
underestimated the number of British troops in the wood and 
the extent to which they had penetrated, had ordered the wood to be 
held at all costs and at 7 pm sent in the 2nd battalion of the 
184th Infantry Regiment to recapture it, assisted by a company of 
Pioneers hastily converted to fighting troops. Together, the two 
units pushed through the wood from the north until they met the 
British troops dug in on a line 200 yards from the edge of the wood. 
Realising the strength of the opposition, they too dug themselves in.
Outside the wood, the 17th Division finally captured Quadrangle 
Support Trench, but not before Contalmaison had fallen to the 
23rd Division at about 5.3O pm. Attempts earlier in the day to 
capture the trench by bombing up Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Alley
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had ended in disaster. Lt Kostlin, in command of a company of 122nd 
Infantry Reserve Regiment holding Quadrangle Support Trench at the 
time, has described how in one such attack the 7th East Yorks found 
Quadrangle Alley blocked 20 yards short of the junction and attempted 
to cross in the open to Quadrangle Support:
My sentries.... noticed steel helmets moving about above 
ground-level at the sap-head /in Quadrangle Alley/ and kept 
it under careful watch. .Each time the men began to climb up 
out of the sap-head and run forward at us vdth bombs, the 
sentries gave the alarm, and we were able to greet them with 
heaver fire at point-blank range. Then others crowded at the 
sap-head and repeated the effort, but with equal failure and 
by midday a heap of British dead and wounded lay about the 
sap-head.
After dark however, vdth Contalmaison taken and the 38th Division well 
advanced in Mametz Wood, Lt. Kostlin and his men, threatened on three 
sides, made good their escape to the rear:
The ground behind our trench was being continually shelled, 
but about midnight the fire ceased and we decided to rush for 
it. The plan worked successfully,' and although a number of 
men were wounded by shells and stray bullets we succeeded, a 
total of 5 officers and 120 men, in reaching the barbed 
I wire entanglements in front of the second line position at
1 ,30  am. Here we were greeted by a machine gun which suddenly 
opened from the trench, but throwing ourselves on the ground and 
shouting we soon convinced the gunner of his error and luckily 
with no cost to ourselves.^9
Thus as 10th July drevf to a close, and lyth Division handed its part 
of the front back to 21st Division, the British were established in 
Contalmaison; in most of Mametz: Wood; and in the trenches in between, 
Everything seemed set for the advance on the German second line. 
‘Another day of heavy fighting', Rawlinson wrote in his diary. 'The 
38th Division succeeded in capturing practically the whole of Mametz 
Wood and the III Corps also took Contalmaison. In these circumstances 
I have decided to begin the bombardment of their second line tomorrow 
and to attack it on the 13th at dawn, weather permitting'. Haig 
was also well satisfied as he toured Army and Corps Headquarters that 
evening. ' I sav; Gen. Horne, commanding XV Corps at He illy' he wrote. 
'He reported that Gen, Watts (Comdg 7th Division) had temporarily 
taken command of the 38th Welsh Division and had nearly got the whole 
of Mametz Wood. Y/hat an effect on the division has a good commander!' 5L
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At 5 am . on 11th July, Brig-G-en Evans (ll^th Brigade) took over command 
of the troops in Mametz Wood, He established his Brigade Headquarters 
in a shell-torn clearing at the cross-roads on the first cross-ride 
and brought up the l6th Welsh (Cardiff City) battalion and two companies 
of the 11th S\7B to relieve units of the 113th and 114th Brigades. T/lie 
only other troops at his disposal - the remaining companies of the 11th 
SY/Bj the 115th MG Company and the 115th Trench mortar Battery continued 
to hold the Western end of Caterpillar lYood. When he arrived in 
Mamets Y/ood, Brig-Gen Evans was surprised to find the front line 
still a long way from the Northern edge, for he had been under the 
impression that the wood had been more or less completely taken and 
that his task was to defend it against possible counter-attack, rather 
than to carry out an attack himself,
When he inspected the line, Brig-Gen Evans found the battalions of 
the 113th and 114th Brigades, and the two battalion of his own 
Brigade which had gone into action the previous day, scattered and 
disorganised, with some units weali in numbers and very tired. He 
therefore straightened the line, sorted out the battalions, and as 
far as possible replaced tired men with fresh. The . 13th Welsh and 
14th Y/elsh, in particular, which had led the attack and been in action 
continuously for more than 24 hours were withdrawn completely from 
the wood. The new dispositions were: on the left, the Cardiff 
City Battalion (l6th Welsh) occupied the line along the railway as 
far south as point 0 , vdth the 1? RVfP on the right holding the line 
to the central ride. The 11th South Wales Borderers held the line 
east of the central ride with the 10th South Wales Borderers on their 
right occupying the northern part of Hammershead. The l6th RWE which 
had had a period of rest outside the wood was brought back to secure 
the railv/ay line between points 0 and K (see map
liVhile this reorganisation was in progress, the Brigade-Major of the 
115th Brigade was hit by shrapnel and Brig-Gen Evans sent for 
Capt. Griffith to join him in the wood, A few weeks previously,
Capt, Griffith had been a Company officer in the 15 RV/F: now without
staff training, he was to become a Brigade-Major at the height of a 
battle :
.14
I passed through two barrages before I reached the wood, one 
aimed at the body, and the other at the mind. The enemy was 
shelling the approach from the South with some determination, 
but I was fortunate enough to escape injury and to pass to an 
ordeal ever greater. Men of my old battalion were lying dead 
on the ground in great profusion. They wore a yellow badge on 
their' sleeves, and vdth out this distinguishing mark, it would 
have been impossible to recognise the remains of many of them.
My first acquaintance with the stubborn nature of the undergrowth 
came when I attempted to leave the main ride to escape a heavy 
shelling. I could not push a way through it, and I had to return 
to the ride. Years of neglect had turned the wood into a 
formidable barrier, a mile deep. Heavy shelling of the Southern 
end had beaten down some of the young growth, but it had also . 
thrown trees and large branches into a barricade. Equipment, 
ammunition, rolls of barbed vdre, tins of food, gas-helmets 
and rifles were lying about everywhere. There were more corpses 
than men, but there were worse sights than corpses. Limbs and 
mutilated trunks, here and there a detached head, forming 
splashes of red against the green leaves, and, as in advertise­
ment of the horror of our way of life and death, and of our 
crucifixion of youth, one tree held in its branches a leg, with 
its torn flesh hanging down over a spray of leaf.
I reached a cross-ride in the Y/ood where four lanes broadened 
into a confused patch of destruction. Fallen trees, shell 
holes, a hurriedly dug trench beginning and ending in an 
uncertain manner, abandoned rifles, broken branches with 
their sagging leaves, an unopened box of ammunition, sandbags 
half-filled with bombs, a derelict machine-gun propping up the 
head of an immobile figure in uniform, with a belt of ammuni­
tion drooping from the breech into a pile of red-stained earth 
.......35
Here he found the Brigade Commander who explained that the Battalions 
were straightening themselves out and strengthening their positions 
before making probes and reconnaissances to establish whether or not 
the enemy was holding the Northern end of the wood in strength. 
Major-General Watts however at Divisional HQ more than 6 miles 
away had no such doubts. He sent a message at 11 am to say that the 
German trenches in front of Bazentin were being shelled and that 'it 
was quite impossible that he had any strong force in JiAlISTZ WOOD’.
He considered that an attack with only a few men 'advancing with deter­
mination' was bound to succeed and he ordered the 115th Brigade to 
attack and occupy the Northern and Western edges of the Y/ood 'at 
the earliest moment', as the Corps Commander had strongly impressed 
upon him the importance of clearing the Wood without d e l a y . W h i l e  
Brigadier Evans was considering this order Lt. Col. Gossett of the 
Fourth Army staff arrived and himself gave orders for the attack 
to be carried out. 'The Brigadier listened to him with the patience
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of an older man coldly assessing the enthusiasm of youth' wrote 
Griffith. 'When the Staff Officer had finished, the General 
spoke. "I've just had orders from the Di\rision to attack and 
clear the rest of the Wood, and to do it at once. The defence 
is incomplete, the units are disorganised, and I did not propose 
to attack until we were in a better position. My patrols report 
that the Northern edge is strongly held. I haven't a fresh battalion, 
and no one can say what is the strength of any unit...... My
intention is to take the remainder of the Wood by surprise, with 
the bayonet if possible; no artillery bombardment to tell him 
that we are coming, I want a bombardment of the main German 
second line when we have taken our objective, to break up any counter­
attack.*' ’
Ydien the Staff Officer had gone, orders were issued to the three 
central Battalions to prepare for an attack Northward at 3 pm, 
the 16th Welsh working up the railway track, the 17 RWF up the 
central ride, and the 11th SY® along the Eastern edge of the wood. 
Patrols had suggested that the Wood was fairly clear in front of the 
16th Y/elsh but that the I7 RvVF and 11 SYYB could expect to run into 
strong opposition. Several German machine-guns were reported to be 
positioned near the centre of the Northern edge of the Wood.
At a quarter to three, these plans were upset by a heavy barrage
put down on the Northern end of the Wood by British artillery. As
all telephone wires had been cut, it was impossible to stop it
although three runners were promptly sent off by different routes in ■
38an attempt to get a message through.^ At 3.3O pm, the barrage 
lifted — not because the runners had arrived with their messages but 
because this was the programme planned by General Watts, and communi­
cated to the Commander, Royal Artillery, 7th Division, though not, 
it would seem, to Brig-Gen Evans.
Although the battalions had postponed their attack, they still 
suffered severly from the shell-fire as the 18 pounders of the artillery 
was now firing at the limit of their range and shells were falling 
s h o r t W h e n  the bombardment stopped the Battalions moved forward.
The 11th SWB on the right reached the North-East corner of the wood 
by 3 .40 pm. in spite of stubborn resistance by the Germans, who 
again made good use of defensive machine-gun fire. The l6th Welsh
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and 17th EiCF however met even stronger resistance and were forced 
back to their original positions. Two companies of the 10th S\YB 
and two of the 10th Welsh Regiment were brought forward to help 
and the l6th Welsh and 17th RWF were ordered to renew their attack 
to relieve pressure on the right. ' The 11th. SV/B held on to their 
advanced position and at 8 pm even tried to work Westwai-d along the 
Northern edge of the wood only to find that the Germans had been 
strongly reinforced. .
The 16th Welsh and 17th R//F were however again thrown back leaving 
the 11th SWB in a precarious position. Brig-Gen Evans with no other 
troops immediately at his disposal except a hundred or so Pioneers, 
realised that the.11th SWB were now dangerously exposed and, although 
desperately anxious to hold the North-East corner, he told the 
Commanding Officer of the 11th SWB (Lt. Col. Gaussen) to use his 
discretion and, if necessary, withdraw to his old position. This he 
did, and by 9*20 pm all the troops on the right were back where they 
had started.
Meanwhile, over on the far left, the l6th RWF now joined by the 
10th and 15th Welsh on the lower part of the railway (O - K) had 
managed to gain the Western edge of the Wood and dig in. . One 
platoon bombed its way northward to come into line with the other 
battalions, ^00 yards from the Northern edge and at one point managed 
to penetrate almost to the NorthhWest corner. At 11 pm however they 
came under heavy Artillery and mortar fire and were compelled to 
withdraw East of the railway. Towards midnight, the German opened 
up with rifle and machine-gun.fire from the Northern edge cf the 
Wood but the tired British troops did not respond. Throughout 
the night, German artillery systematically bombarded the wood the 
and 8" shells and inflicted many casualties’.^*'^
On the German side, there was complete determination to hold the 
2nd line behind Mametz Wood at all costs and to retain the Northern 
strip of the wood as a buffer. The remnants of the 1st Battalion 
Lehr Regiment, and of the Fusilier Battalion of the 9th Grenadier 
Regiment holding the line north-west of Mametz Wood were ordered to 
push forward patrols into the Wood, to establish the true strength 
and position of the British troops. The patrols were also to bring
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, back news of other German units in the Vfood and, if possible, clear 
the patrolled area of British troops - an almost impossible task.
It proved to be quite beyond them as heavy artillery fire and 
difficult conditions underfoot hindered their progress. On both 
sides of the light railway, they encountered units of the 184th 
Infantry Regiment in position but found it difficult to estimate 
their strength. To the West, but still inside the Wood they met 
units of the l6th Bavarian Infantry Regiment and sharpshooters from 
the 9th Grenadiers. They also had difficulty in establishing the 
extent of British occupation of the Wood but estimated, correctly, 
that they were within 150^200 metres of the Northern edge. The 
patrols failed to make contact with the other Battalions of the Lehr 
Regiment but in the afternoon came across a company of the 77th 
Reserve Infantry Regiment (2nd Guards Reserve Division) which had 
been sent forward 'to clear Mamets: V/ood*. The patrols seem to 
have regarded this as a futile attempt, being of the opinion that 
it would need a large force of fresh troops to sucoeed.^^ Never­
theless, this unit, together with the 2nd Battalion of the 184th 
Infantry Regiment and remnants of the 122nd Reserve Infantry 
Regiment, helped frustrate the AVelsh attack in the centre of the 
wood from 4 pm onwards.^
Although the German patrols failed to find the 2nd Battalion of the. 
Lehr Regiment in the wood, some companies of the battalion were in 
fact still there, but weak in numbers, in spite of having received 
a hundred new recruits during the night. The previous day, they 
had lost heavily: one officer killed, two taken prisoner; 82
Warrant Officers, NCOs and guardsmen killed, 6l wounded and 254 
missing. The now depleted units came under the command of an 
officer of the 77th Regiment and continued their stubborn defence of 
the wood until 8 pm by which time it was clear that the Wood could no 
longer be held and a retreat to the second line was ordered. The 
evacuation began as darkness fell and only a few patrols were left 
inside the Wood,^^
Just before dawn on 12th July, the four battalions of the 62nd 
Infantry Brigade (21st Division) moved up to relieve the exhausted 
units of the 38th Division in the Wood. This was not before time.
The conditions of the Welshmen had been cause for common concern at
119
Corps Headquarters as early as 8 am on the previous morning as the 
record of a telephone conversation between General Watts and the 
Corps Commander shows:
8 am July 11th. .
The situation in MA.METZ WOOD was being investigated ■with a 
view to clearing it up and establishirg a line on the 
northern edge of the Wood. General Watts was of the 
opinion that if the 38th Division were not in a condition 
to do so, he had better put one of the battalions of the 
7th Division in to do the job. Corps Commander concurred 
but impressed upon General Watts the desirability of not 
using the battalion of the 7th Division if it were possible 
to avoid doing so. Corps Commander would direct GOG 21st 
Division to arrange with General Watts for the relief of th^x 
38 Division in Mametz Wood at the earliest possible moment,
Later that day, arrangements were made for the Welsh Division to be 
withdrawn from the battle area to billets around Hibemont and Treux,, 
about 9 miles away. The battalions already outside the Wood were 
to begin marching that afternoon. Those still fighting 'will on 
relief march to the CITADEL ^  miles from the V/oo^ and bivouac for 
the night' before proceeding to the billeting area.^^ By the time 
the last unit left the wood for the CITADEL however it was 6.30 am on 
12th July and there was little time for rest. At dawn the following 
morning the 115th Brigade began its long march behind the other two 
Brigades:
The clear air and fresh sunlight, the green fields, the white road 
and the pale blue sky all combined together to make a fit setting 
for a pageant of youth in bright colours. There was a quality 
in the hour and the place, a harmony in the open countryside,
indescribable save in terms of serenity Against this background
of freshness and-purity a slow-moving worm of dingy yellow twisted 
itself round the corner made by a jutting shoulder of downland.
The battalions of the brigade were marching in column of fours 
along the road, and from a little distance it was clear that there 
was a lack of spine in the column. No ring of feet, no swing of 
shoulder, no sway of company; slack knees and frequent hitching 
of packs, a doddering rise and fall of heads, and much leaning 
forvrardo Fatigue and exhaustion in a body of men attain an 
intensity greater than the simple sum of all the individual 
burdens of its members warrant. This loss of quality in a unit 
marching away from the Somme battlefield was made more evident 
by the rising memory of the sturdy column that svrung its way down 
. the hedge-bound lanes in the early morning of the end of June, 
a bare fortnight past singing and laughing in the happiness of 
relief from the fetters of the trenches in Flanders, To-day the 
silence was unbroken save by the shuffling of feet and the clank­
ing of equipment.
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A walk along the column brought a new aspect of our condit­
ion to view. A captain was leading a battalion, subalterns 
and company sergeant-majors were marching at the heads of companies, 
corporals in front of platoons. Men were marching abreast who 
had never before stood together in the same file,. There are 
no gaps in a battalion on the march, though many have fallen, 
but the d o  sing-up that follows losses tells its own tale. The 
faces of many silent and hard-eyed men showed they were but half- 
.aware of their new neighbours, newcomers who jostled the ghosts 
of old companions, usurpers who were themselves struggling against 
the same griefs and longings, marching forward with minds that 
looked backwards into time and space.^
The 21st Division had little difficulties in clearing the remaining
portion of Mametz. Wood. The Germans sent out reconnaissance patrols
from the Second line, but these offered no resistance and troops of
the 21st Division reached the Northern edge of the Vfood just after
midday on 12th July, They found hundreds of German dead in the wood
49and 13 heavy guns. As the Germans had evacuated the Wood on the
night of llth/l2th July however, its capture can be attributed-wholly
to the 38th (Welsh) Division. It had cost them dearly. The casualties
for the period 7th~12th July totalled nearly 4,000, including 6OO
50killed and a lilce number missing:
Killed 4Ô officers 55^ otlisr ranks
Wounded I38 " 2,668 " "
Missing 6 " 579 " "
Total 190 " 3,803
Sbme battalions were severely mauled, including the l6th Welsh 
(Cardiff City) Battalion which suffered more than 350 casualties 
- almost half its fighting strength. 'On the Somme* wrote Private 
Joshua afterwards, 'the Cardiff City Battalion died'. 51
On the eve of the battle the Commander-in-Chief had urged the men 
of the Welsh Division to take the opportunity offered them 'of 
serving their King and Country at a critical period and earning for 
themselves great glory and distinction’. Two days later, they had 
succeeded in driving the Germans from the largest of all the woodlands 
on the Somme though with appalling casualties. Glory and distinction 
was not noticeably showered upon them. Instead they were bundled 
unceremoniously away to a quiet sector of the front, and todtno furthei 
part in the fighting on the Somme.
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35. Bl. Wyn Griffith, Up to Mametz pp 208-213
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124
says that interrupted telephone communications caused half 
an hours delay: *At 3*30 pm the British Artillery ceased
firing on the Northern edge of the v.^ ood’• The 115th Brigade 
diary also says that the bombardment lasted until 3»30 pm 
but the diary of the 35th Brigade RFA (7th Division) records 
that their batteries 'bombarded northern edge of Mamets Wood .
   till 3*15 pm'.
40. \70 95/1643. 22nd Brigade RFA, War Diary. Entry for 11th July
1916: 'Fighting in MMIETZ WOOD still continues but our
advance has now progressed so far that batteries are 
becoming out of range.'
41. WO 95/2560. 115th Brigade War Diary. 11th July I916.
42. ibid. '
4 3* Mulmann und Mohs, Gesohichte des Lehr Infanterie Regiments, p 293
44# The War Diary of the 115th Brigade records that at 4 pm,
prisoners from the 77th Regiment and 122nd Regiment 
were taken who "stated that 1000 men had been thrown into 
the Wood on the night of lO/llth July".
45o Mulmann und Mohs. Gesohichte des Lehr Infanterie Regiments, p 300. 
46.. WO 95/921 XV Corps War Diary. Appendix 63/7
47c WO 95/2-539 38th Division War Diary Appendix 12
Zi-8. Griffith, Up to Mamets:, pp 231-234
49* Edmonds, Official History I916 Vol. 2 p 54
5O0 The figures are taken from Harden; The Welch Regiment 1914-
1918. p 390. Harden also gives figures for each battalion 
of the Welsh Regiment involved in the fighting (but not for 
battalions of the other two Regiments represented in the 
Division). These figures are approximately the same as 
those recorded in the battalion diaries. It has not been 
possible to check Harden's figure for the Division as a 
whole as the complete casualty figures for all the RJF 
battalions are not recorded. There is no reason to doubt 
the figure of about 4,000 which is also given in the 
Official History.
51* William Joshua *. Letter to the author, 25 Jan. 1974
125
CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions
e . a n d  when the chemical
thick air dispels you see briefly and ?^ith groat
clearness
what kind of a show this is.
The attack on Bazentin Ridge
As soon as the ^th (Welsh) Division had penetrated Mametz Wood 
on 10th July, Rawlinson made up his mind to attack Bazentin Ridge on 
the 13the As we have seen however he failed at first to convince 
Haig of the soundness of his plan to assemble four divisions close 
to the German second line under cover of darlaiess and to attack at 
'first streak of d a w n * * 0 a  the afternoon of the 11th*/Rawlinson®s 
Chief of Staff, General Montgomery, wrote afterwards, *Sir Douglas 
Haig came down to our HQ and we had a tremendous discussion with him 
as to whether he would allow us to make the attack or note I f  he had 
allowed this, we might have been able to get through the preparations 
by the 13th as already arranged. However he still dug his toes in and 
it was not until I  rang up General ICiggell about 8 o’clock on the
12th before breakfast that wo finally got leave, with cort@.in qualifi-
2
cations, to make the attack* © This caused a postponement of one 
day - a delay which, according to one commentator at least, was 
to prejudice the outcome of the battle.^
However, Haig*a hesitation is understandable, for the plan involved 
great risks. The advance to the assembly positions within a few 
hundred yards of the German line was to be made at night across open 
ground for a distance varying from nearly a mile on the right, to about 
300 yards on the left. If the Germans discovered the British plan 
beforehand, or were alerted by signs of movement on the night, their 
artillery and machine gun fire could annihilate thousands of British 
troops exposed on the bare hillside. Another difficulty was that 
Trones Wood on the right, which should have been captured beforehand 
to protect the flank, was still in the hands of the Germans who 
could easily follow-up a bombardment of the open ground on which 
the British were forming up with a counter-attack against the flank 
and rear of the British troops. The French could hardly believe that 
anyone would be so foolish as even to consider such a plan. When 
General Gouraud, Commanding the French Fourth Army, visited the 
area afterwards and reconnoitred the ground he said that * none of our
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troops could have carried it out*^. The British staff however was 
completely confident and set about planning the operation with 
great bare.
On the morning of 12th July, the British Artillery began a slow
bombardment of the German defences along the 3 mile front. Because
the front was much narrower than on 1st July it was possible to
concentrate the artille ry  and provide one gun for every 6 yards of
front, compared to 1 gun for every 20 yards on 1st July. About
5370,000 shells were fired in the two days preceding the attack.
The position of the British front line on the night of 13th/l4th July, 
and the forming-up position for the assault troops are shown in 
Map 15. From this it can be seen that the two divisions of XIII Corps 
on the right - the 3rd and 9th Divisions -  were to be assembled 1500 
yards or so in front of the British trenches in Montauban Alley and 
well forward of the line in the southern tip  of Trones Wood* On 
the left, the 21st and 7th Divisions of* the XV Corps were already 
established nearer to the Germans, especially the former which 
occupied Mamets Wood only 5-400 yards short of the second line* In 
all, about 20,000 men from six brigades were to make the initial 
assault on the ridge* At the same time, the 54th Brigade of 18th 
Division was to attack Trones Wood from the south, to protect the 
right flank of the 9th Division.
After dark the troops moved forward unobserved by German sentries 
•» even on the right where they advanced parallel to the western edge 
of Trones Wood, which bristled with German machine guns. Long lines 
of white canvas tape guided the troops forward and similar tapes, 
placed laterally, marked each forming up position. By 3 &m - barely 
half an hour before the attack was to begin - all six brigades were 
in position with scarcely the loss of a man and vdth no serious 
interference from German patrols.
At 3«20 am 'the whole sky behind the waiting infantry of the four 
attacking divisions seemed to open ;vith a great roar of flame. For 
five minutes the ground in front was alive with bursting shol3.B, 
whilst the machine-guns, firing on lines laid out just before dark 
on the previous evening, pumped streams of bullets to clear the way* .6
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At 3*25 am the artillery lifted and the thirteen leading battalions - 
twelve of them New Army battalions - went into the attack. On the 
left, the 21st and 7th Divisions entered the German trenches almost 
as soon as the guns had lifted. On the right, the 3rd and 9th 
Divisions of XIH Corps encountered unbroken \m*e which they had 
either to cut by hand or outflank before they could continue. Very 
soon, they too had captured long stretches of the German line except 
near Longueval where the 27th Brigade of 9th Division met fierce resis­
tance. On the left, British troops continued to advance and quickly 
captured Bazentin-le-Petit and Bazentin-le-Grand villages and Bazentin- 
le-Petit Wood, The sections of the German line which had so far 
eluded capture now fell to bombers working round from the flanks.
While the main attack went well, the 18th Division in Trones Wood 
found themselves hampered, like the 38th Division in Mamets Wood 
before them, by thick undergrowth and fallen trees. Not until
9 ,30  am - 6 hours after the assault on the ridge - was the wood 
cleared and the right flank secured.
Although bitter fighting continued in Longueval and nearby Delville 
Wood, elsewhere the opposition crumbled. The and 7"kh Divisions in 
the centre were keen to push on beyond their objectives to High Wood 
on the crest of the ridge overlooking the German 3z"d line on the 
reverse slope. At 10 am several officers wallæd towards the wood 
without attracting attention but in spite of this, General Watts 
(7th Division) was instructed by XV Corps to stay where he was until 
the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, which had been ordered up at 7*40 am 
from Carnoy (4 miles away) had taken the wood. The cavalry moved 
off soon after 7*40 but made slow progress over shell-torn, wet and 
slippery ground and by noon was still south of Montauban.^ The 
order for the cavalry advance was therefore cancelled and Fourth Army 
sanctioned instead an advance on High Wood by 7th Division. For 
some unexplained reason, XV Corps now preferred to vmit imtil 
Longueval had fallen and it was not until 6.45 pm (after Longueval 
had yrongly been reported as captured) that 7th Division, supported 
on the right by cavalry, advanced on High Wood fi-om thé neighbourhood 
of Bazentin-le-Grand, three quarters of a mile away. At first the 
going was easy but as they approached the wood the Germans mounted 
a strong counter-attack from the west which, though repulsed,
8prevented the 7th Division from entering the wood until 8.40 pm.
Once inside the wood the British troops moved forward almost unopposed
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until they reached the German 'Switch Line* running through the northern 
corner (see map 15) which was strongly defended. They dug themselves 
in on a line running through the centre of the wood where they remained 
during the night. Outside the wood, the cavaliy reached the high 
ground between the wood and Longueval but failing li^t soon brought 
all movement to a halt. In the morning they were relieved by infantry.
During the night, the Germans strengthened the Switch Line and brought 
0
forward reserves. On 15th July they counter-attacked fiercely in
Hi^ Wood and Lt-Gen Horne ordered 7th Division to withdraw completely
from the wood which remained for two more months in German hands. Thus
the momentum of Rawlinson*s boldly conceived attack was lost, never to
be regained. From that time forward, the Battle of the Somme degenerated
TO
into a battle of attrition,
Lt.Col* J H Boraston, co-author wi.th George A B Dewar of Sir Douglas
Haig' s Command had no doubt where the fault lay; with the 38th (Welsh)
Division for failing to * secure* Mamets Wood.at an early date. Writing
in 1919, he said;
The days lost here were of the greatest value to the enemy. They 
gave him the opportunity he needed to restore order among his 
defeated battalions, to bring up fresh troops and to reorganise 
his defences. Though he could not prevent us from carrying his 
second line system in our next assault, he was enabled so to 
strengthen his last remaining defences on the crest and reverse 
slopes of the ridge beyond that our advance was held up there 
when within measurable distance of effecting an actual"break- 
throu^i.
There is little risk of exaggerating the effect of three days'
delay at this stage of the battle, when every hour was of
importance. To be seen in the right perspective the incident 
must be viewed from the standpoint of July 12}., when a most 
brilliant operation came within an ace of achieving a great 
victory ...... On July 14 our troops broke through the last
completed defence line and at High Wood reached the crest of 
. the ridge overlooking the half-finished line running through 
Flers, For a moment it seemed as though the German front would 
be completely pierced. Certainly, could our hold on the ridge 
have been extended to the east where our cavaUfy endeavoured to 
push their way forward, and could High Wood have been finally 
cleared and held, an attack on the Flers line could have been pressed 
on with excellent chances of breaking through to the open country.
The narrowness of the margin by which the German line was saved 
at this point is the measure of the value of the days lost at
Mametz Y/ood.......Higli Y2ood, situated on the very crest of
the ridge, represented an advance of two miles from our old 
positions. Held by our troops, it threatened the safety of the 
whole German battle lino, opening out to us the slopes and spurs
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falling away northwards to the eastern arm of the upper Ancre 
valley, with Bapaurae and the Loupart V/ood on the rising ground 
beyond. But the opportunity had corné too late. Through the 
northern corner of the wood and along the high ground to the 
east and west there now stretched Switch lines which barred 
the passage of our troops, while the gathering strength of the 
enemy's reserves showed itself in counter-attacks of increasing 
violence and determination. After holding High Wood for a 
night and a day, our troops were withdrawn a distance of about 
a mile to the general line of the Longueval-Bazentin road.
Though by the end of the month we had again worked our way 
forward to the southern point of the Wood, it was not until 
September 15, two months after we first entered it, that the 
wood was gained and the crest with it.
In the course of those two months, trench systems, switch 
lines, strong points, and belts of wire were multiplied 
across the #ole space from High Wood to Bapaume. That was a 
part of the price paid for the check at Mamets Wood,
Boraston does not mince his words. The British Army, he is saying, 
would have penetrated to Flers and the open country beyond if the 38th 
(Vfelsh) Division had shown more determination at Mamets Wood. In 
other words, he blames the Welsh Division alone for the failure of 
the British Army to achieve a 'great victory' during this phase of 
the Battle of the Somme. This is a serious charge, but is it fair?
Setting on one side, for the moment, the argument that the Battle of 
the Somme - other than as a battle of attrition - was doomed to failure 
before it began, it is worth examining the course of events from 1st 
to 14th July to see if those at Mamets Wood were of special significance 
and, if so, whether anything could, or should, have been done to speed 
up the capture of the wood.
The Welsh Division took five days to capture Mamets Wood. They took 
over the line on the night of 5th/6th July and were ordered to attack 
on the 7th, The attack failed and was not remounted in any strength 
until 10th July, when the division entered the wood and, after two 
days of bitter fighting, forced the Germans to withdraw. Boraston* s 
criticisms probably relate to the events preceding the 10th July 
for he judges the final attack a success and talks of three days delay 
rather than five. Referring to the attack on 7th July he says:
In the centre, however, the attack of the 38th Division on 
Mametz Wood failed, the advance of the 17th Division on their 
left was swept by fire from Mametz Wood and held up, and, lacking 
support on their right, the 23rd Division were later in the 
day forced back from Contalmaison. The 33th Division were
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ordered to repeat their attack on the afternoon of July 7 
and again on the morning of the 8th, when the 17th also 
attacked: but the situation at Mamets Wood remained unchanged.
Further orders were given to the 36th Division to gain a footing
in Mamets Wood on the afternoon of the 8th and to exploit their
gains on the morning of the 9th. No attack took place, and 
the 23rd Division, who on that afternoon had again succeeded 
in entering Contalmaison. were for a second time unable to 
maintain their positionnas
Not only did 38th Division fail to capture Mamets Wood during this period, 
Boraston says, but their failure to do so made it impossible for the 
23rd Division to hold on to Contalmaison. Boraston implies, in effect, 
that Contalmaison could not be held against a German counter-attack 
unless Mametz Wood was also in British hands. But a glance at Map 4 
soon demolishes this argument, or shows at least that it was not a view 
held by the British High Command. The British objectives for 1st July
had included Contalmaison village but not Mamets Y/ood. And, as the
battle developed during the succeeding two or three days, the possession 
of Contalmaison village was seen as necessary to ensure that Mametz 
Wood could be held, rather than the other way around. 'Contalmaison 
is of such importance to the secure possession of Mametz Wood that it 
must be captured and held*, Kiggell wrote on 8th July.^^ Nor did 
Rawlinson believe that the 38th Division were responsible for the ,23rd 
Division's ivithdrawal from Contalmaison, *In the pm*, he wrote in 
his journal on 7th July, * we lost Contalmaison without sufficient
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excuse I think as it is reported we were shelled out*»"^ Thus, 
whatever failures there may have been on the part of the 38th (Welsh)
Division during their first few days of fighting, they cannot justly 
be accused of prejudicing the capture of Contalmaison village.
But there are also flav/s in Colonel Boraston* s main criticism. If a
delay of 3 days in the capture of Mamets Wood had such a crucial
effect on the course of the war, why was no attack mounted until 7th
July? Y/liy are the 5 days singled out by Boraston more important than 
any of the other eleven which lapsed between the opening of the 
Battle of the Somme and the attack on Bazentin Ridge?
As we have seen, on the 1st July the 7th Division broke through .
Mametz village and by the evening of the 2nd they were in possession
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of White Trench just south of Mamets Y/ood. Writing of these events in 
1930, a staff officer of the 7th Division recalled a feeling at HQ 
7th Division that *a great opportunity was being let slip on the 
evening of 1st July* a feeling which, ho said, was shared by troops 
in the front line ;
After the fall of Mametz (by 6 pm on 1st July) the enemy* s 
resistance had been well broken on the front of 39th, 13th and 7th 
Divisions, Certain localities outside the final objective could 
have been captured with very small loss, which subsequently were 
very costly to take.
The most notable of these were Mametz Wood and Caterpillar Wood,
To my certain knowledge there were hardly any of the enemy in 
the former at this time: our infantry in Bunny Alley and Y/hite
Trench were very keen to push on, but right up to the time of 
the_division re lie f on 6th July no concerted forward move on 
Corps front was permitted, other than by patrols.
An advance by 17th Division through 7th Division from the south 
against Mamets Wood could have been undertaken at dawn on 2nd July, 
a s the whole front here was stable, and defined by 6 pm on 1st 
July. Mca*Gover the capture of Mametz Wood by that division in 
conjunction with an advance by Corps on the left, would
have facilitated and shortened the operations which were so 
long drawn out and costly, subsequently undertaken to capture 
Contalmaison and the area between that village, Mamets Wood 
itself and Fricourt Farm, Had this been done German reinforcements 
could have been prevented from trickling dovm to this a r e a . ^ 5 ,
The Official History also echoes this theme of lost opportunities 
during the early days of the battle, *XW Corps HQ*, the history records, 
*had received many reports to show that on its front the enemy had not 
yet rallied, and at 3 pm ^ n  3rd Jul^ patrols found that Mametz Wood 
and Quadrangle Trench were empty* « The account goes on to say that, 
at about 5 pm,Lieut-General Horne the Corps Commander, gave permission 
for the 7th Division to occupy the southern edge of Mamets Wood after 
dark and also Strip Trench, Wood Trench and the Eastern end of 
Quadrangle Trench. Needless to say, if those formidable defences had 
been taken at this early stage, Mamets Y/ood would have fallen much 
more easily than it subsequently did and the Welsh Division, and more 
particularly the 17th (Northern) Division on its left, would have been 
spared much bloodshed. However, the guide sent to bring forward the 
two battalions of tho 7th Division for this purpose (the 2nd Royal 
Irish and the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers) *went astray* and dawn broke 
before the troops were ready to advance. *It would appear* says the 
official history 'that if the XV Corps had encouraged more vigorous 
action on the afternoon of the 3rd, a hold on Mametz Wood could have 
been secured, and Wood Trench and Quadrangle Trench occupied. The
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last-named objective was taken on the morning of the 5th, but the others 
were to cost many lives and much precious time*
Three days could also have been saved if the attack on Bazentin Ridge 
had been launched on the morning of 11th July when the 38th Division 
had captured all but tho northern edge of the wood and was badly in 
need of relief. An attack at this moment would have caught the Germans 
at a time when they were particularly vulnerable and were desperately 
moving troops out of the second line at Basentin-le-Petit to defend 
Mametz Wood. The British Fourth Array however was not yet ready for 
an attack, Haig was still brooding over Rawlinson* s plans and the 
artillery had to destroy the wire in front of the German second line, 
a task which was not in fact completed in time for an attack on the 
13th let alone the llth,^^ It was this lack of continuity in British 
operations more than anything else which gave the Germans ample 
opportunity to mend their broken defences and bring forward their 
reserves© And if, as Boraston not unreasonably suggests, * every 
hour was of Importance* to the achievement of victory, Rawlinson need 
not even have waited until 11th July. As we have seen, as early as 
9th July he had doubts about the need to wait for the capture of 
Mamets Wood before launching his attack against the ridge. There was 
of course a grave risk of a counter attack against his flank if 
Mametz Wood was not secure but it was a risk he took at Trones Y/ood 
on the right flank on 14th July, and which he would have been justified 
in taking on the left if this would have made the difference between 
ultimate victory and failure.
It seems therefore that Boraston has done the 38th Division a grave 
injustice, perhaps because of his evident dislike of Lloyd George, 
which comes out so clearly in his book. Y/hether or not their 
performance at Mametz Wood was all that it should have been - and 
we shall examine that in a moment - it is not fa ir to blame the 
division for the subsequent failure of the British Army to break the 
German line and sweep through to victory. There would have to be 
something very wrong with British plans if a check - avoidable or 
otherwise - to one division, out of a total of some 24 divisions^^ 
involved in the operations up to that time, could have prejudiced 
the main stroke.
1^}-
Comments on the 38th Division
But if Colonel Boraston*s extreme arguments are easily demolished, 
the question still remains: was the performance of the Welsh Division
at Mametz Wood creditable or not? Colonel Boraston is not the only 
critic. There were some nearer at hand, in the division itself.
Brigadier Priee-Davies, commanding the 113th Brigade, frankly admits 
that because of his own inexperience, communications within his Brigade 
were practically non-existent, as was liaison between his ovm Head­
quarters and other brigades. Writing after the war, he said:
I was as much to blame as those on my flanks, probably more, 
as I had not been engaged in fighting when the Brigade went 
into the line.
I give only one instance. It must have been on 7th July when 
I was visiting my forward posts and looked down upon Mametz 
Wood at a few hundred yards* range. I was by a Lewis Gun post 
when I became aware of an attack in progress by what I believe 
were the 6th Dorsets ^7th Division, then attacking Mametz Wood 
from the West whilst 38th Division (115 Brigade) attacked from 
the Basÿ. They were creeping forward and using rifle grenades 
against the strip of wood jutting out towards us. I had never 
heard of this attack and got covering fire to work as quickly 
as possible, but the Lewis gun jammed and the attack fizzled out
 .Y/e occupied a position from which very heavy covering gg
fire could have been brought to bear had this been organised.
Prioe-Davies was also disappointed with the performance of his own troops 
when their turn came to attack on 10th July. A few days after they had 
been relieved in the wood, his Brigade Major delivered this assessment 
to the battalion commanders:
After a careful consideration of the accounts of the action the 
Brigadier General Commanding has the following remarks to make 
on the events of July 10th and the night of lOth/llth.
The initial advance against the wood appears to have been carried 
out mth the utmost gallantry by all ranks in the face of a 
heavy fire from artillery and small arms. After the wood was 
entered, however, and certainly by the time the first objective 
was reached the sting had gone from the attack and a certain dsgree
of demoralisation set in. The desire to press on had vanished
and it was only by the utmost strenuous efforts on the part of a 
few officers that it was possible to make progress.
The demoralisation increased towards evening on the 10th and 
culminated in a disgraceful panic during which many left the 
wood w'hilst others seemed quite incapable of understanding, 
or unwilling to carry out the simplest order. A few stout­
hearted Germans would have stampeded the whole of the troops
in the wood.
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Later in the night, rapid fire was opened on the slightest alarm, 
and several of our men were hit and one officer was killed by 
this indisciplined action.
The Brigadier General Commanding wishes all credit given for the 
early success but thinks v/e should recognise and face our failures
Battalion commanders in the 113th Brigade were later told to instill in 
their men 'that the word "retire" is not to be used and that any man 
using it is liable to be shot on the spot. Officers must deal with all 
cases of indiscipline of this nature which can only be stamped out by
pp
the most drastic action'
Brig-Gen. Price Davies's account to Divisional Headquarters vb.s similarly 
critical of the battalions under his command but he had second thoughts 
when he heard reports of the difficulties which others had encountered, 
in Trones Wood and High Wood; difficulties which were not dissimilar 
from those experienced by his own troops in Mametz Wood©
Æ y  ropor^ was made up after the receipt of the accounts furnished 
I by Battalion Commanders and from ray own personal experience. Since 
: thon, however, I have had the accounts of certain gallant actions 
performed by Officers and other ranks, and I feel that possibly 
I may not have given my Brigade full credit for what they did in 
Mametz Wood.
This is probably in great part due to the painful impression left 
on Lt. Col. Bell and myself (the two senior officers and the only 
Regular Officers of the Brigade who witnessed the fight and did " 
not become casualties) by the discreditable behaviour of the men 
of the Division who fled in panic at about 8.45 pm on July 10th.
iho result has been that the initial success of entering the wood 
in the face of heavy Artillery and Small Arm fire has not been 
brought to notice sufficiently.
I feel that some Brigadiers uho have made a very readable story 
with the material available. They would, no doubt, have dwelt 
upon tne capture of guns in the Y/ood, and on tlie number of 
- Machine Guns to our credit, as well as upon the difficulties 
of attacking through a thick wood in the face of Snipers and 
Machine Guns.
Even so. Price-Davies is sparing in his praise:
Though 1 deprecate all forms of bragging and consider that 
when failure is disclosed it should be faced, I think it is 
possible that a certain amount of praise^ in fact mailing the most 
of sucn successes as vre obtain, is good for^morale and improves 
the confidence and self-respect of the men.“^
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Captain Glynn Jones of the 14th R7/F, one of Price-Davies* s battalions, 
also thought there was little to be proud of during the fighting in 
the wood. It was, he wrote afterwards, ’nothing less than a glorious 
mess, from which only the few remaining pawns in the game returned 
with g l o r y * -
But the most telling criticism of all is contained in some notes 
compiled by Major GPL Drake-Brockman in 1930, well after the heat of 
the event,
Dralce-Brockman was a regular soldier and staff officer who transferred 
from 7th Division Headquarters to 38th Division Headquarters on 8th 
July and who was therefore in a position to observe the performance 
of the Welsh Division with the eye of a newcomer detached from the 
field of battle. He found little fault vrith the fighting troops 
whom, he describes as * really good material* but he was appalled 
by the way the division was being runs
The 38th Division suffered from having a number of senior 
officers who owed their appointments to their political 
positions or to being friends of Mr Lloyd George. I can 
quote two glaring examples.
Major General I Philipps. V/as appointed to the command of 
the division in early 1915, when it was formed. He had 
originally been a regular soldier but had retired before 
the war, and at the time hostilities started was a Major or 
Lieut. Colonel in the Pembroke shire Yeoraaniy, and a Member 
of Parliament. He was thus promoted over the heads of many 
more senior and meritorious officers.
As a divisional commander it is hardly surprising that he
was ignorant, lacked experience and failed to inspire 
confidence,
Lieut-Golonel David Davies 0 C 16 RY/P si^. A politician 
pure and simple who knew nothing about soldiering before the 
war; his chief claim to fame was that he had subscribed 
much money to Mr Lloyd George's Liberal party fund.
It is therefore not to be wondered at that an influential 
political atmosphere permeated the whole division and was in 
some cases the cause of considerable friction. Brigadier/^ 
found it difficult to get rid of officers who were useless, 
since,,,, they were often the constituents or political 
supporters if the divisional commander, who held a high 
opinion of their capabilities,25
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Fortunately, according to Drake-Brockman, the GSOl of the division, 
Lieut-Golonel Rhys Pryce, was a very capable officer *who in reality 
commanded the division himself*, and there were some * excellent® battalion 
commanders - mainly those from the Indian Army*
With Ivor Philipps in command it is hardly surprising, in Drake- 
Broclcman* s view, lhat"fee ^ vision * did not distinguish itself in its 
firs t engagement, though later in the war, under different commanders, 
i t  did extremely well* * Ivor Philipps is criticised for carrying 
out piecemeal attacks, one brigade at a time and for making it known 
beforehand that he did not wish attacks pressed home in the face of 
machine gun fire. In such circumstances, battalions were instructed 
to return to the starting line until another artillery bombardment had 
been carried out;
By the time, therefore, that General Watts took over command 
of the division on 9th July, it is not to be wondered at that 
the infantry were considerably discouraged and exhausted after 
three day* s fighting of this nature.
Conversely these half-hoar tod attacks encouraged the enemy 
considerably so that instead of evacuating Mametz Wood as he 
appears to have intended, he kept reinforcing his troops in 
the wood.
This, coupled with the extremely thick and impenetrable nature 
of the wood rendered the final attack a very much more formidable
affair than it would have been three days earlier - in fact
Mametz Wood on 10th July was a really tough proposition and the 
division deserves credit for what it did do after being "messed 
about" for three days.
This, 8.S we have seen, is the interpretation which both Haig and Rawlinson
placed on the events at Mametz Y/ood; that under Ivor Philipps the Welsh 
Division lacked guts and determination but responded well to a new 
commander.
Drake-Broclanan also tells a story of the recall to England of Lt. Col. 
David Davies and two other officers at the request of Lloyd George who 
sent a personal telegram to Ivor Philipps a short time before the 
division went into action;
There can only be one reason for the recall of these officers and 
it Tras certainly a widespread impression in 38th Division at the 
time « namely that from a political point of view their lives were 
too valuable to be lost.
I mention this incident because I  think it must be almost a 
record instance for political interference and dishonesty with the
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fighting portion of the Army in France. Particularly is it an 
illustration of the disadvantages under which the 38th Division 
functioned, which in no small measure accounts for the very 
poor performance put up by it during the period under review© 
Consequent to the elimination of this political atmosphere under 
the leadership of Major-General Blaokader the division did extremely 
well.during the rest of the war. I served with the 38th Division 
for 10 months, but for the whole of this period the stigma of 
Mamets Y/ood stuck to the division and it was common talk in the 
B.E.P. that 38th Division had "bolted" and the fact remains that 
38th Division was never employed again on the Somme.
Actually Drake-Brockman was wrong in thinking that there could be 'only
one reason* for the recall of David Davies to England. On 7th July, the
very day on which his 'Welsh Army* launched its first attack on Mametz
Wood, Lloyd George took over as Secretary of State for Y/ar and appointed
26David Davies as his Parliamentary Private Secretary. Nevertheless, 
what matters in this context is the impression made on the division and 
it is certainly true that the 14th BYF, which Colonel David Davies had 
commanded, suffered more than any other battalion from lack of firm 
leadership* It is, of course, difficult for a second in command to 
tako over on the eve of a battle and this may account for the confusion 
on 10th July when, by mistake, only two companies of the 14-th'HWF went 
into the attack, the other two being left behind until much later in
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the day. Ten years afterwards, Glynn Jones, a company commander in 
the 12}.th KY/F, recalled the inadequate briefing he was given before 
the battle, -
Crowded round the door of a dug-out with the CO inside and hardly
audible we were- given some very small prints of the wood and what 
appeared to be instructions. They were verbal, decidedly 'sketchy*
and to me appeared to be more lilce instructions for a ceremonial
parade than an order for battle .... When I look back at
v/hat was intended to be our general method of advance I can well 
understand how it developed into what it did ^8
But the most significant remark in Drake—Broclcman* s account is that for 
at least 10 months after the event it was common talk in other units 
that the Y/elsh Division had run away from the battle. It is difficult 
to tell just hoYf widespread this was *» Drake-Brockman ?/as hardly in a 
position to know all the small-tall: in the BEF - but it certainly seems 
to have been a view held in the 7th Division from which Drake-Brockman 
came, possibly because it was to the commander of that division.
General Y/atts, that Price—Davies would have sent his report of 
'discreditable behaviour* by troops under his command. Siegfried 
Sassoon, who was in 7th Division, spoke of 'wild rumours* reaching 
them of Welsh troops stampeding under machine-gun fire.^^ That this
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poor opinion of the Welsh Division was not perhaps so widely held as 
Drake-Brockman suggests is apparent from the accounts of other observers 
who were in the vicinity at the time. General Brenan snatching a few 
days leave from another part of the front, cycled round the 'back areas 
of the battle* and arrived in Mametz Y/ood a .day or two after the 
14th July;
Its trees were torn and shattered, its leaves had turned 
brown and there was a shell-hole every three yards. This was a 
place where something almost unheard of in this war had taken 
place - fierce hand-to-hand fighting in the open with bombs and 
bayonets. Y/hat seemed extraordinary was that all the dead 
bodies there lay just as they had fallen in their original 
places as though they were being kept as an exhibit for a war 
museum. Germans in their field-grey uniforms, British in their 
khaki lying side by side, their faces and their hands a pale 
waxy green, the colour of a rare marble. Heads covered with 
flat mushroom helmets next to heads in domed steal helmets that 
came down behind the ears. Some of these figures still sat with 
their backs against a tree and two of them - this had to be seen 
to be believed - stood locked together by their bayonets which 
had pierced one another's bodies and sustained in that position 
by the tree trunk against which they had fallen. I felt I was 
visiting a room in Madame Tussaud* s Chamber of Horrors, for I 
could not imagine any of those bodies having ever been alive.
I Yet the effect in its morbid way was beautiful,30
This is not a scene which suggests that the Welsh Division had 'bolted*
in the face of the enemy; on the contrary, it is a picture of 'fierce
fighting with bombs and bayonets* the like of which Brenan had never 
seen before.
Lj.euuc St. H Evans, 9th Battalion Welsh Regiment, 19"kh Division, which 
was in Mctinebs Y/ood on 23rd July, was also unaware of 'wild* rumours ;
This spot was lately made famous for all time when it was 
captured by the Welsh Division in which by some stroke of the 
pen we are not included. Yet we may claim a share as here we 
holding on and in close support ready to move up,.,,,..,, 
in this one-time pleasant wood now largely splintered to 
fragmencs \Yith whole truiilcs fallen at all angles and the 
ground cratered out of all semblance we dig for dear life.3%
Lieut, Evans was obviously proud of the achievement of the Welsh Division 
and disappointea that his own battalion was not part of it* The signs 
of fierce fighting in Mametz: Y/ood also made an impression on another 
officer, Capt, D V Kelly of the 21st Division which had taken over the 
wood from the 38th:
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On the 13th I wallced over to Mametz Wood to see General
Rawlings, tiio commanded the 62nd Brigade and was in a German
dugout on the western edge of the wood. The wood was
everyv/here smashed by shell-fire and littered with dead - a German 
sniper hung over a branch horribly resembling a scarecrow, but 
half the trees had had their branches shot away, leaving 
fantastic jagged stumps like a Dulac picture of some goblin 
forest...,. Along the west edge ran a trench, from the side 
of which in places protruded the arms and legs of carelessly 
buried men, and as our men moved up that night to attack dozens 
of them shook hands with these ghastly relics. All the old 
'rides* throu^ the wood were blocked by fallen trees and great 
shell-holes, and over all hung the overwhelming smell of corpses, 
turned-up earth and lachrymatory gas.^^
Frank Richards, in Old Soldiers Never Die talks of * the ground all 
around us being thick with dead of the troops who had been attacking 
Mametz Wood* and Robert Graves in Goodbye to All That tells much 
the same stoiy:
The next two days we spent in bivouacs outside Mamets Wood.
We were in fighting kit and felt cold at night, so I went into 
the wood to find German overcoats to use as blankets. It was 
full of dead Prussian Guards Reserve, big men, and dead Royal 
V/elch and South Wales Borderers of the New Army battalions, 
little men. Not a single tree in the wood remained unbroken,
I collected my overcoats, and came away as quickly as I could, 
climbing through tho wreckage of green branches. Going and 
coming, by the only possible route, I passed by the bloated 
and stinking corps© of a German \7ith his back propped against 
a tree© He had a green face, spectacles, close-shaven hair; 
black blood was dripping from the nose and beard, I came 
across tv/o other unforgettable corpses; a man of the South 
Y/ales Borderers and one of the Lehr Regiment had succeeded in 
bayoneting each other simultaneously* A survivor of the 
fighting told me later that he had seen a young soldier of 
the Fourteenth Royal Welch bayoneting a German in parade- ^ 
ground style, automatically exclaiming; *In, out, on guardl*
There is therefore plenty of evidence that the fight was exceptionally 
hard and it is noteworthy that few, if any, other actions on this 
scale made such an impression on the writers who were to emerge after 
the First World War,
If some senior officers in the Welsh Division were critical of the 
troops under their command, others were more inclined to praise them. 
In a special order of the day issued to the lUfth Brigade on 13th July, 
Brig.-Gen. Harden congratulated all ranks on their achievements of the 
10th July *when they firmly established the fighting reputation of 
the llZ}.th Infantry Brigade by capturing that portion of the Mamets 
Y/ood allotted to them by the Divisional Commander, thereby gaining 
the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief for the performance of a task
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which called for special effort.* 'Wood fighting', Harden continued,
'is recognised as the most difficult form of fighting and it reflects
the greatest credit on all engaged that at the end of the day all units
of the Brigade were under their own commanders. The advance to the
attack v/as carried out in perfect order by the 13th and 14th Welsh,
to whom fell the majority of the wood fighting, the severity of which
is shown by the casualty lists. The 10th and the 15th Y/elsh showed
equal steadiness in the advance when called on to support..... With
such a splendid start, the 114th Infantry Brigade can look with
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confidence to the future, and with pride to the past'. In his 
official report of the attack, Harden expressed the opinion that all 
ranks 'behaved with great dash and gallantry in the face of consider­
able fire* and after the war he told Brig.-Gen. Edmonds, the official 
historian, that the Commander of the 14th Y/elsh, Lt. Col. Hayes, had 
written to him saying that the officers and men of his battalion fought 
better than they did at Pilckem Ridge in the third Battle of Ypres 'and 
■ got far less credit for it* - a sentiment with which Harden said he 
agreed.^^
The critics of the Y/elsh Division's performance during the period ?th- 
9th July were, of course, unaware of the extent to which the division's 
Headquarters was being directed from above. Y,hat ever Ivor Philipps' s 
shortcomings in the field, he cannot fairly be blamed for making 
piecemeal attacks 'one brigade at a time* when he was merely carrying 
out the orders of Lt. Gen. Horne at XV Corps HQ. It was XV Corps 
which decided on a two-pronged attack on ?th July from positions well 
over a mile apart, Maj.-Gen. Philipps could perhaps have organised more 
support by the 113th Brigade perched in Y7hite Trench and overlooking 
both attacks (see Brigadier Price-Davies*s remarks on page 135, 
and Map 9 on page 73) but the role of the 113th Brigade - again dictated 
by XV Corps « was to stand ready to enter tha wood by the southern 
tongue after the other troops had penetrated from east and west. The 
evidence suggests that XV Corps interfered far too readily in work which 
should have been left to divisional commanders and spent too little time 
coordinating their efforts. It may be, of course, that XV Corps was 
reluctant to trust either Ivor Philipps or the commander of l?th 
Division, Major General Pilcher, for like Philipps. Pilcher was relieved 
of his eoiüB&nd a few lat^r. 'After talcing the Quadrangle Trench',
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he wrote to Brig.-Gen, Edmonds after the war, ♦ we wanted, I thinlc, two 
days before attempting a further general advance. Then by orders 
from the Corps, I attacked at about 11 pm /5th Jul^ and was driven 
back. This attack was quite justifiable and the casualties suffered 
in it were the result of the fortunes of war. The division on my 
right was in the early morning to attack Mametz. Y/ood. It was about 
7 sni that I was ordered on the telephone to attack again over an open 
plain position which I had been unable to get near under cover of 
darkness*. General Pilcher was shocked to receive this order:
I  protested.•.and begged to be allowed to confine my operations 
to a bombing attack, but the reply I received was a definite 
command to make a frontal attack. For several minutes I pondered 
and once again took up the telephone with the object of informing 
the corps that I must refuse to carry out that order, and begged 
to resign my command. Then I thought that the only consequence 
of such action would be that someone else would be put in my 
place and would probably carry out the operation in such a manner 
that far greater loss would be incurred than if I were to undertake 
it myself, and I issued orders in accordance with the instructions 
I  had received, employing a minimum number of men. If four times 
as many had been launched the only consequence would have been 
four times as many casualties. Neither Mamets Y/ood, the high 
ground on my right, nor ContaJmaison, the height on my le ft, had 
fallen, nor indeed were they being seriously attacked and in such 
circumstances to attack the low ground between these heights was 
iniquitous folly.
Two subsequent attacks were ordered by the corps with the same 
result,
Y/hen four or five days later Contalmaison and Mametz Y/ood were 
carried Quadrangle Support fe ll  of itself.
I f  I  had obeyed the Corps more lite ra lly , I  should have lost
anotner two or three thousand men and have achieved no more,
I  was, as you know, accused of want of push, and consequently 
sent home. It is very easy to sit a few miles in the rear, and 
get credit for allowing men to be killed in an undertaking 
foredoomed to failure, but the part did not appeal to me, and 
my protests against these useless attacks were not well received*"^
One can only sympathise with General Pilcher and the 17th Division but 
ib is iale co suppose that the Y/elsh Division could have come to his 
assistance; tney were a mile away and on the other side of the wood. 
Indeed, as we have seen, they failed themselves to reach the wood 
because ox the deadly sweep of German guns across the intervening 
open ground. Even if they had forced their way into the hammerhead 
on the eas t side of the wood they would still have faced enormous 
difficulties. The 113th Brigade diary states that 'Owing to the
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dense nature of the undergrowth it would have been impracticable to 
have carried out the programme for the attack as laid down by the 
time given even had no opposition been encountered* Nor did
the XV Corps plans allow for any breakdown in communications and 
subsequent delay in the transmission of orders though this Y/as a common 
enough event, and particularly important in view of the distance 
between the spot selected by XV Corps for 113th Brigade HQ and the 
attacking troops.
I f  the attacks planned for 7th July were "iniquitous folly", 
subsequent events came near to farce. As related in Chapter 5,
XV Corps ordered a raid on the wood during the night of ?th/8th.
Brig.-Gen, Price-Davies ( 113th Brigade), v/ho was given discretion 
by Corps to choose the spot, decided to attack Strip Trench using 
a whole battalion. Corps immediately intervened, repeating their 
request for a small-scale probe. LteCol*Gwyther, whose battalion 
(l4th Rf/P) had been chosen for the attack, could make little 
sense of it all;
1 received verbal orders from Brig,-Gen. Price-Davies,
commanding 113th Infantry Brigade, on 7th July to attack 
the salient of Mamets Wood with the whole battalion at
2 am on 8th July,....Having issued orders for the same, I 
was very surprised when the brigade commander rang me up on 
the telephone on the night of 7th July and said he had received 
entirely new orders from 38th Divisional Headquarters to the 
effect that my attack must be undertaken with a much smaller 
force than was originally intended and which should amount
to the strength of a platoon, including bombers; hastily 
fresh orders had to be issued at the eleventh hour and the party 
started off d.ov/n the communication trench leading to the front 
line and our starting place, in good time under normal conditions; 
as however the communication trench was fu ll of other troops of 
our brigade, progress was so slow that I  attempted to get to 
the position overground, but found that our advance was so impeded 
by barbed wire and other obstacles that I  considered i t  advisable 
to resort to the communication trench again, and the result was 
that the party arrived very late at the"point from which the 
the attack was to be made. Daylight wa-s commencing, the element 
of surprise was problematical and I therefore decided not to 
risk men"8 lives unnecessarily and reported the situation to 
Brigade Headquarters. I consider that with my whole battalion 
I  could have got a firm foothold in the wood,... I have never 
discovered why the bewildering and sudden change of orders on 
the night of 7th July were issued by Divisional Headquarters,^^
There is no record of what the raid - by less than 50 men - was 
supposed to achieve, but Gwyther"s account gives an interesting example 
of the way in which 38th Division HQ Y/as held responsible for failure
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when they were in fact powerless to intervene. As we have seen, this 
particular incident over which he had no control ^ms to culminate in 
the dismissal of Ivor Philipps,
On the 9th July, the 113th and 114th Brigades formed up in Yfhite Trench
ready to attack the wood fVom the south. In the afternoon the order
was cancelled by XV Corps and the bewildered troops were withdrawn to
positions behind the broken village of Mamets, "God knows what it was
all about,* wrote David Jones, * but they moved you back that evening
41to another field of bivouac*. Hours later they were back again,
assembling for the 4.13 attack on 10th July, weary through lack of
sleep. In spite of this treatment, when the order to advance was
given the troops moved forward down the slope and into a hail of
Shells and bullets * with a success that astonished all who knew 
I 2
the ground*, This was all the more remarkable in that many of the 
troops had been told that they would be practically unopposed, a 
situation which one participant contrasts with that at Pilkem 
Ridge a year later when a fully briefed 38th (Welsh) Division fought 
well alongside the Guards Division and received great praise, Por the 
most part, the advance to the wood Y/as made in good order especially 
where, as in the centre, full advantage was taken of the model tactics 
employed by the artillery. But inside the wood inexperience and inade­
quate briefing began to tell. On the left, far too many troops were 
packed into the narrow space between the central ride and Strip Trench^ 
though these were needed beyond the 1st Cross-ride where the wood 
broadened out to almost twice its previous width. There the troops 
had to fan out sideways, keeping their sense of direction, *A 
beautiful operation on paper* wrote Gl^mn Jones, * shoving more text 
book knowledge than experience, but ridiculous for a wood fu ll of 
the unknovm, and bodies of men completely lost in thick undergrowth 
and without leaders* But in spite of this and of the ease with
which the Germans could reinforce the wood from the north and fx*om 
Sabot and Flatiron copses to the east, the Welsh Division during 
the course of the day fought its way a mile forward and by evening 
were in sight of the northern edge and only a few hundred yards from 
the German second line. Thereafter the battle see-sawed for another 
30 hours until the Germans evacuated the wood and the exhausted Welsh 
troops were relieved.
What can we conclude from a study of the struggle for Mamata Wood?
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Firstly, that there was muddle and confusion at all levels of command, 
though this is not perhaps surprising given that operations on the 
Somme were on a much larger scale than anything previously attempted, 
and proper means of controlling the vast forces employed had not been 
developed. The set piece attacks on 1st and 14th July, although 
they may appear clumsy now, represented a great tactical advance on 
1915? but the fighting between them was far too fragmented and 
undoubtedly badly handled at Corps level. This combination of penny 
packets, bad tactics and poor control made success virtually impossible, 
for example, on 7th July. While separate attacks were being launched 
on Contalmaison, Mamets Wood and Trones Wood, the rest of the British 
Army stood still. There was little or no attempt to coordinate the 
efforts of the units making these attacks, not even at Mamets Y/ood 
where tr/o divisions were converging on the same target. On this 
front too, XV Corps chose methods of attack which had scant regard for 
the nature of the ground and which resulted in the maximum exposure 
of British troops to German machine-guns. On top of this, as the attack 
developed, orders were issued at Corps and Divisional level which 
had no chance whatever of reaching the troops concerned in time.
These were tragic failurethe effects of which still linger on in 
the maimed bodies of the wounded and in the minds of the bereaved.
But it is easy to be wise after the event and to dissect at leisure 
decisions which had to be taken hastily in the heat and uncertainty 
of battle. It is easy, too, to forget how quickly the British Army 
had grown: from two Army Corps in France in August 1914 to fifteen,
less than two years later. Many of the staff were inexperienced and 
working under great pressure. There was no time to establish mutual 
trust between Corps HQ and those Divisions which had never previously 
served the Corps and which were wheeled in and out of the battle 
every few days. *Our professional officers*, D V Kelly wrote after 
the war, *with certain defects and virtues.....were inferior to none, 
but they were totally inadequate, both in numbers and staff experience 
for the work of handling millions of men. Why should one e:cpect a man 
who has never commanded more than a Battalion to make no mistakes in 
charge of a Division or a C o r p s * T h e  British Army fought the Battle 
of the Somme before it Y/as ready and it could be argued that the battle 
was lost before it had begun. But war is not a sporting event: 
commanders cannot make fixtures just when it suits them - they must
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react to pressure from the enemy and to demands from their allies,
Haig, as we have seen, \?as reluctant to commit his new armies too 
soon, but, though he treated it with some reserve, he could not ignore 
Joffre*s cry that the French Army would be destroyed if the British 
held back. Though * idealism perished on the Somme* 47 and the British 
Army was never to be the same afterwards, it could hardly have been 
otherwise given the remorseless pressure of events.
Secondly, although it is incidental to the main theme, it is worth 
pointing out that at Mamets Wood, as elsewhere ,on the Somme, the main 
damage to the German arny was inflicted by the British artillery, Tliis 
is something v/hich those who argue that German losses on the Somne 
could not possibly equal those of the British tend to neglect. They 
point to the unequal nature of a contest between defenders armed with 
machine guns and attackers moving over open ground. But, as we have 
seen, infantry attacks were sporadic, and though attacking troops had 
little chance against machine-guns they were exposed only for short 
periods at a time. At Mamets. Wood, for example, the infantry of the 
38th Welsh Division faced German machine-guns in the open for a few hours 
on 7th July and again for a few hours on 10th July. They paid a heavy 
price for a short period while the Germans were subjected to a torrent 
of shells night and day. And although their second line was equipped 
with well-constructed, deep, dug-outs these were mostly used as 
casualty dressing stations and were not always proof against heavy 
calibre British shells. Much of the trench works soon crumbled away 
and many Germans were buried alive as roofs and walls were blown in oh 
them. Corporal Hetschold of the 2nd Machine Gun Company of the Lehr 
Regiment has described what it was lil:e to suffer in this way. He 
moved into the second line at Basentin le Petit on 3rd July while it 
Yfas being heavily shelled;
A few dugouts were still there. And now these were crushed in.
In the dugout in which I was, 100 comrades soon gathered. It was 
a strong dugout but after a short barrage it also gave way. First 
an entrance collapsed and many comrades suffocated. Then a shell 
landed in the middle and we were thrown hither and thither. As 
we came to our senses again, there was a dud shell sticking out 
from under the framework of the dugout, We all took fright but 
it did not explode, vYe breathed again. But then the next 
followed immediately. A fearful rending, all the candles are 
out, shouts and groans, I can still breathe, I hear my comrades 
calling. "The long gallery is smashed in right up to us; we must 
get out", I see two boots, pull hard and manage to free a comrade,
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who was already nearly dead. But we can do nothing for the many 
others; 13 feet of earth lie on them. I shudder, There is no 
escape here. As we make for t}ie second entrance, the next shell 
smashes it in. We are buried alive, I feel that I can scarcely 
get any more air. Then a Pioneer calls: "I will use a detonator
quickly. If it succeeds, we are free; if not, the end will come
quickly**, I call **Don’t use explosive! Let us try this way first,**
There are perhaps five to eight of us still alive. We scratch 
the earth dovn vdth our hands and feet. Dead comrades are
unearthed, ’We press close to the steps. If the earth falls 
from above we are lost. My hair stands on end. Then - a:shout 
of joy! A small ray of light comes from above. We are saved.
Now the hole is big enough to allow head and chest tlirough,
and then off to the nearest shell holes.
Only a few comrades are still with me from our companty , We stick 
together like true brothers,49
The British seige guns, too, kept up a ceaseless bombardment of depots 
and supply lines to the rear and the Germans lost heavily trying to get 
food and water through. It is sometimes argued that German sources play 
up these losses in order to excuse their own failures but this certainly 
cannot be said of the historians of the Lehr Regiment who give the 
figures in some detail and name the officers and NCOs killed and 
wounded. It is not possible to draw up a balance sheet of the losses 
on each side of Mamets-. Wood but there is nothing in the evidence to 
suggest that the Official History is necessarily wrong (as some 
maintain) in stating that German losses on the Somme equalled those 
of the British and French combined.
Finally, what of the 38th (rfelsh) Division? T/hatever faults there
may have been in execution, there can be no doubting now the magnitude
of their achievement. Map 15 shows all the woodlands of the Somme,
MametR. Wood was the largest and one of the most easily defended, with
the German second line just above it on the ridge, Trones Wood was in
a like position but,though smaller than Mamets Wood, it remained in
German hands until by-passed by the main assault on Basentin Ridge,
Bernafay and the two Basent in Woods were well forward of any rear
defences and fell quickly as a result, though Delville Wood, similarly
placed, resisted capture for nearly 6 weeks, falling to the 14th Division 
50on 27th August, High Wood held out for irffo months against sustained 
attacks by a number of divisions. By comparison, the five days which 
the Welsh Division took to capture Marnetz Y^ ood ie creditably short and 
i t  is understandable that some of the early criticism of the division 
became muted as the difficulties of woodland fighting became accarcnt.
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The capture of Mametz Wood was not a tidy affair: the fighting was
confused and there were moments of near panic with the Welshmen falling 
back in disarray, Leaderless men dribbled out of the wood looking 
for directions. The performance did not at first sight perhaps 
suggest ’one of the most magnificent little armies ever turned out’ but 
the Welsh Division, inexperienced and inadequately trained, pushed the 
cream of Germany’s highly professional army back about one mile, an 
achievement which ranks with that of any division on the Somme- 
including the much-vaunted ?th Division,
Addressing reserves for the Welsh Division at Kinmel Park some weeks 
later, Lloyd George said:
You are proceeding to a great struggle, I know the dangers 
you have to face. You will face them like men. The men 
belonging to the division you have the honour to belong to 
are a credit to their race. They had a very difficult piece 
of Tfork to do on the Somme in that great battle. They 
accomplished much with honour to themselves and the land to which 
they belonged. The attack on Mametz Wood was one of the most 
difficult enterprises which ever fell to any division. It 
was left to the Welsh Division, and they swept the enemy out 
of it. From end to end there is not a living German in the wood 
now. He has been driven far beyond it, and it will be your 
task to drive him still further and I think in time you will 
accomplish it. When I look down upon you I know the gallantry 
with which your comrades in France have fought, and I bid you 
God speed,5Ï
Stripped of rhetoric and bombast, this represents no more than the simple 
truth, though it ignores the suffering experienced by both sides. The 
Welsh Division’s performance was disappointing only when measured 
against the unrealistic expectations of higher commands. By any objec­
tive measure , it did remarkably well.
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Annex A
Senior officers proceeding overseas with 38th (Welsh) Division
PmSIONAL HQ! . '
Commander! Ma.j.-G-en» Ivor Philipps DSC
ADC’s : Lieut, G. Lloyd George
, Lieut D.M, Mein
GSOl : Lt, Col* H.E. ap Rhys Pryce CMG,
113th INF. BDE
Commander: Brig,-Gen, A.F. Price-Davies VC DSO
Bde, Major: Capt. H* R, Bentley
13th RWF
In Command: Lt.Col. O.S. Flower
Major R.O. Campbell (2i/c)
Major O.J. Bell ,
14th RWF -
- In Command: Lt. Col, D. Davies
. Major G.H, Gwyther (2i/c)
15th RWF
In Command: Lt. Col. R.C, Bell
Major H.V.R. Hodson (2i/c)
Major J, Edwards _
i6th rv;f
In Command; Lt. Col. R.J.V/, Garden
Major HeM. Richards (2i/c)
Major F.RcH. McLellan
114th INF BDE
Commander: Brig.-Gen. T.O. Harden CMG,
Bdo.Major: Capt. C.H.R.Crawshay
10th WELSH ^
In Command: Lt, Col, P.E. Ricketts MVO
Major M.A,Napier (2i/o) 
Major F.C.Coath
IJthlKELBR
In Command: Lt. Col. W.C. Gif fard DSO
Major G.D. Edwards (2i/c)
" Major C.E. Bond
14-th WELSH
In Command: Lt. Col, L.R. King
Major J.H, Hayes [2i/o) 
Major D.B. Williams
15th YŒLSH
In Command: Lt. Col, T»W. Parkinson
Major W.8.R. Cox (2i/o) 
Major J.K. Williams
* Source WO95/2539
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115th INF. BDE
CommanderÎ Brig*-Gen. H.J.Evans
Bde.Major: Capt. C.L. Veal
17th RWF
In Command: Lt.Col. J.A.Ballard
Major H.T.Walker (2i/o)
10th SWB
In Command: Lt. Col, Sir H, Greenwood Bart"*"
Major CD-Harvey (2i/c)
Major T.H. Morgan
11th 8WB
In Command: Lt. Col. J.R. Gaussen DSO
Major D,Grant Dalton (2i/o)
I6th WELSH
In Command: Lt. Col. F.H. Gaskell
\ Major F YL Smith
Major TcCochran
19thY/BL8H (PIOI^ IEERS)
In Command: Lt.Col. S.J, Wilkinson
Major A.E.S.Fennell 
Major R Lloyd George
"T Returned almost immediately to England
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. ANNEX C.
113th DTP. BDE .
OPERATION ORDER 100^
MANOEUVRES
Ref.: Sheet 36b 1/40,000
1. The Brigade Td.ll capture the enemy’s 2nd line system
vh between the points UJb-0.34c and the 3^^ line system
between the points U.4c and U#4b.
These objectives are to be regarded as strictly limited 
except that commanders should extend to their flanks to 
secure their position should the attack of troops on 
their* flank or flanks fa il, or lose direction.
2. The 2nd line system \7ill be attacked by the 13th 
battalion EWP on the right, and the l6th battalion 
RWP on the le ft.
3. This attack vdll leave the German 1st line system at
2 pm in 8 lines at 30 paces distance in accordance with 
the organisation already issued.
Pour Machine Guns will accompany the sixth line.
4. When information has been received that the above 
objective has been reached, the 14th and 15th battalions 
RdP on the right and left respectively will leave the 
German front line system in artillery formation.
Before leaving the valley in rear of the 2nd line system, 
lines will be formed (as already'’ stated), and the advance 
will move over the 2nd line system to the attack of the 
3rd line system. 4 Machine Guns will accompany this 
attack.
6. The artillery will lift 15 minutes after this attack
leaves the valley in rear of the 2nd line system.
Every means of sending this information back must be 
employed, as smoke, etc, may present the advance being 
actually seen.
7* 8 Machine Guns will be used to provide overhead fire to
support the attacks and will form a reserve in the hands 
of the Brigadier.
8. All positions gained will be consolidated. One section 
of RE will be sent forward to each battalion after it 
has gained its objective.
9. I t  is important that touch should be maintained both
laterally and from front to rear. All ranks will watch 
for runners and assist them, and fon?ard their messages 
i f  they become casualties. Runners will wear white 
aivn-bands. -
1 ^ Souncc :
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2 runners from each battalion will report for duty at 
Brigade Headquarters at 1 pm.
10. Watches will be synchronised at 10.15am at Brigade 
Headquarters, (in theory only; it will actually be 
done at the Conference at 10,15am).
11. Reports will be sent to cross roads at U,51*b.6,4«j
where Brigade Headquarters will be situated at first. 
Brigade Headquarters will be advanced as the situation 
allows.
12. Attention is directed to instructions already issued 
(BM6194).
15. The 129th Field Ambulance will establish a Dressing 
Station in MONGHY IE BRETON.
lif. Battalions taking prisoners vdll arrange to escort 
them back to Brigade Headquarters. Escorts should 
be in a strength of 1 to 10 prisoners.
15. 115th Trench Mortar Battery will send one Stokes
Gun forward in rear of each battalion.
Remainder of Battery to remain in Reserve in 1st line 
German trenches.
22nd June I916. (Sgd.) H Hodson, Major
for Brigade Major 
115th Infantry Brigade,
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ANNEX D
58th (we lsh) division ORDER No. 39
9th July 1916
1. The Division will attack îvLAJ.ŒTZ. WOOD to-morrow with a view to 
capturing the whole of it. Throughout the operation the left 
of the 114th Infantry Brigade, and the right of the 115th 
Infantry Brigade will be on the main ride running North and 
South through the MAMETZ WOOD,
The 17th Division will co-operate by bombing up QUADRAI'jG-LE 
SUPPORT and WOOD SUPPORT,
The hour of the Infantry assault on the edge of the wood will 
be 4*15 am, but all troops will be ready in position by 5 am,
2® Prom 5*50 am to 4,15 am the Artillery will bombard the Southern
portion of MAMETZ WOOD, especially the edge of the Wood J.H.G.E. 
B.A.X.
3. At 5.55 am a smoke barrage will be formed in the neighbourhood 
of STRIP TRENCH and at A.R.C.X., and will be continued for
50 minutes.
4. At 4ol5 am the Artillery will lift gradually to a barrage North 
and West of the J.P, line - D - X, maintaining a barrage on 
WOOD SUPPORT, and (under cover of the smoke barrage) the 114th 
Infantry Brigade will attack the front X.A.G., and the 113th 
Infantry Brigade will attack between G and STRIP TRENCH, pushing 
on to the first objective - a line just short of the ride running 
Fast from WOOD SUPPORT - and B.G.X. Strong points will be 
immediately made near A.B.C.X., Eastern edge of ride near the 
main central ride at X.24.0.,5*8 and at Junction o f 'WOOD TRENCH 
with STRIP TRENCH, and Eastern edge of WOOD SUPPORT.
5. At 60I5 am the Artillery barrage will lift to the line W.V.Y.O. 
and K, and the Infantry will capture and consolidate the line, 
making strong points at V.Y.O. and K.
6. At 7.15 am the Artillery barrage will be lifted to North edge of 
the V/ooa U to P, and the infantry will advance and. consolidate 
themselves inside the North edge of the Wood, making strong 
points near U.T.S.R.A. and P.
7« At 8.15 am. the Artillery barrage will be lifted on to the German 
second line.
8. Throughout the operation Machine Gun fire will be directed from 
MYiRLBORO r/OOD and CATERPILLAR vvGOD in a North Westerly direction 
against MIDDLE ALLEY" to prevent communication between the German 
second line and MAMmZ vfOOD, This area will also be kept under 
constant Artillery fire.
9. Three Heavy Trench Mortars in QUEENS NULLAH and the Medium Trench
Mortars in CLIFF TRENCH will assist the attack against STRIP 
TRENCH. Care should be taken as regards WOOD TRENCH which is 
occupied by the 17th Division up to within 50 yards of its 
junction with STRIP TRENCH.
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9o G.O.C. 115th Infantry Brigade will arrange for close and
constant communication with the Right Battalion of the 17th 
Division. A heavy mortar will be placed in position to-day 
to bombard the portion of the Wood A. B.C.X, G.O.C, 114th 
Infantry Brigade will also place light mortars to assist in 
bombarding this portion of the Wood.
10. The 124th Fd. Coy. R.E. and 2 Companies Pioneers have been
placed at the disposal of the G.O.C. 115th Inf. Brigade to make
strong points and dig a trench from STRIP TREI'ICH to CLIFF 
TRENCH. '
151st Fd. Coy. R.E. and Pioneers less two Companies are placed 
at the disposal of G.O.C. 114th Inf. Brigade to make strong 
points, and a communication trench from neighbourhood of 
CATERPILLAR YfOOD to MAÎŒTZ WOOD. 125rd Fd. Coy. R.E. will be 
in reserve at present billets (F.28.b., 1.6.)
11. The 115th Infantry Brigade less two Companies at CATERPILLAR
WOOD will be in reserve near MINDEN POST,
12. C.R.E. will arrange for necessary R.E. material being brought 
up rapidly as required from depots at QUEENS NULLAH, and 
CATERPILLAR WOOD, 115th Infantry Brigade furnishing carrying 
parties as required. DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS will be 
informed by C.R.E. of the numbers used as carriers.
15. G.O.C. 115th Inf. Brigade will form an ammunition, ration
and water depot near QUEENS NULLAH, and G.O.C. 114th Infantry 
Brigade similar depots by miTE TRENCH and CATERPILLAR WOOD.
14. All men must be carefully instructed in the compass direction 
of the advance, and of the necessity for consolidation and 
re-organisation when the vai'ious rides and edges of the wood are 
reached. Care must be taken also to instruct in the advantage 
of working up as close as possible to the edge of our Artillery 
barrage, and it should be explained to the men that Artillery fire 
will sound much louder in the wood than outside. To help the 
men in knowing which is the main central ride, G.O.C, 115th Infan­
try Brigade will arrange for a party to place red flags along it. 
25 flags will be issued to representatives of the Bde. at the
■ HALTE at 9 pm to-day,
15. Brigadiers and Battalion Commanders will ensure that adequate 
arrangements have been made for inter-communication by visual 
and runners, as well as by wire. Immediate reports will be 
sent when each objective has been gained, otherwise hourly 
reports must be furnished of the progress being made. Negative 
reports required.
(Signed) H E Pryce 
Lieut.Col.
General Staff 58th (Welsh) Division
ACKNOWLEDGE
Issued at;-5«30 p.m.
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